Ratna Naidu

Old Cities, New Predicaments

A Study of Hyderabad

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RATNA NAIDU

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For Krishna and Tulsi

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RATNA NAIDU

ONE

Decay and Discord in a Walled City

The thought of undertaking a study on old (walled) cities in India had been in my mind for quite some time. Behind this thought were the frequent Hindu–Muslim riots in recent years in Delhi, Moradabad, Meerut, Ahmedabad and Hyderabad. What struck me was that the riots always seemed to start in the walled part of these old cities and spread outward. I wondered whether the walled part of the old city, the historic core from which Muslim imperial power emanated, has today not become the last battleground of the war between the communities which divided the subcontinent. I was fascinated by the idea that possibly the Muslim-dominated walled city[1] is a victim of an eternally incomplete urban ecological cycle. The usual ecological cycle is one of competition, invasion and succession, wherein one community displaces another in an area. The Islamic walled city has always had a considerable number of Hindus who were integrated in the feudal structure. With the flight of the Muslim population after Partition, Hindus from other parts of the country migrated into these areas. However, the intrusion of Hindus in large numbers into these urban ghettos, which bear an indelible stamp of Islam, has led to friction, making the defensive minority cling on even more firmly to age-old symbolic ties.

[1] There are also walled cities which are predominantly Hindu (as in Jaipur) and Sikh (as in Amritsar) in their ecological and architectural form. However, this study concerns itself with the walled city which is a product of Muslim rule.

Apart from the ecological matrix of communal aggression, the other major question that interested me was the exploration, in theory, of the possibility of the restoration of the walled city to a viable urban form. This involved an examination of the quantum and causes of physical decay in the walled area, and investigations into the well-known fact that the development impulses of the metropolis in India have inevitably bypassed this historic core.

THE STUDY DESIGN

In this study we will use the words 'walled' city and 'inner' city interchangeably partly because, as just mentioned, the historical, census and municipal definition of the walled area was known as city *Anderun*, which corresponds linguistically to the term 'inner city'. In Western usage the term inner city refers to the urban core, the area which corresponds to the first centre of the city. In this sense, also, it is quite appropriate to use the terms 'walled city' and 'inner city' interchangeably. However, whereas in Europe and America the inner city or the urban core is the place where land values are high and which forms the centre of intense economic activity in retail trade and the service sector, the walled cities in India cannot be characterised thus. Some of the characteristics of inner cities in the West, such as intense retail trade, can be found in some walled cities in India, as in Old Delhi, but the milieu of theatres, modern shopping arcades, hotels and museums, so typical of the urban core in Europe and America, is alien to the walled city culture of India. The modern urban cores in India have not evolved out of the ancient city centres, but have emerged, more often than not, *de novo*, in new areas.

Congestion and heavy traffic in Hyderabad have necessitated the dismantling of most of the six-mile-long wall that gave the city of the Qutub Shahis and the Asaf Jahis (the Nizams) protection and a definite boundary. Of the original 12 gates, the remnants of only two still survive. However, the erstwhile walled area, known in official records as city *Anderun*, even now has a distinctive identity. It may be distinguished both from the old city outside the wall, known in official records as city *Berun* (outer city), and the throbbing new metropolis which stretches out to the British-initiated cantonment area.

Today, Hyderabad's city *Anderun* of medieval vintage is of interest

to urban conservationists. It is also an area in distress. The population of the erstwhile walled city lives under the shadow of communal tensions, experiencing all manner of civic disabilities for lack of urban amenities. A primary survey at the household level elicited vivid portrayals of urban deprivation in the area.

Analysis of census data provided the framework for drawing the sample for field survey. It was important to ensure that the sample was not clustered in a limited area and that it did not reflect a disproportionate representation of any one community. It was essential to have a fair representation of the Hindu and the Muslim communities from all areas in the walled city. Consequently, a stratified random sample was drawn.

With a population of 240, 962[2] in 36,798 households, the walled city comprises wards 20, 21, 22 and 23. These four wards consist of 28 blocks and 370 enumerator blocks. The term 'enumerator block' denotes houses that cover the length of a street, which are allotted to the census investigator. We obtained full lists of enumerator blocks from the electoral rolls.[3] The 370 enumerator blocks were then divided into three groups according to the proportion of Hindus and Muslims living in each of them.

The first group of enumerator blocks consists of households all of which belong to either Hindu or Muslim communities. Thus 100 per cent of the households in each enumerator block of this group belong to one or the other community. The second group of enumerator blocks has 70 to 90 per cent of the households belonging to one or the other community. In these enumerator blocks, therefore, one or the other community dominates. In the third group of enumerator blocks, no more than 60 per cent of the households belong to one or the other community. There is therefore, a balanced mix of both communities living on these streets.

After classifying all the enumerator blocks in the walled city into these three groups, 20 per cent of the enumerator blocks from each group were selected by drawing chits randomly. This yielded 74 enumerator blocks, which were felt to be sufficient for the selection

[2] The population count of ward-wise data from 1981 gave us a figure of 240,681. However, the census data on migration, mortality and birth rate is from a different survey and the population count there is 240,962. The negligible difference between the two figures is being ignored for the purposes of this study.

[3] The source for electoral rolls are census enumerators. Since it is easier to have access to electoral rolls, the lists of households were obtained from them.

of sample households. Every third house number in each of these blocks was chosen through systematic random sampling. The investigators were given these house numbers and instructed to conduct interviews in the first household in the house—if the house numbers happened to apply to more than one household. Some of the 1,500 households thus selected had to be dropped because, for one reason or another, interviews could not be held in them. Thus finally, the survey covered 1,031 households, which is approximately 3 per cent of the total households in the walled city.

The main objective of the questionnaire was to document the socio–economic attributes of the residents of the walled city, including an assessment of Gulf employment, of the urban/civic processes as perceived by them, and information on the communal question. I was particularly interested in eliciting how living space and facilities are shared both by members of households and by households sharing a house.

The problem of the walled city was identified as one of congestion (inadequate facilities in the house and inadequate infrastructure in the mohalla) rather than density. Indeed, density is the highest in two wards in Secunderabad rather than in the old city of Hyderabad. The conceptual distinction between congestion and density is important from the point of view of policy. Compulsions of congestion in the walled city, where spatial arrangements reflect the social structure of a feudal era, have implications which are much more complex compared to congestion elsewhere in the metropolis.

Imposing facades along primary and secondary streets which are limited in extension, the extensive but closed circulatory streets and chowks within mohallas, the low-rise, densely-packed houses in the mohallas opening out into spacious inner courtyards, the mixed and intense land-use patterns in the walled city, all these constitute problems of congestion which tend to be intractable. Widening the roads, laying new sewerage lines along narrow lanes and renovating buildings are not only expensive in terms of compensatory payments but also require sensitivity to the emotional and cultural needs of the local people as well as the need to conserve historical–cultural styles. Urban renewal and tackling the problem of congestion in the walled city therefore demand more than the usual level of expertise. The attempt in this study is to look at the roots of congestion and its many dimensions in the walled city, so as to present a clear analysis relevant to policy formulation.

The other major point from the perspective of policy is the problem of dilapidated and old buildings. The questionnaire distinguished between 'blight' and 'slum'. The two, that is, dilapidation/blight and slum formation, are outcomes of different forces. Dilapidation is the result of socio–economic and cultural factors in the walled city, whereas slums are the outcome of demographic pull and push in the region and, to some extent, the politics of slum identification. With national and international funding flowing in to alleviate the problem of the urban slum dweller, there are vote banks and vested interests in getting an area recognised as a slum. These forces were explicitly taken into account when designing the survey of the walled city. This recognition has paid off in that we have now a clearer picture of the contrast between the downwardly mobile, respectable but economically stagnant population that lives in dilapidated housing, and the more dynamic, migrant slum dwellers: they differ in terms of median income, education, type of occupation as well as educational and occupational aspirations and life-styles.

In the walled city, dilapidation and blight are rooted in what is technically known in the literature as the phenomenon of 'multiple deprivation'. Multiple deprivation is a series of correlated, cross-cutting deprivations which often compound one another.[4] In the social science literature, this vicious cycle of multiple deprivation of, for instance, poor education and training, low income, poor diet and poor hygienic conditions leading to low efficiency and ability to enhance incomes, is analytically applied to understand poverty at the individual, community and class levels. This is the classic 'interlocking series of cycles of deprivation'.[5] However, the concept of multiple deprivation in the walled city should be applied (as is more usual in urban studies) on an area basis. Due to certain historical and cultural factors which will be discussed in the next chapter, the walled city area has been deprived of the developmental impulses which propel the metropolis.

Deprived of economic opportunities with the dismantling of the feudal structure, and deprived of its elite, who are usually the powerful

[4] Hamnet, Chris, 'Area-based Explanations: A Critical Appraisal' in Herbert, D.T., and David M. Smith, *Social Problems and the city: Geographical Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 152.

[5] Cullingworth, J.B., *Problems of an Urban Society, Vol.II, The Social Content of* Planning, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972, p. 77; also quoted in Hamnet, *ibid*, p. 152.

spokesmen for the enhancement of civic amenities, the walled city as an area languishes in multiple deprivation. To the economic and civic deprivations must also be added deprivation which accrues from the alienation of communities from each other, resulting in frequent communal riots. Thus we find in the walled city the classic syndrome wherein the 'different types of deprivation mesh into one another to create, for those who must endure them, a total situation shot through and through by one level of deprivation after another'.[6] The sample survey tried to cover the many facets of this multiple deprivation.

It is, of course, difficult to elicit information on the communal question through the questionnaire method. In any case it is futile to try and establish the socio-eonomic attributes of the communalist in an area where communal conflict is as pervasive as it is in the walled city. We were more interested in the impact frequent riots had on the migration plans of the mohalla residents, or how they organised themselves during riot periods, and so on. We also had a series of questions on processions, since it is our experience that processions very often lead to communal conflict. We were thus able to identify the persons among our respondents who actively participate in processions, and to tabulate their socio-economic characteristics. We found that they are not always people who, according to us, are communal in their attitudes.

In addition to the questionnaire survey, we did an on-the-ground survey of all mosques and temples in the walled city. Our study, which allowed a comparison with a similar survey undertaken in 1917, was concerned with the analysis of the juxtaposition of procession routes, location of religious places, conflict-prone locations and majority/minority areas in the walled city.The Office of the Commissioner of Police in Hyderabad provided us data on the starting, convergence and the termination points of the major religious procession routes in the city. They also provided us with information on what they term as communal clash-points and sensitive areas.

Our enquiries on the communal problem were thus at two levels. First, we enquired into the specific causai factors in the communalisation of the walled city psyche. The causal factors lay in the propaganda used in the competition for vote banks, all of which have become

[6] This is another description of multiple deprivation taken from Coates, K. and R. Silburn, *Poverty: The Forgotten Englishman*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970; and quoted in Hamnet, *ibid*, p. 252.

increasingly community-based due to the emergence of communal parties. The communal parties in turn have been given a boost by the transformation of Muslim-dominated constituencies into electorates comprising near-equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims. The increasing use of religious platforms for political propaganda has in turn triggered off revivalist/fundamentalist trends.

This brings us to the second level of our enquiry: the phenomenon of religious and cultural revivalism. We attempted an analysis of processions and the quantum increase in religious places, covering the types of major processions, their routes, the culture of processions and participation in them. The location of religious places and conflict zones in the context of majority and minority areas were also taken into account. We present our analysis in Chapter 7: 'Institutionalisation of Communal Politics.'

The survey data on all these aspects were strengthened by the collection of secondary data from the office of the Urban Community Development Project of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH), the Drainage Investigation Division of the MCH, Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Works, the Planning Office and Traffic Cell of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, and, of course, the census. A demographic profile of the walled area could be drawn from data obtained from the office of the census authorities in Hyderabad. An analysis of community-wise data from 1951 onwards was also undertaken. 1951 is a crucial year since the transfer of power during the period immediately preceding it and the integration of the Hyderabad State with India dislocated the people and disturbed the existing demographic pattern of the walled city. Apart from community-wise population and migration data from 1951 to 1981, data on *kaccha* and *pucca*[7] housing and community-wise occupation was also collected for the same years.

It was possible to get information on all the slums in the twin cities from the Urban Community Development Project Office. This data

[7] A *pucca* house is one which has its walls and roof made of the following materials: Wall material: burnt bricks, stone (packed with lime or cement), concrete or timber. Roof material: tiles, galvanised corrugated iron sheets, asbestos cement sheets, reinforced brick concrete, reinforced cement concrete and timber.

A *kaccha* house is one which has its walls and roof made of materials other than those used for *pucca* houses, such as unburnt bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, reeds, thatch, loosely packed stone and so on. See *Instructions to Enumerators for Filling Up The Household Scheduled and Individual Slip*, New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner for India, 1981, p. 5.

was used together with our primary survey on blight, and the analysis is presented in Chapter 6: 'Blight/Dilapidation and Slum Formation'. Data was collected from the Drainage Investigation Division of the MCH and the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Works. Since disposal of sewerage is a major problem in the walled city, we decided to do a detailed case study of one sewerage district, extending from Khilwat in ward 20 through Ghansi Bazar in ward 21 and terminating in the main sewerage pipe running along the south bank of the river. Our analysis revealed one of the many dimensions of infrastructure overload in the walled city: it is presented in Chapter 4: 'Dimensions of Congestion.'

Aside from data obtained from the Deputy Inspector of Schools, Darulshifa Range, Hyderabad, primary information on all schools, both private and government, was collected for this study. The report on the physical infrastructure of schools is also given in Chapter 4, and the report on the medium of instruction, drop-outs and the socio-economic aspects of the school system is presented in Chapter 5: 'Socio-Economic Survey of the Walled City.'

The policy implications which flow from our analysis are presented in the context of an assessment of the local administrative authorities in the area. Besides the Municipal Corporation and the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority there is also the Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development Authority, a registered society, which was created in response to the frequent riots and communal tensions in the old city. All these organisations are responsible for ameliorating the civic problems which trouble the residents of the walled city. Chapter 8, 'Local Administration and Policy Dilemmas,' analyses the functioning of these organisations.

TWO

Profile of the Walled City

The Muslims from the north came to the Deccan as early as 1249 AD, and the Golconda Fort, built by the Rajas of Warangal, was surrendered to the Bahamanis, the Muslim kings of Gulbarga, in 1364 AD. High cultural mix or heterogeneity has thus been distinctive of Hyderabad's population since very early times.

The founders of Hyderabad were the Qutub Shahis, the first of whom was the Viceroy of the Bahamanis of Gulbarga. For centuries Islam-based orthogenetic culture forces dominated the city's landscape, although this dominance was amalgamated with native Telugu culture. Much later, during the Asaf Jahi period, the cultural influences of migrant groups from other regions in India, and indeed also from countries outside India, penetrated the walled city (city *Anderun*) of Hyderabad.

These cultural groups, most of which migrated to Hyderabad about two centuries ago, still continue to occupy the same areas in the walled city. The architectural style and building facades of these culture zones are therefore distinctive, as are the life-styles of the people who live in them. The places where these ethnic groups first settled continue to act as a nucleus for further settlement. Their settlement patterns in Hyderabad's walled city show remarkable stability.

Prominent among these ethnic groups are the Arabs, the Marathas, the Marwaris, the Bohras, the Kayasths and the Khatris, aside from the two major Islamic sects, the Shias and the Sunnis. The Arabs and the Marathas were recruited in the Nizam's army when Aurangabad

was the capital, and they moved to Hyderabad with the Nizam when he shifted there. In fact, Arab troops (as also Pathan mercenaries) were employed as bodyguards by bankers and 'almost all men of any standing in the city, to protect their interests'[1]. The Bohras and the Marwaris were business communities who came to Hyderabad from Gujarat and Rajasthan respectively. The Kayasths and the Khatris, who came mostly from north India, occupied vital positions in the Nizam's administration.

Of the two Muslim sects, the Shias held high administrative posts while the mass of the Sunnis belonged to a lower socio-economic strata, despite the fact that some of the Nizams were also Sunnis. The Sunnis are descendants of the Sayeds, Shaiks, Mughals and Pathans, many of whom were immigrants from north India. Many of them are also descendants of Hindus converted to Islam. The Shias, however, came mainly from Persia. The Golconda rulers were Shias who maintained cordial trade relations with Persia which followed the same faith. Many of the Shias who came to Golconda settled down in the walled city. Other distinguished Shia families came to Hyderabad via Bijapur, such as the Salar Jungs who served the Adil Shahi dynasty. In fact, one of the forefathers of Salar Jung, Shaik Mohammad Ali, was invited to become Prime Minister to the Adil Shahis of Bijapur.

Originally, the walled city was spread around the old trade route which connected the fortress of Golconda to the port of Masulipatnam. A second major road connected the settlements to regions in the north and the south. Thus were formed the four quadrants of settlements along the four directions of the cross-cutting roads, with the culture groups described in the preceding paragraphs occupying specific areas in each quadrant. These quadrants consist of the now-declining palaces and havelis (mansions), and the mohallas which grew around them. The mohallas are characterised by low-rise, densely-packed houses, accessible only through narrow lanes which often terminate in *cul de sacs*.

During the Qutub Shahi rule each quadrant was set apart for a particular social class of the people. The north-western quadrant was occupied by royal palaces and state offices. The north-eastern quadrant was reserved for the nobles, and the southern quadrants were occupied by jagirdars and other important officials. This pattern

[1] Leonard, Karen, 'Banking Firms in Nineteenth Century Hyderabad Politics' in *Modern Asian Studies*, 15, 2, 1981, pp. 177–220.

changed during the Asaf Jahi rule. Though there was no strict division of housing in terms of social class, one finds that the palaces of the rulers and Paigah nobles were situated in the south-western quadrant. The Marwaris and the Bohras settled in the western corner of this quadrant, in Hussaini Alam (Old Kabutar Khana), to facilitate their financial transactions with the nobility. In the north-eastern quadrant was the Purani Haveli palace of the Nizam and palaces of such nobles as Salar Jung (the Dewan Deodi) who belonged to the Shia community. This area therefore became a nucleus for Shias of all classes.

The jagirdars chose to settle in the north-western quadrant, although some parts of it, like Mitti Ka Sher, were occupied by rich Marwari merchants and came to be known as the takshal area. There was a further infiltration of Marwaris into this area after 1930, when the Pathergatti commercial complex was built. With the mass outmigration of the Muslim elite after 1948, many of the palaces in the area were bought by Marwaris who later rebuilt them in their own ethnic style. Latticed woodwork, typical of Rajasthan, characterises the facades of buildings here, with forms of gods and goddesses like Lakshmi, Ganesh and Hanuman decorating the front entrances.

The Marwari takeover of Muslim property in the Pathergatti–Ricabgunj area continued steadily after the late 1940s—a trend which stopped only in 1982, when riots became frequent in the walled city. Thus the census data for 1981 (see map on 'Ethnic Settlements') shows that Ricabgunj, a once Muslim-dominated area, has had a sizeable increase in Marwari population in recent times, from 88 in 1971 to 1,202 in 1981.

In the later stages of Asaf Jahi rule, a part of the south-eastern quadrant was occupied by the palaces of the Prime Minister, Sir Kishen Pershad Bahadur. Bordering this quadrant was land given to some of the regiments in the Nizam's army. The Arabs and the Marathas settled here, the former in Barkas (local pronunciation of 'barracks') and the latter in the Shah Ali Banda and Brahmin Wadi (now Gowlipura) localities respectively. A second stream of Maratha migrants, who came decades later, were engaged in setting up factories and the banking business. They too settled in the Shah Ali Banda and Brahmin Wadi localities but later, after 1911, some of the families moved north across the Musi to the Sultan Bazar area.

The Arabs, on the other hand, have continued to live in Barkas for centuries. Indeed, the opening up of opportunities in the Gulf

countries during the 1970s, and extensive travel to and from the Gulf countries have consolidated Arab ethnic identity in the area. Once again, this is reflected in the style of building renovation and the cultural change in the life-styles of the people that were set in motion by the Gulf boom. Onion-shaped domes and elegant arches typically decorate the facades of buildings in this area.

The palaces of the Kayasths and the Khatris, who had a high status and formed the backbone of the administration, became the focal point for the settlement of other members of their communities. For example, the famous Malwalla palace on the road leading towards Kotla Alijah from Charminar, which belonged to the Kayasth family of Raja Shiraj Dharmavant, became the focal point for the settlement of most Kayasth Mathur families (see map on 'Ethnic Settlements'). They settled around Chowk Maidan Khan, Ali Jah Kotla, Kooche Shadilal areas. Among the Khatris, the most famous was Maharaja Chandulal whose baradari (twelve-door palace) was situated beyond the Doodh Bowli darwaza. Later, his great granddaughter's son, Maharaja Kishen Pershad, built his beautiful palace near Shah Ali Banda. Even now, most of the Khatri families that have not migrated to the northern half of the city reside near Doodh Bowli and Shah Ali Banda.

The scheduled caste and tribe communities reside at the edges of the walled city. This pattern of lower castes occupying the outer edges of a built-up area is common throughout India. Some of these border settlements are well-known slums, such as Pardiwada near Puranapool, Mehtarwadi near Sultan Shahi and Nallapochamma Basti near Darushifa. These slums have now been in existence for more than 30 years. Interestingly, slums with a Muslim preponderance, such as the Macca Masjid and Damika Bagh slums and Jagdish Huts, are located in the inner core of the area and first made their appearance around the palaces.

There were 1,200 *devdis* in the walled city by the middle of the seventeenth century. A *devdi* consisted of either a number of separate buildings set in gardens and courtyards, or of a single extensive building made up of successive quadrangles, each containing a courtyard with gardens. Each *devdi* was surrounded by high walls and often the outer faces of these walls were either let out to shops or housed the dwellings of the common people. In the spaces between *devdis*, which acted as nuclei, were the more modest dwellings made of tiles and mud houses. These were the mohallas of the artisans,

minions and soldiers. Business activity was confined to the two main arterial roads and continues to be so even today.

A century ago, 1,23,675 people (1881 census) lived in the walled area which extended over the same 2.5 square miles as it does today. Nine years ago, the number of people living there was 2,40,962 (1981 census). Thus the population almost doubled in these hundred years. There is also a simultaneous doubling of density figures. The 1881 figure of 77 persons per acre shot up to 178 persons per acre in 1981. Further details on increasing density in the walled city and its implications for congestion will be discussed in the next chapter.

Here we shall confine ourselves to presenting a profile of the city's population characteristics derived from census data. Our starting point is 1951, the census year immediately after the dismantling of the Nizam's domain, when there were 3,19,028 people living in the walled area. The Muslims formed the majority community, comprising 69 per cent of the population (see map on 'Population Growth: Hindus and Muslims'). The Hindus constituted 25 per cent and the rest (Jains, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and others) formed 5 per cent of the total population[2]. In 1961, the population in the same area was reduced to 1,62,955. Thus during the decade 1951 to 1961, the population of the walled city experienced a negative growth rate, that is −6.50 per cent per annum (Table 2.1), reflecting the turmoil of the years immediately following the integration of Nizam's Hyderabad state with India.

This negative growth rate was due more to out-migration than to lack of natural increase in population which, in fact, was 0.95 per cent per annum (Table 2.2). There seems to have been a mass exodus of population, especially of the Muslims who constituted 73 per cent of the total population which migrated out of the area during 1951–61 (Table 2.3). From 69 per cent in 1951, the Muslim population thus shrank to about 55 per cent in 1961. The population of communities other than Hindus also declined, from 5 per cent in 1951 to one per cent in 1961. However, the Hindu presence increased from 25 per cent to 45 per cent. Thus, while the growth rate per annum

[2] The classification of the census data on communities in this report is different from what is usually published in census reports. The data was taken in this form from the local Directorate of Census Operations. We took into account the size and the importance of the role of these communities in the walled city. For instance, Kayasthas and Marwaris are not usually reported separately in census reports. We have taken the data in this form so as to give due weightage to the importance of these communities in the walled city.

Table 2.1
Community-wise Population: Size and Growth Rates, 1951–81

		Population								*Growth Rates (per cent)*		
		1951		*1961*		*1971*		*1981*		*'51–61*	*'61–71*	*'71–81*
		No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*			
1.0	Muslims	2,20,613	69.15	89,080	54.66	1,16,266	54.61	1,47,791	61.33	–8.67	2.70	2.43
1.1	Shia	68,704	21.53	9,078	5.57	12,541	5.89	8,641	3.59	–18.32	3.28	–3.66
1.2	Sunni	1,51,909	47.62	80,002	49.09	1,03,725	48.72	1,39,150	57.74	–6.21	2.63	2.98
2.0	Hindus	81,889	25.67	72,776	44.66	94,117	44.21	91,528	37.98	–1.17	2.60	–0.28
2.1	Other Hindus	65,734	20.60	64,495	39.58	83,036	39.00	87,521	36.32	–0.19	2.56	0.53
2.2	Marwari	8,117	2.55	7,374	4.53	9,405	4.42	3,626	1.50	–0.96	2.46	–9.09
2.3	Kayasth	8,038	2.52	907	0.55	1,676	0.79	381	0.16	–19.60	6.33	–13.77
3.0	Others	16,526	5.18	1,099	0.67	2,526	1.18	1,643	0.69	–23.74	8.68	–4.21
3.1	Jain	6,541	2.05	431	0.26	1,448	0.68	423	0.18	–23.81	12.88	–11.58
3.2	Sikh	3,379	1.06	462	0.28	688	0.32	461	0.19	–18.04	4.06	–3.93
3.3	Buddhist	1,497	0.47	20	0.01	47	0.02	0	0.00	–35.05	8.92	0.00
3.4	Christian	5,109	1.60	166	0.10	320	0.15	722	0.30	–29.01	6.78	8.48
3.5	Miscellaneous	—	—	20	0.01	23	0.01	37	0.02	—	1.41	4.87
	Total	3,19,028	100.00	1,62,955	100.00	2,12,909	100.00	2,40,962	100.00	–6.50	2.71	1.25

Notes: 1. In 1951, wards 20, 21, 22, 23 had 4, 4, 8 and 5 blocks respectively and these increased to 7, 7, 8 and 6 blocks respectively after 1961. This increase in the number of blocks resulted from reorganisation of blocks and change in boundaries and not from increase in the total area. Therefore ward boundaries remained the same.

2. Growth rate has been calculated on the basis of natural increase and migration increase in population.

$$\text{Growth Rate (r)} = \frac{Y_t}{Y_o}^{\frac{1}{t}} - 1;$$

where Y_t: terminal year population, Y_o: base year population, t: time period.

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

Table 2.2
Community-wise Population and Natural Increase (NI) Growth Rate, 1951–81

Community	Population (numbers)						Natural Increase Growth Rate (per cent)		
	1951	*1951 + NI*	*1961*	*1961 + NI*	*1971*	*1971 + NI*	*'51–61*	*'61–71*	*'71–81*
1.0 Muslims	2,20,613	2,43,830	89,080	1,60,193	1,16,266	1,40,745	1.01	1.77	1.93
1.1 Shia	68,704	76,460	9,078	10,565	12,541	15,166	1.08	1.53	1.92
1.2 Sunni	1,51,909	1,67,370	80,002	95,628	1,03,725	1,25,579	0.97	1.80	1.93
2.0 Hindus	81,889	89,318	72,776	85,309	94,117	1,13,971	0.87	1.60	1.93
2.1 Other Hindus	65,734	72,435	64,495	75,919	83,036	1,00,570	0.98	1.64	1.93
2.2 Marwari	8,117	8,547	7,374	8,367	9,405	11,377	0.52	1.27	1.92
2.3 Kayasth	8,038	8,336	907	1,023	1,676	2,024	0.37	1.21	1.91
3.0 Others	16,526	17,351	1,099	1,252	2,526	3,025	0.49	1.31	1.82
3.1 Jain	6,541	6,896	431	480	1,448	1,752	0.53	1.08	1.92
3.2 Sikh	3,379	3,539	462	524	688	826	0.46	1.27	1.85
3.3 Buddhist	1,497	1,553	20	20	47	50	0.37	0.00	0.62
3.4 Christian	5,109	5,363	166	208	320	374	0.49	2.28	1.57
3.5 Miscellaneous	—	—	20	20	23	23	—	—	—
Total	3,19,028	3,50,499	1,62,955	1,92,754	2,12,909	2,57,741	0.95	1.69	1.93

Note: Natural Increase growth rate, $g = \frac{P_o + NI^{\,1/10}}{P_o} - 1$; where P_o: Base year population, and NI: birth minus deaths over the decade.

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

Table 2.3
Percentage Distribution of In-migration and Outmigration, Walled City, 1951–81

Community	*In-migration*			*Outmigration*		
	1951–61	*1961–71*	*1971–81*	*1951–61*	*1961–71*	*1971–81*
1.0 Muslims	36.15	56.37	57.54	73.33	63.66	43.64
2.0 Hindus	56.14	38.25	40.14	19.48	31.92	53.25
3.0 Others	7.71	5.38	2.32	7.20	4.22	3.11
All communities	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

was –8.67 per cent for Muslims and –1.17 per cent (Table 2.1) for Hindus during 1951–61, the rate of natural increase was 0.87 per cent and 1.01 per cent per annum for Hindus and Muslims respectively, indicating a slightly higher rate of natural increase among Muslims.

We do not have any data on the socio–economic class of the out-migrants. Those troubled times must have forced people from all classes to move in search of security and livelihood. However, one may safely assume that a greater proportion of those who occupied high positions in the Nizam's administration and the *jagirdari* system must have felt the compulsion to move. The same class of people also had the financial means and elite network to ease their transition to greener pastures.[3] There is no doubt that there must have been a mass exodus of the Muslim elite from the walled area during 1951–61. The Shias, who had held high positions in the previous administration, seem to have almost disappeared from the census map.[4] During 1951–61, the Shia population of the walled city decreased from 22 per cent to 6 per cent, and now constitutes only 4 per cent (1981 census data) of the entire population (Table 2.1). Many migrated to Pakistan while others moved north, especially to Lucknow and other places in Uttar Pradesh. Some from the highest elite level were absorbed in the Indian governmental machinery.

[3] A telling illustration is the fact that the direct descendant of the Nizam now lives in Australia.

[4] There exists the possibility of a lower estimate of Shia population. One of the census monographs reports, 'Shias are permitted by the religious doctrine of *taqiah* (guarding one's self), to conceal their sectarian affiliation in order to secure immunity from persecution by others. At present, however, it would seem that more cordial relations exist between Shias and Sunnis and Shias reveal their identity far more readily.' See, *A Monograph on Moharram in Hyderabad City*, Series 2, Andhra Pradesh, Census of India, 1971, p.25.

With the flight of Muslims from the walled city during 1951–61, there was an invasion of Hindus into the area. The prices of land and buildings must have fallen during those uncertain times, and the Hindus, more confident of the future, took advantage of this fact and invested in them. Thus the proportion of Hindu immigrants into the walled city during 1951–61 was 56 per cent of the total immigrants (Table 2.3) and their proportion in the population increased from 21 per cent to 40 per cent during the decade (Table 2.1).

Our survey shows that 72 per cent of the total Hindu first-generation migrant households came after 1951, and that a large number of them came to do business (see Chapter 5). The survey also reveals that many of them came from places in North India and from as far away as Gujarat, Rajasthan and Haryana.

We know from the literature that elsewhere in the world this classic pattern of out-migration of one ethnic group and invasion of the inner city by another usually results in 'succession', whereby the culture and character of the inner city evolves into a new pattern. This did not happen in Hyderabad. As can be seen in Table 2.3, not only is there a dramatic reversal of population trends during 1961–71 as compared to the previous decade (the trend of overall negative growth rate was reversed) but the proportion of immigrants to the walled city, who are mostly Muslims, begins to increase, and continues to do so until the 1981 census.

In comparison, the immigration of Hindus during the last two decades declined while out-migration showed an upward swing (Table 2.3). The trend depicts the flight of the lower classes of the minority community from the districts to the safe haven of the walled city identified with the symbols of Islamic culture. Indeed, the walled city in Hyderabad as elsewhere in India (Delhi, Ahmedabad, Moradabad and so on) has become the last battle-ground of the Hindu–Muslim conflict that divided the subcontinent three decades earlier. The hardening of conflict between the communities and the frequent riots which characterise the walled city will be explained in a later chapter.

As already discussed, between 1961 and 1971, there was a dramatic reversal of population trends as compared to the previous decade. The growth rate per annum increased to 2.71 per cent. The population increased to 2,12,909, with the proportion of Muslims and Hindus standing at 55 and 44 per cent respectively. Growth due to natural increase was slightly higher: 1.60 per cent per annum for

Table 2.4
Community-wise In-migration and its Origin, 1951–81

Community	Period	Place of Origin: Outside Walled City		District within State		Other States in India		Foreign Countries*		Total In-migration	
		No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
1.0 Muslims	1951–61	5,310	45.47	4,352	37.27	1,608	13.77	408	3.49	11,678	100.00
	1961–71	1,662	7.72	12,184	56.57	194	0.91	7,498	34.81	21,538	100.00
	1971–81	11,893	19.92	27,386	45.88	8,843	14.81	11,575	19.39	59,697	100.00
2.0 Hindus	1951–61	8,643	47.66	5,963	32.73	3,461	19.08	96	0.53	18,136	100.00
	1961–71	4,330	29.63	8,564	58.60	1,669	11.42	52	1.87	14,615	100.00
	1971–81	13,123	31.51	22,570	54.19	5,178	12.43	778	1.87	41,649	100.00
3.0 Others	1951–61	502	20.14	836	33.55	829	33.27	325	13.04	2,492	100.00
	1961–71	522	25.41	304	14.80	1,157	56.33	71	3.46	2,054	100.00
	1971–81	723	30.05	830	34.50	754	31.34	99	4.11	2,406	100.00
All Communities	1951–61	14,455	44.74	11,124	34.43	5,898	18.26	829	2.57	32,306	100.00
	1961–71	6,514	17.05	21,052	55.10	3,020	7.90	7,621	19.95	38,207	100.00
	1971–81	25,739	24.81	50,786	48.95	14,775	14.24	12,452	12.00	1,03,752	100.00

* This also refers to Indians working in another country who have come back or may just be visiting.

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

Hindus and 1.77 for Muslims (Table 2.4). The overall growth rate was almost the same (2.60 for Hindus and 2.70 for Muslims) for the two communities (Table 2.1).

In 1981 the population numbered 2,40,962 and the growth rate between 1971–81 was 1.25 per cent per annum (Table 2.1), which is slightly less than that of the previous decade. The natural increase between 1961–71, as has been mentioned earlier, was 1.69 per cent per annum and this increased further to 1.93 per cent per annum between 1971 and 1981.

In 1981 the proportion of Muslims in the walled city's population was 61 per cent with the Hindus comprising 38 per cent (Table 2.1). The rate of natural increase of both communities was identical during 1971–81, that is, 1.93 per cent per annum. However, due to out-migration the Hindus had an overall negative growth rate of −0.28 per cent per annum, whereas the Muslims showed a growth rate of 2.43 per cent per annum, due mostly to increase in immigration (Table 2.3) into the walled area.

The population data from 1951 to 1981 as depicted in Tables 2.1 to 2.5, affirms the same overall trend, which may be summarised as follows:

Between 1951 and 1961 there was outmigration of (presumably upper class) Muslims in the wake of the transfer of power and the consequent disturbances in the walled city. There was a simultaneous immigration of Hindus (Table 2.3) and a greater proportion of this immigration was from the immediate vicinity of the walled city (Table 2.4). There was a slight decrease in the population of other communities such as Jains, Sikhs, Christians and Buddhists (Table 2.1). After 1961 and until 1981 there has been a decrease in Hindu immigration and a proportionate increase in their outmigration, with the opposite trend discernible among the Muslims (Table 2.3). The outmigration of Jains, Marwaris, and so on, also increased after 1961. In fact, the Buddhists who numbered 1,497 in 1951, seem to have moved out entirely by 1981, and the Jains, who were 6,541 in number, were reduced to 423 in 1981 (Table 2.1). Whereas the immigration into the walled area between 1951 and 1961 was from other parts of the city, from 1961 onwards it has been substantially more from the districts (Table 2.5).

Thus in recent years, the erstwhile walled area seems to have begun to conform to the popular image of the ghetto, consisting increasingly of one ethnic community and that, too, of its most deprived classes. In Chapter 4 we will describe the socio–economic

Table 2.5
Community-wise Outmigration and its Destination 1951–81

Community	Period	Place of Origin: Outside Walled City		District within State		Other States in India		Foreign Countries*		Total In-migration	
		No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
1.0 Muslims	1951–61	38,228	19.55	1,27,680	65.28	27,968	14.30	1,705	0.87	1,95,581	100.00
	1961–71	1,346	11.64	3,305	28.58	27	0.23	6,886	59.55	11,564	100.00
	1971–81	16,898	32.13	14,465	27.51	8,711	16.57	12,511	23.79	52,585	100.00
2.0 Hindus	1951–61	11,467	22.07	29,627	57.03	10,614	20.43	240	0.46	51,948	100.00
	1961–71	3,344	57.67	1,835	31.64	445	7.67	175	3.12	5,799	100.00
	1971–81	23,700	36.94	17,645	27.50	14,496	22.59	8,322	12.97	64,163	100.00
3.0 Others	1951–61	4,132	21.53	8,930	46.52	5,329	27.76	804	4.19	19,195	100.00
	1961–71	495	61.64	90	11.21	198	24.66	20	2.49	803	100.00
	1971–81	1,302	34.75	1,100	29.36	1,021	27.25	324	8.65	3,747	100.00
All communities	1951–61	53,827	20.18	1,66,237	62.33	43,911	16.46	2,749	1.03	2,66,724	100.00
	1961–71	5,185	28.54	5,230	28.79	670	3.69	7,081	38.98	18,166	100.00
	1971–81	41,900	34.77	33,210	27.56	24,228	20.10	21,157	17.56	1,20,495	100.00

* This also refers to Indians who are employed in foreign countries. The impact of Gulf employment can be seen in this column in the proportionate increase during the 1961–71 decade relative to 1951–61.

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

attributes of the communities residing in the walled city. Here, we might mention that while the wall of this ghetto has disappeared, the mental walls separating the communities seem to continue to multiply.[5] Whereas different communities lived alongside each other for centuries, their ritual and cultural life is today much more intense and potent with mutual conflict. There is fear, but also, especially among the minority community, a zealous defence of the community's way of life, and indeed, even the feeling that the spatial rights of the community must be defended. During fieldwork we came across enclaves of Muslims surrounded by Hindu mohallas. Many of the families in these enclaves had been evacuated in the wake of riots and settled in the new city. But the houses have not been entirely vacated; one or two young male members have remained behind, feeling that unless they defend their spatial rights, the entire area may be taken over by Hindus. The walled city during this last decade has been a troubled area, frequently torn by riots. The Hindus have felt free to move out to untroubled areas. But the Muslims, tied to the sentiments and symbols of the area, seem to have rooted themselves even more deeply in the city *Anderun*.

[5] Here reference is being made to Louis Wirth's classic study, *The Ghetto*, wherein he says that 'the ghetto though a physical fact, is more a state of the mind,' See Wirth Louis, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1928, p. 8.

THREE

Roots of Congestion

In this study, the distinction between the concepts of congestion and density is important.[1] When physical infrastructure is not commensurate with density, the inevitable consequence is congestion. Density or clustering of activities and people takes place to facilitate efficiency and economy in communication and transportation, and the optimal utilisation of space. The orderly evolution of density in space, however, requires a certain level of technology and also planning and regulation. An absence of these may lead to congestion, a situation which implies an overloading of facilities, or in other words, a violation of the technical norms of usage. Indeed, the orderly evolution of density in space may be retarded or facilitated depending on the type of technology, planning and regulation which has guided the city structure in its initial stages. As we shall show later in this chapter, there are congenital problems of congestion built into the principles which guide the structure of Islamic cities.

Applying the analytical distinction between congestion and density to the walled city of Hyderabad and the high-density areas of Secunderabad, one finds that wards 3,4,7 and 8 of Secunderabad municipal

[1] The term congestion is routinely used in the literature on traffic engineering. Some welfare economists have also worked with this term; see for instance, Rothenberg, Jerome, 'The Economics of Population and Congestion: An Integrated View' in *The American Economic Review*, LX, 2, May, 1970, pp. 114–122; Mills, David E., 'Ownership Arrangements and Congestion-prone Facilities', *The American Economic Review*, LXXI, 3, 1981, pp. 493–502.

division, constituting the erstwhile General Bazaar area, have on an average a higher population density of 211 persons per acre compared to 184 persons per acre in the walled city area (represented by wards 20, 21, 22 and 23). One also finds that the General Bazaar area has a higher residential density, with 36 houses per acre compared to 27 per acre in the walled city. Yet, because of the adequate infrastructural facilities available, the high-density areas of Secunderabad suffer from none of the problems of congestion which plague the walled city.

One must therefore try to diagnose the malaise of congestion in order to find out why it is such a major problem in the walled city of Hyderabad. The problem of congestion may be analysed from three different perspectives.

First, congestion occurs due to the lack of adequate facilities within a house. Rooms may be overcrowded either because the size of the household is large or because the house has been partitioned to accommodate a large number of households. Thus the number of people who have to share civic amenities like water, and latrine and bathroom facilities is much larger than is optimum for their efficient use.

Second, the lack of adequate social and physical infrastructure for the people living in a particular area can also lead to congestion. When physical infrastructural facilities like sewerage, water and condition of roads, and social infrastructural facilities like schools, colleges, hospitals, parks and playgrounds are overloaded, because the demands on them are greater than they are designed to cater for, they function at a lower level of efficiency.

Third, congestion can occur due to lack of proper circulation space. Congestion is understood in traffic engineering as a flow concept, and the traffic jam is a classic example of it. A traffic jam can be described as, a situation which causes disruption and confusion, forcing an inefficient use of vehicles which have to be driven at a speed slower than that for which they are designed.

In the next chapter, the dimensions and extent of congestion in the walled city of Hyderabad will be considered from these three perspectives. The historical and structural factors which make the walled city congestion-prone are presented in this chapter.

HISTORICAL FACTORS

With the passage of time, the walled city, which was the political

and administrative capital of the Nizam's feudal rule, has lost its importance to the northern half of the city. Along with Secunderabad, this northern half has grown into a throbbing metropolis while the walled area has lapsed into decadence and neglect. The structure of the walled city—typically Islamic in terms of its fortified walls, thickly built-up area, hierarchical differentiation of public and private space, and narrow, winding streets that end in blind alleys—thwarts modern developmental impulses. Designed for a certain era with limited technology, and built for a particular culture with its own socio–economic and political parameters, it does not have the infrastructural facilities needed to support a modern population with its accompanying economic, social and cultural needs. A breakdown in the form of congestion occurs easily when such an urban system is forced to sustain a large population.

The foundation for the city of Hyderabad was laid in 1591 AD by Mohammad Quli Qutub Shah, mainly because the fortress town of Golconda had become overpopulated, congested, unhygienic and unsuitable for the growing urban population. In the area south of the Musi river, the city grew and prospered under the Qutub Shahi rulers until Aurangazeb invaded and conquered the Deccan. The consequent stagnation and decline of the city was reversed when Nizam-Ul-Mulk, the Moghul Viceroy of the Deccan, rebelled and declared himself the ruler of the Deccan.

Fortified by a surrounding wall, Hyderabad flourished under the Asaf Jahi dynasty, with increasing trade and commerce. The growth of a feudal city depends on the presence of the ruler and his nobles, who extract revenue from the peasants and artisans and expend it in the construction of palaces and other public buildings. The imposing facade and splendour of the built-up environment of the feudal city carries its own message of invincible power and authority of the feudal lineage.

The signing of the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty with the British in 1798 tilted the axis of growth towards the northern direction. The British Residency was built on the northern bank of the Musi. This shift in axis marked an important stage in the city's development because of the contrasting nature of growth on either side of the river. The growth pattern of the southern half of the city reflected a feudal economic and social structure. The structure of the city was determined by its role as the political and administrative capital of the region. Commerce was present, but it played a negligible role in

the city's development. However, the coming of the British ushered in a new phase of growth in the northern half of the city. The economic concessions granted to the British attracted merchants and bankers to the area, and the type of economy which developed was based mainly on commerce. This can be seen from the settlements which spread near the Residency Bazaar, the General Bazaar of the Secunderabad cantonment area, and later around Begum Bazaar and Afzalgunj, which became wholesale trade centres.

The growth process in the northern half of the city and in Secunderabad was thus based mainly on commercial capitalism. This process received a further boost with the coming of the railways in 1874, which cemented the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad even more firmly and halted the growth of the city south of the river. There were no modern industries in either city before 1874, but soon mechanical workshops, railways, repair shops, a mint, cotton ginning, spinning and weaving factories and a tile factory came up in the northern half of Hyderabad. These units were the harbingers of industrial growth that was to take place in the future. And it was from this period that incipient urban stagnation started in the walled city, which, until then, represented the core of the built-up area. The process of industrial growth has an inherent logic and dynamic of its own, a logic that leads to a process of urban growth which has its own momentum. Such a process of industrial expansion was missing in the walled city of Hyderabad. Urban growth was now oriented towards railway stations, goods yards, associated warehouses and industrial regions. As a result, rapid extensions of settlements occurred north of the Musi around Begum Bazaar, Chaderghat and the Residency Bazaar.

The disastrous floods of 1908 and the plague of 1911 further sealed the fate of Hyderabad's walled city. Following these events, in 1914, the ruling Nizam, Osman Ali Khan, decided to shift to the north of the river. The transfer of his residence and administrative offices from the Chow Mohalla palaces of the walled city to the King Kothi palaces in the Chaderghat area was also a recognition of the increasing importance of the northern part of the city, and the move itself gave its growth a further boost. With the Nizam's occupation of the King Kothi palace, the nobility also moved across the river to settle in the areas of Himayathnagar, Hyderguda and Banjara Hills, which soon became associated with the upper classes.

It should be pointed out here that the floods and the plague only

hastened an inevitable process. The unplanned growth in the walled city, with its densely-packed settlements, narrow, winding lanes, insanitary conditions and growth in terms of accretion around the palaces of nobles, had resulted in a pattern of land use which was unsuitable for modern industrial development. On the other hand, the vast and sprawling vacant land north of the river, the economic system based on commerce set up by the British and the presence of the railways offered ample scope for industrial development. The modernisation trend had shifted the axis of growth in the northern direction and the walled city had started to stagnate.

The integration of Hyderabad state with the Union of India dealt the final blow to the walled city by dismantling the Nizam's administration and the *jagirdari* system, thereby further hastening the flight of the elite out of the city. Large numbers of the ruling elite migrated to other countries, mostly of course, to Pakistan. The upper class Muslims were also absorbed into important positions in the north of the country by a government anxious to project a secular image.

The abolition of the *jagirdari* system resulted in the sudden disappearance of the feudal economic base, which was the main prop and source of sustenance for the inhabitants of the walled city. We have seen in the last chapter that it resulted not only in the flight of the Muslim elite but also in the influx of poorer migrants from the districts into the walled area. There was thus a certain amount of dislocation and with the collapse of the feudal system the inner city was left with no inherent dynamic to sustain itself. The strengthening of the intra–urban transportation system saved it from depopulation, but it did not generate any economic growth.

The southern half of Hyderabad, especially the walled city, was thus reduced to a residential area for the poor and middle income groups. The palaces and mansions of the nobles and other officials have now fallen into decay and blight has set in. The low income levels of the walled city inhabitants, in addition to their large family size, has led to an increase in the subdivision of houses, lack of maintenance, encroachment of open lands, litigation over property and the sharing of civic amenities between large households. Further, with the shift in the development axis and the consequent absence of elite pressure on the administration, the provision of social infrastructural facilities has been neglected. A large proportion of the population commutes to the new city for its livelihood, education,

entertainment, and so on. All these factors lead to the overuse of the existing facilities and hence increasing congestion.

Historical circumstances have thus been a major factor or cause for the increasing congestion in the inner city area.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

The second major cause of congestion in the walled city is its structure, which is typically that of an Islamic city. There is considerable debate on the concept of the Islamic city,[2] on whether the cities in the Muslim world have any important common features which could be explained in terms of Islam, or whether these are features common to all medieval cities. Whatever the merits of this debate, we found that the walled city of Hyderabad manifests certain features which are similar to those characterising cities identified with the Muslim world. These attributes are typical of Islamic cities belonging to the medieval period, with palaces, chowks, masjids, mohallas with narrow, winding streets, blind alleys and houses with internal courtyards. The hierarchical differentiation between public and private space, a principle underlying the structure of the Islamic urban form, can also be discerned in the walled city.

Most historians and sociologists differentiate between European cities and those of the Muslim world in terms of the fact that the city in Europe was always a legal entity which found expression in the institution of the municipality. The Islamic city had no legal privileges conferred by the State.[3] It was recognised as a city by virtue of its greater density of population and was governed by rules and regulations emanating directly from the state. As Grunebaun very aptly says:

> Muslim Law 'in its horror of exemptive privileges' does not concede special status to the town. The Law knows the *Umma* , the community of the faithful, which by definition is one and indivisible.[4]

[2] Hourani, A.H., 'The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research' in Hourani, A.H. and S.M. Stern, (eds), *The Islamic City*, Bruno Cassirer and University of Pennsylvania Press, Oxford, 1970.

[3] See Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, especially pages 372–373 for the concept of the city. See also G.E. Von Grunebaun, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955, the chapter on 'The Structure of the Muslim Town', pp. 141–158.

[4] Grunebaun, *ibid*, p. 152. The phrase 'in its horror of exemptive privileges' is taken from Sanvaget.

Thus the basic principles which guided the structure of the cities of the Muslim world are quite different from those of the European/western city.

It is convenient to follow Janet Abu-Lughod's [5] itemisation of these basic principles, although we may not entirely agree with her explanation of them. First, residential spaces in the city were differentiated along ethnic or religious lines. Abu-Lughod argues that property rights over a large space were assigned to a *group* which was empowered to subdivide it. This large space evolved into what she calls a 'residential superbloc' or what in Hyderabad's walled city would be known as a 'mohalla'. Though whether space was actually 'assigned' on a group basis (and by whom) is debatable, the fact remains that residential quarters in the Islamic city were separate, autonomous and ethnically differentiated.

According to an explanation contrary to that of Abu-Lughod,

> ...as a new city developed or an old one expanded, the immigrants, soldiers, merchants, peasants, nomads tended to settle in compact groups.... This happened in Kufa, and can be seen today in the *bidonvilles* of the great cities of the Near East and North Africa. Methods of administration and tax-collection strengthened and perpetuated the separateness of these groups; it was simplest and most satisfactory to hold each group collectively responsible, and recognise one member of it as local chief.
> The separateness was still further strengthened when the authority of the ruler was weakened... because the quarter provided a viable unit of defence... chiefs of quarters would have more of the character of 'subordinates' when the government was strong, more of 'leaders' when it was weak.[6]

Abu-Lughod has developed the concept of 'semi-private' space from this characterisation of the cellular structure of the residential superblocks which comprise the Islamic city. The interior spaces, including the lanes and blind alleys of the residential block or mohalla, constitute semi-private space, which is 'a protected area outside the dwelling unit itself within which kin-like responsibilities (and freedoms) govern'.

[5] Abu-Lughod, Janet, 'Contemporary Relevance of Islamic Urban Principles' in *Ekistics*, Vol. 47, 280, Jan-Feb 1980, pp. 6–10.

[6] Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

A second fundamental characteristic of Islamic cities, a corollary of the first, is the secondary significance of the circulation system. The street system developed after the utilisation of space for residential cells. Whereas in both Roman and Hindu design, the city structure began with the roads, in the medieval Islamic city the street system occupied whatever space was left over after its allocation for houses. The passages in the residual spaces between houses thus constituted the street system. This perhaps explains the haphazard, narrow and crooked lanes in the walled city of Hyderabad. However, it could be argued that this is not a particular characteristic of medieval Islamic cities, and that in all unplanned cities, such as the port cities which evolved out of small, fishing villages, the street system emerged from the residual spaces after the dwellings had been built.

Only a very limited number of major arteries were actually planned and provided for in the walled city of Hyderabad. In contrast to those which formed the boundaries of residential cells, these streets were actually a continuation within the city walls of those long-distance routes that connected cities with one another or to the ports. For example, in Hyderabad's walled area, the main road from Puranapul to Charminar, passing through Lad Bazaar, is actually a part of the old trade route that connected the fortress of Golconda to the port town of Masulipatnam. These main roads within the city walls also served as linear locations for manufacturing, commerce and vending. Also along this main street, or at easy connections to it, were the main congregational mosques and many of the public administrative buildings.

In addition to these two types of streets (the residential block or mohalla boundary streets and the major inter–urban arteries) there was a third category of streets comprising the interior paths within residential cells. Short and closed-ended, their only purpose was to allow access to individual dwellings within the large residential blocks.

In marked contrast to this type of approach, the first concern of city planning is to develop a proper circulation system. It is only after roads have been laid and a relatively uniform circulation system established, and after their public ownership has been secured, that the remaining spaces of the city are subdivided and assigned to individual owners. Three types of roads are usually created in planned cities: the major processional routes, the less important

thoroughfares and the smaller grids giving access to dwellings. These roads are distinguished by their relative width and not, as in the case of Islamic cities, by their access to private/semi-private and public spaces.

The concept of semi-private space (which leads to the formation of residential cells and the unusual circulatory system) was an invention necessitated by the Islamic social practice of segregation by sex. A semi-private space served as a protected area outside and around the access area to the home. Segregation, especially of strangers and visitors, was maintained in the built-up environment through the separation of the *mardana* (parts of a house reserved for males) from *zanan khana* (inner quarters of a house reserved for females) by a spacious courtyard. The courtyard served to distance the *mardana* from the *zanan khana* so that even voices were not carried from one part of the house to the other. Segregation by gender was further effected by providing the house with two entrances; a side entrance allowed women to enter the house without going through the men's quarters.

The third fundamental principle which structured urban settlement in the Muslim world relates to rules which governed building heights, common access, separation of houses by standard widths of roads/pedestrian paths, and other setbacks from neighbouring activities. Unlike Roman or western law where universal criteria applied to the governing rules, the Muslim world recognised that development of urban property affected immediate neighbours and therefore conferred rights and responsibilities upon them to control access, building heights, and so on. Such rights emanated in part from such Islamic laws as that of pre-emption (*shafa*), which is defined as 'a right which the owner of certain immovable property possesses, as such, for the quiet enjoyment of the immovable property, to have first right to buy any neighbouring property which is for sale'.[7] Besides this privilege of *shafa*, rights and responsibilities of contiguous property owners also emanated from the importance given to privacy: building heights, access, etcetera, were required to be such that they prevented one from becoming a nuisance to one's neighbours. The important point is that the governing rules emerged out of agreements between co-residents rather than through fiats issued by the state/municipality. These customary regulations further explain the

[7] Fyzee, Asaf A.A., *Outlines of Muhammadan Law*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 334.

relatively arbitrary character of the Islamic urban form in contrast to the gridiron structure of Hellenistic and Roman cities.

Related to the third is the fourth principle of Islamic cities that provides an elaborate system of property rights which, in turn, imply spatial rights. Whereas the western property law entitles, unless otherwise specified, the owner to a set of spatial rights which include 'rights over the surface land, the minerals beneath the surface, any structure built on the surface and the air rights over the land',[8] Islamic law recognised a wide range of spatial rights like 'rights to a single floor or even a single room or even a portion of a single room... rights to use, but not sale of a property, rights during one's life time which then revert to others'.[9] Such rights led to an infinite division of space which, in turn, led to congestion in later years.

The typical Islamic city is walled, with several gates. The primary streets, which are actually continuations of the inter–urban trunk roads, pass through these gates intersecting at the central area where the main mosque or *jami* is located.[10] Although the palace or administrative area usually occupies the centre of the city, near the *jami* it is sometimes located on the periphery. In the latter case, it generally takes the form of a fortified citadel. The major markets or bazaars are located in a linear pattern along these primary streets which serve as main thoroughfares. These streets are usually 40 to 60 feet in width and can be negotiated by modern systems of transport. The buildings along them are often ornate and double-storeyed, with residences on the floors above the shops.

Leading out from the primary streets are the secondary streets which separate one mohalla from another.[11] A mohalla is a clearly defined area of residential and commercial activity, whose boundary is often nebulous because of the intricate street pattern. Bazaars of lesser importance which are restricted to the sale of select articles are situated along the secondary streets. The articles sold here are often manufactured in the inner courtyards behind the stores themselves.

[8] Abu-Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[9] Abu-Lughod, *ibid.* Here the reference is probably to the institution of *waqf* (endowment for a charitable purpose), especially to *waqf-a-l-awlad* (family *waqf*) by which endowments of the type mentioned by Abu-Lughod may be made.

[10] Grunebaun, *op. cit.*, See also, Noe, Sambel V., 'In search of the Traditional Islamic City: An Analytical Proposal with Lahore as a Case-Example' in *Ekistics*, Vol. 280, Jan-Feb 1980, pp. 69–75.

[11] See the M.Sc.(Arch.) thesis by Badshah, Aktar, for a similar description of the street system, 'Intervening, into old Residential Quarters: The case of Shahjahanabad'

The secondary streets are quite narrow, being about 20 to 40 feet in width, with barely enough room for two cars to pass each other. When a secondary street meets with two or more such streets coming from different mohallas, a chowk is formed. A chowk belongs to the inhabitants of a group of mohallas. Around it there is generally a change in land use, from residential to service or commercial activity. A mosque or a temple is usually to be found in the vicinity.

From the secondary streets which separate mohallas, tertiary streets or inner lanes branch into the *mohalla* interiors. These streets, which form intricate patterns, are generally negotiable either by foot or bicycle. Some of these inner lanes are blind alleys which form the approach road to a group of houses, while others are connected to other lanes through gateways or chowks. The blind alleys are often dark, narrow and private. This structuring of an Islamic city, with its differentiation of public and private space, gives the residents the desired amount of privacy. Thus a resident of a walled city moves out from the complete privacy of an inner courtyard to a lesser degree of privacy provided by the narrow lanes and familiar faces, till he enters the busy streets where his identity becomes anonymous.

One generally finds that the *mohallas* in walled cities have low, very densely-packed houses with hardly any open space or parks around. This lack of lung space is usually compensated by the spacious inner courtyards which are an inherent feature of all houses. A comparison of land use in the old and new city of Delhi[12] shows that whereas in Old Delhi, only 15 per cent of the area is covered by streets, lanes and chowks, in the colonies of New Delhi 25 per cent of the land is taken up by roads. Similarly, 54 per cent of Old Delhi is comprised of built-up, residential structures, compared to 24 per cent in New Delhi. But, as already stated, this lack of open space is made up by internal courtyards which cover 25 per cent of the area in Old Delhi. Such inner, private spaces are missing in New Delhi, which has parks and gardens instead.

The walled city of Hyderabad has all the features described as being typical of Muslim cities. However, communities from many different regions and professing faiths other than Islam also served the Qutub Shahis and, later, the Asaf Jahis, and settled in the walled city.

[12] Gupta, Alka, 'Traditional City As a Response to Climate. A case study: Shahjahanabad,' mimeo. The paper is available at the Massachussetts Institute of Technology Library.

Inspite of the range of cultural heterogeneity described in the previous chapter, the nuances of architecture, the structure of city growth, the norms of property rights, and values of privacy came from the reigning monarch, or the dominant community professing Islam. The walled city of Hyderabad is also characterised by the 'distinctive cellular character of Islamic cities' described by Janet Abu-Lughod and others. However, each cell/quarter or mohalla was peopled by members of the same ethnic community and the mohalla, as described in the previous chapter, evolved around the mansions of those that were the most notable in that community.

The walled city was once demarcated by a wall which had 13 gates or *darwazas* and 13 posterns or *khidkis*. This city wall, together with its gates and posterns, was dismantled in the 1920s by the City Improvement Board because of heavy congestion and traffic problems. The Puranapul and Dabirpura *darwazas*, which have survived along with part of the city wall near Mir Jumla Talab, give us some idea about the structure of the wall. Scholars who have written about Hyderabad claim that the city was planned on a gridiron pattern. Such statements are disputable because the road from Puranapul to Yakutpura passing around the Charminar was the only major road for quite a long time. In fact, it was part of the age-old trade route between the fortress town of Golconda and the port town of Masulipatnam. It was only in the latter part of the city's history, especially after the coming of the British and the northward shift in the axis of development, that the other major road from Afzalgunj to Falaknuma developed.

The centre of the walled city is marked out by the towers of the Charminar. Near it is situated the main mosque or *jami* called the Macca Masjid. Roads from the different gates of the city lead to the city centre. The Nizam's Chow Mohalla palace and his former administrative building—the Khilwat palace—are located near the city centre on the easily accessible Moti Galli lane. Markets and bazaars are located in a linear pattern on the major roads. The Pathergatti area on the Afzalgunj to Charminar road and the Lad Bazaar area on the Puranapul to Charminar road form the two main commercial centres. These two roads, running north–south and east–west and cutting each other at the Charminar, represent the two main thoroughfares which have a facade of highly ornate, double-storeyed buildings. There are a number of secondary streets branching off from these primary streets into the interiors of the walled city.

These include the Hussaini Alam road, the Purani Haveli road, the Dabeerpura road, Motigalli lane, the Mir Jumla tank road, the Gowlipura road, and so on, each separating one mohalla from another. From these roads branch out the inner lanes which lead into the different mohallas. The walled city also has its share of chowks (Mahboob Chowk, Mir Chowk and Etebar Chowk), bazaars (Chatta Bazaar, Ghansi Bazaar, Noorkhan Bazaar, Shahgunj) and kamans (Kali Kaman, Machli Kaman, Kaman Sher-e-Bathil, Sukhimir Kaman and Kaman Elaichi Baig).

This picture of the structure of the walled city would be incomplete without a graphic description of its street patterns. We present two street maps of different areas taken from Municipal Survey Sheet nos. 58 and 86 printed in 1917. The first map depicts two mohallas bound by two secondary streets in ward 22, block 3. The area is popularly known as Yakutpura. As can be seen from the map, the mohallas have their own mosques or temples. The second map depicts an area in ward 23, block 3, known as Bakshi Bazaar. This map also shows a chowk. We have shaded the streets according to the hierarchy of street patterns typical of Islamic cities. At each hierarchic level (as can be seen from the maps) some privacy is lost/gained, the maximum privacy being in the blind alleys which lead to the house, and the maximum anonymity on primary streets.

It is worth mentioning that the secondary streets and chowks which separate mohallas peopled by communities in conflict are often the most unsafe during periods of riots. As Janet Abu-Lughod points out,

> 'To some extent, one can think of these streets as frontiers between not necessarily friendly neighbours and as is the case of frontier areas, they were places where trade and interchanges could be conducted in a neutral setting governed by rules of truce'.[13]

In an era when communities have been transformed from subjects to citizens, neutral settings are increasingly assaulted by the consciousness of rights and animosities. During periods of riot in Hyderabad's walled city, an innocuous strip of road often becomes enemy territory. A person may well find crossing that strip of road to get to the safety of his home a terrifying experience. Mahboob

[13] Abu-Lughod, Janet, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Chowk in ward 20, which separates a Marwari from a Muslim mohalla, is one such neutral area now transformed into a zone of conflict. Etebar Chowk is another. In Chapter 6 we will analyse these conflict zones in greater detail.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the structure of an Islamic city leads to congenital congestion. Various other propositions follow from this. First, the densely-packed, built-up character of the walled city, with its lack of open spaces and narrow, circulatory roads is not suitable for modern industrial development. The imperative of industrial development is such that it creates its own infrastructural facilities, albeit with the help of state intervention. Because of the lack of such industrial development, there has been, until now, no additional provision of social infrastructure than had been laid down by the City Improvement Board in the 1920s and 1930s. Thus the existing roads, sewerage lines, water-pipes, electricity and playgrounds have become old, obsolete and overloaded and are inadequate for the present population. This has increased congestion in the area.

Second, the circulatory system in the walled city was meant for a different era and a different culture. The secondary importance given to the circulatory system in an Islamic city and its use for maintaining the privacy of residents has already been discussed. Thus, except for the primary streets which are 60 feet wide, all the other roads are narrow and unsuitable for vehicular traffic. The increased population of the walled city, as also the southward spread of the built-up area, has resulted in a lot of vehicular traffic. This is because both people going northwards to the new city for work and people going southwards to the newer built-up areas use the roads of the walled city as thoroughfares. And given that slow-moving vehicles like cycles and rickshaws still ply in the walled city, roads have naturally become more congested.

Third, the mohallas of the walled city have low-rise, densely-packed houses, a majority of them being *kaccha* houses with mud walls and tiled roofs. Most of the inhabitants are economically depressed and belong to lower income groups. They stay in the area either because they own their houses or because it is possible to rent one cheaply. Over the years the family size of each household has increased. But due to the absence of open space and the inability to

pay either higher rent or build new structures, the only option they are left with is to subdivide the house to accommodate the growing family or to earn income by renting out portions of the house. Thus the already packed structures have become even more congested.

Lastly, it is often argued that the problem of the walled city is merely one of widening roads and creating social and physical infrastructure. Widening the roads would involve destroying the highly ornate buildings which line the primary and secondary roads, some of which are architecturally valuable. Mosques and temples also line most of the roads and destroying or removing them is impossible considering the communal sensitivity of the walled city. The cellular structure of the mohallas is also a formidable obstacle to urban renewal plans since even marginal intrusion into them could affect the entire fabric of the city.

What we would suggest as a policy option, therefore, would be to aim not at dramatic changes but at the kind which would regenerate the walled city without altering its structure. The householder in the walled city needs help to renovate his house and improve his economic position. New economic activities should augment the income of the householders in city *Anderun* without drawing in a lot of people and traffic from outside. In other words, planners for the walled city have to recognise the reality on the ground, that fundamental changes in its structure are neither possible nor desirable. The last chapter includes some suggestions about the kinds of economic activities and urban renewal plans which would be appropriate for the area. In the next one, we present the dimensions of congestion and the extent of the problem to which the planners for urban renewal must address themselves.

FOUR

Dimensions of Congestion

Historically a high density area, the walled city recorded a density of 77 persons per acre in as early as 1881. This was higher, for instance, than the population density in Bombay, which was 50 persons per acre in the same year. However, the density in the walled area has not been consistently high. Events such as the floods of 1908 and the plague in 1911 did have the effect of depopulating the area to some extent. As we have seen, the transfer of power from the Nizam to the Government of India also led to a dispersal of population from the walled city. But from 1961 onwards, the population in the area began to increase again.

The massive outmigration trends between 1951 and 1961 in the walled city had their impact on housing as well. The impact of communal conflict and the distress sale of property can also be seen. Many of the vacant houses deteriorated, and perhaps as many were razed to the ground. Table 4.1 shows a decrease in housing density from 36 houses per acre to 17 houses per acre. Even so and by any measure, housing density remains high in the walled area. In 1961, when the population density in the walled city was 121 persons per acre, housing density was 17 houses per acre, showing an average of seven persons per house. In 1971, population density increased to 157 persons per acre but housing density remained at 17 houses per acre, thereby raising the average number of persons per house to nine (Table 4.1). Unfortunately, we cannot use the housing density figures for 1981 for comparison, because the definition of the term

Table 4.1
Population, Housing Densities and Household Size, 1951–81.

Year	*Area in acres*	*Population*	*Population density*	*Occupied residential houses*	*Housing density*	*Persons per house*	*Households*	*Households per house*	*Household size*
1951	1352.12	3,18,720	236	48,137	36	7	60,476	1.26	5.41
1961	1352.12	1,63,059	121	24,032	17	7	29,650	1.23	5.50
1971	1352.12	2,12,908	157	23,317	17	9	34,432	1.48	6.18
1981	1352.12	2,40,861	178	—	—	—	36,798	—	6.89

Note: Figures on housing for 1981 could not be shown because of the definition change.

Source: Office of the Directorate of Census Operations, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.

'house' was changed in the 1981 census, which used 'house' synonymously with 'household'. This led to an inflation of the total number of houses in the walled city in the 1981 census, a rise that is not reflected in reality. However, considering the rise in population density from 157 persons per acre in 1971 to 178 persons per acre in 1981, and considering the instability of housing density over the decade 1961 to 1971, it would not be incorrect to assume that the average number of persons to a house is higher in the 1980s decade.

PRESSURE ON FACILITIES IN THE HOUSE

The increase in the average number of persons to a house from seven in 1961 to nine in 1971 and certainly more in 1981 reflects the increasing pressure of population on the existing stock of housing. In other words, the number of people living in a house is not proportionate with the existing facilities and has led to congestion within the house. Another measure of congestion within the house is the average household size which increased from five in 1961 to six in 1971 to seven in 1981 (census).

In order to obtain a closer understanding of the congestion problem, we tried to elicit information on how living space and facilities are shared not only by members of a household but also by households living in the same house. Questions were asked regarding the number of rooms per household, the number of households sharing a house, the number of people and households sharing facilities such as latrines, taps, access and so on.

The frequency distribution of the number of rooms per household shows that as many as 30 per cent of the households in the sample reside in one room only, while 54 per cent occupy two to

Table 4.2
Rooms per Household

Rooms per household	*Number of households*	*Per cent*
1 only	630	30.5
2 to 4	1,119	54.2
5 to 8	262	12.7
9 to 12	36	1.7
13 & above	15	0.7
Total	2,062	100.00

Table 4.3
Sharing of Living Space by Households

Households per house	*Rooms per household*										*Total households*	
	1 only		*2–5*		*6–9*		*10–13*		*13 & above*			
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1 only	60	10.27	405	69.34	97	16.60	15	2.56	7	1.00	584	100.00
		10.71		33.19		67.36		57.69		77.77		29.81
2–5	274	28.69	629	65.86	41	4.29	9	0.94	2	0.20	955	100.00
		49.92		51.55		28.00		34.00		22.00		48.74
6–9	166	52.69	141	44.76	6	1.90	2	0.63	0	0.00	315	100.00
		29.64		11.15		4.00		8.00		0.00		16.07
10–13	45	67.16	22	32.83	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	67	100.00
		8.03		1.80		0.00		0.00		0.00		3.42
13 & above	15	39.47	23	60.50	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	38	100.00
		2.67		1.88		0.00		0.00		0.00		1.93
Total	560	28.58	1220	62.27	144	7.35	26	1.32	9	0.45	1959	100.00
		100.00		100.00		100.00		100.00		100.00		100.00

four rooms. Along with the fact that 85 per cent of the households in the walled city have a maximum of four rooms, we also have to consider the large household size in the walled city. According to the 1981 census it is seven, but our survey shows eight as the average household size.[1]

The lack of adequate accommodation in the walled city is the outcome of an increasing subdivision of houses, as can be seen from Table 3. In this Table, the horizontal columns depict the number of households per house while the vertical columns depict the number of rooms available to each household. As can be seen, with the increasing subdivision of the house by two and more households, there is an increasing shortage of living space per household. Looking at the vertical columns, out of a total of 1,959 households (i.e., the sample households and their tenant or other households), 29 per cent live only in one room. Of these, 11 per cent live in one-room tenements while the others share their house with two or more households. About 62 per cent of the households live in two to five rooms. Of these, only 33 per cent do not share their house. On the whole, only 30 per cent of the households have a house to themselves, whatever the number of rooms. The remaining 70 per cent share it with other households.

As a result of this multiple subdivision of houses, the size of each room also becomes small. In the sample survey, 85 per cent of the households have rooms with an average size of 10 sq. ft. (with one dimension smaller or larger) and 13 per cent have rooms with an average size of 5 sq. ft. (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4
Average Size of Room

Size of room	*Number of rooms*	*Per cent*
Small (5′ × 5′)	262	12.70
Medium (10′ × 10′)	1,742	84.80
Big (20′ × 20′)	50	2.40
Total	2,053	100.00

[1] According to a sample survey conducted in wards 17 to 23 in Old City by Professor Afzal Mohammed, Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, over 45 per cent of the households covered had six to eight members and 25 per cent had nine to 12 members (mimeo).

Table 4.5
Latrines in the House

Latrines	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
No latrine	73	7.12
Latrine with septic tank/ *kucchi mori* drainage system/sewerage system	842	82.22
Khuddi system	109	10.64
Total	1024	100.00

Table 4.6
Average Number of Persons Sharing a Latrine

Persons per latrine	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
0–5	223	23.90
6–10	395	42.30
11–15	150	16.10
16–50	164	17.60
Total	932	100.00

Congestion in the house strains both the living space and the amenities in the house. This strain is further compounded by the economic inability of the householders to improve their amenities. Our household survey shows substantial evidence of the poor condition of the amenities within the house. Seven per cent of the households have no latrines, while eleven per cent use the primitive *khuddi* system (which involves the manual removal of night soil); 82 per cent have proper latrines connected to either sewerage pipelines or *kucchi-moris* (dug-out, open drains).

Although 82 per cent of the sample households do have proper latrines, these are highly overused, with 42 per cent of the latrines being regularly shared by six to 10 persons and about 34 per cent being shared by more than 10 persons, that is, by roughly two households or more.

A similar inadequacy is seen in the supply of drinking water. About 15 per cent of the households have no drinking water facility within the house; 12 per cent have wells in their house, and 63 per cent have piped water supplied by the municipality. As with latrines, the pressure on piped water is also high.

Table 4.7
Water Supply to the Household

Source of water	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
Tap (piped)	501	62.86
Well/borewell	96	12.04
No water facility	116	14.55
Well and tap	84	10.53
Total	797	100.00

Table 4.8
Average Number of Persons Sharing a Tap

Persons per tap	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
0–5	167	21.00
6–10	329	41.38
11–15	138	17.35
16–50	161	20.25
Total	795	100.00

In 41 per cent of the households with piped water facility, six to 10 persons share a single tap, while in 38 per cent of the households it is shared by more than 10 persons. Given this high ratio of persons to a tap, the problem of inadequate water supply becomes even more acute in the summer months or in a season of drought such as the one we are going through at present (May 1986), when water is supplied only on alternate days for about two hours in the mornings. The supply of electricity is also highly inadequate, with 164 households (20 per cent) out of a total of 839 having no electricity. This is obviously because they cannot afford it.

The quality of roofing was taken into consideration as an indication of housing conditions. We found that about 51 per cent of the houses have country tile roofs and 16 per cent have tin or asbestos roofs. Only 29 per cent have *pucca*, that is, lime or cement roofs. This again indicates the economic inability of the occupants to improve their living conditions. All the respondents who answered our questions on amenities were asked to explain the lack of improvement in their living conditions. About 33 per cent said they did not require any improvements, showing their satisfaction with what little they possessed. However, as many as 45 per cent said they did not have the finances to make renovations (Table 4.10).

Table 4.9
Roofing Material Used

Roofing material	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
Country tiles	525	51.47
Asbestos/tin sheets	160	15.69
Lime/cement	293	28.72
Thatch/bamboo/wood	42	4.12
Total	1020	100.00

Table 4.10
Reasons for Lack of Renovation of Houses

Main reasons	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
No repairs required	237	33.19
Lack of finances	324	45.38
Low rent	8	1.12
Apprehension of sub-division/litigation	13	1.82
Desire to sell the house	4	0.56
Tenant's indifference/ non-cooperative landlord	128	17.93
Total	714	100.00

Finally, congestion within the house is reflected in the fact that many of the households in the house have become less easily accessible. We found it difficult to locate many of the house numbers on our sample list due to the subdivision of houses for the purposes of selling or renting. Since these portions are often in the interior of the house, the owner's entrance and inner courtyard becomes a thoroughfare for the tenant–owners and their visitors. Some houses have been subdivided so frequently that they have taken on the appearance of a *chawl* (a multi-storied, slum-like tenement) and are referred to as *bada*. Here a single door or gate serves as the entrance to several households (each having a separate house number). Our investigators sometimes walked through the premises of several households in order to reach the ones in the sample. The inner courtyard and its tap are used by all the households for washing and other activities.

High congestion within the house, then, is a real problem in the walled city. With the increasing pressure of population on the existing housing stock, living space has become a scarce resource leading to overcrowded rooms and invasion of privacy. Housing facilities

and amenities meant for single households are now being shared by two or more households, leading to insanitary living conditions.

OVERLOAD ON PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

While every household requires a minimum of facilities within the house for its urban existence, it also requires a minimum of social and physical infrastructures outside the house. Physical infrastructural facilities like a sewerage system, water supply, tar roads and street lighting are vital for any urban neighbourhood. Equally important are social infrastructural facilities like schools, parks and playgrounds, post offices, shops and police stations.

Social and physical infrastructures are grossly overutilised in the walled city, leading to severe congestion problems. It is evident from their state of neglect that ever since the axis of development shifted to the new city, no effort has been made by the local administration to upgrade and increase these facilities to meet the demands of the growing population.

In this context, an assessment of the sewerage system in the walled city was made by the study team, the technical details of which were submitted to the Planning Commission. Some of the important points which surfaced are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The sewerage scheme for Hyderabad city was completed in 1931 to serve a population of 4.68 lakhs. Two main lines, the Southern Intercepting Sewer and the Northern Intercepting Sewer, were constructed in the valley (along the river Musi). The city, north and south of the river Musi, was divided into 15 drainage districts from where the main lines carried the sewage to the interceptors. These two interceptors then carried the sewage to the treatment plant further down the valley.

Since 1931, the population of Hyderabad has risen tremendously, with the population of the walled city itself standing at 2.49 lakhs (1981). Most of the existing sewer lines in the walled city are too narrow for the increasing volume of outflow and get blocked frequently. Moreover, as is evident from the survey, 11 per cent of the households interviewed have no sewerage connection (Table 4.11).

Residents have also broken the sewer lines at several points, either for illegal connections or for cleaning their blocked pipes. As a result, overflowing sewers and open manholes have become a common sight in the walled city. In addition, those who do not have sewer

Table 4.11
Sewerage Condition

Condition of sewerage	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
No sewerage	106	10.72
Frequent breakdown (blockage)	458	46.31
Infrequent breakdown	98	9.91
Functions well	327	33.06
Total	989	100.00

connections have illegally connected sewer lines to stormwater drains which open out into the river Musi. Thus, much of the walled city's sewage simply flows into the river Musi and further pollutes the environment.

The sewerage schemes now underway to extend the existing sewer lines are inadequate because they are based on estimates of population which assume a depopulation of the walled city because of the planned growth of satellite towns outside it. In fact, the satellite areas are being captured by the relatively well-off who have purchasing ability and the means to commute long distances. Another reason why the depopulation of the walled city has not occurred is because it provides cheap housing not only to people working there but also to those working in the new city.

The sewerage problem in the walled city is matched by problems of inadequacy in other areas. Drinking water is in short supply throughout the city of Hyderabad. However, in the walled city the supply is so inadequate that less than 25 gallons per head per day is available to walled city residents whereas the all-India standard is 40 gallons.

Roads in the walled city were first metalled between 1920 and 1930, when the City Improvement Board commissioned by the Nizam began its developmental activities. The major roads, what we have called primary and secondary streets, were paved with cement–concrete, a material considered to have longer durability. This material is no longer used because of the high cost of cement. Instead, asphalt or waterbound macadam roads are preferred although they have a shorter life. Asphalt is a mixture of mud, tar and sand and water-bound macadam is a method by which concrete and gravel are first consolidated with water and then covered with a mixture of tar and gravel chips. The minor roads, that is, the inner lanes which form

the approach to houses and are therefore largely pedestrian, are either made of mud or paved with flat stones.

Today, due to long years of use by increasing volumes of heavy vehicular traffic, the roads in the walled city (except the inter–urban roads like that leading from Nayapul to Falaknuma, which were built for heavy traffic) are in a state of total disrepair. In many places, there is less of tar and cement than large craters which have subsequently been filled with mud and stone.

The minor roads and lanes, meant mainly for pedestrian use, are in worse condition, due to their increasing use by cars and scooters. In our household survey as many as 40 per cent of the respondents had mud roads in this mohalla, while 32 per cent had the old cement–concrete approach roads. Only 10 per cent had the relatively recently laid tar or asphalt roads (Table 4.12).

Table 4.12
Condition of Roads

Type of road	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
Cement road	316	32.14
Tar road	98	9.96
Mud road	393	39.98
Shahabad road	91	9.26
Badly pot-holed Tar or Cement road	85	8.65
Total	983	100.00

Street lighting is another facility that is neglected in the walled city. This is surprising, given the communal problem which exists in the area, leading to frequent incidents of violence that generally take place at night. In our sample survey, as many as 45 per cent of the respondents said that they had no street lights in their lanes. About 23 per cent claimed that although the facility exists, it functions only periodically. The most common complaint is that bulbs are always missing from the lamps.

OVERLOAD ON SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

As has already been pointed out, an urban area not only needs adequate physical infrastructure in order to survive, it also requires some social infrastructural facilities such as schools, parks and playgrounds, post offices, banks and shops.

In 1978, I conducted a study entitled *Social Infrastructure in Urban Planning with Special Reference to Children*[2], covering the entire city of Hyderabad. Data from that study revealed that relative to all other areas in Hyderabad–Secunderabad, the walled city has a larger number of schools. According to its report, 27 out of a total of 106 schools in 1978 were high schools while 79 were primary and upper primary schools.

This data is corroborated by our present survey. A complete census of both government and private schools undertaken by the study team, reveals a relatively large number of schools in the walled city. We counted 277 schools, of which 72 are of high school level.

The household survey shows that 31 per cent of the population are of school-going age (that is, between ages 4 and 16). If one were to project this ratio upon the 1981 census population figures for the walled area, there should be, on an average, 340 children studying in each school if all the children went to school. However, the sample data indicate that only 75 per cent of the walled city children attend school; the figure is probably much lower at the higher levels of schooling.

The 1978[3] study shows that most of the schools—52 per cent of the high schools and 84 per cent of the primary/upper primary schools—in the walled city are housed in rented buildings. In contrast, the percentage figures for Secunderabad are 15 per cent and 62 per cent respectively. The study also shows that 70 per cent of the schools in the walled city are privately run. Since the buildings in which they are located were not designed to be used as classrooms, they are functionally and hygienically unfit for housing schools. Again, while the average number of children in each school is around 300, most of the schools, especially the primary schools, consist of only two or three rooms. Even these are small, and to increase their capacity only benches are provided in place of chairs and tables. This shortage of accommodation in schools must be considered together with the substantial increase in the shift system operating in the city. The 1978 study reported that at least 9 per cent of the school buildings in the metropolis operate on two or more shifts. One can imagine the undesirable impact of this on the timetable of schoolchildren.

[2] Naidu, Ratna, 'Social Infrastructure in Urban Planning with Special Reference to Children', report on a Study for ICSSR, 1978 (unpublished).

[3] *Ibid*

While there is nothing wrong with a planned shift system to facilitate a fuller use of capital installations, unplanned crowding of space disturbs the balance in the space–time resource nexus. In this instance, schools functioning in shifts have had to cut down on their total school-time activities to ensure that all participants in the shift system have their fair share of space. This means that the actual number of teaching hours assigned to each teacher decreases (due to the amalgamation of smaller class units into bigger units to save time), although the number of students per teacher doubles. Inevitably, the teaching time per student declines. Finally, although the number of teaching posts sanctioned for each school remains the same, the services of the teachers are not optimally utilised since they lack the space to carry out all the activities.

Very few schools have playgrounds and most of the children are found playing in the streets during recess. The services of teachers of physical education, which are sanctioned posts in most schools, cannot be utilised primarily for lack of playground space.

This lack of recreation space in schools is compounded by the fact that due to the haphazard and densely-packed physical structure of the walled city, even mohallas do not have enough space for parks or playgrounds. Our survey data shows that there are only five playgrounds and two parks (constructed by the Municipal Corporation) in ward 20, four playgrounds each in wards 21 and 22, with the latter having only three parks, and two playgrounds, and one park in ward 23. These parks and playgrounds were built by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad on plots of land meant for houses, and are therefore very small with practically no greenery.[4] The lack of playground facility is also reflected in our household survey where 36 per cent of the respondents stated that their children played on the streets facing the house and another 20 per cent said that their children played on the main road (Table 4.13). Many of our respondents complained that a constant irritant in their lives was the intrusion of an errant ball and *gulli*[5] into their houses.

[4] It is interesting to note that during the survey of the scale of inadequacy of civic services in the old city the largest representation was with regard to the inadequacy of parks (93%) and playgrounds (89%), thus conforming the popular notion that the old city is a highly congested area. See, Muttalib, M.A., 'Urban Renewal: A case for the Old City of Hyderabad', Vol.1, Regional Centre for Urban and Environmental Studies, Osmania University, Hyderabad, March 1985, unpublished report, p. 29.

[5] The *gulli danda* is a game played on the streets. The *gulli* is a short stick sharpened at both edges which flies when struck with a *danda* or longer stick.

Table 4.13
Use of Playground Facilities by Children

Place for play	*Respondents*	*Per cent*
Park/playground	96	10.09
On the main road	194	20.40
Open place in front of house in the inner lanes	341	35.86
On unused property/land	8	0.84
Graveyard	6	0.63
Inner courtyard	42	4.42
Inside the house	242	25.45
Do not play	22	2.31
Total	951	100.00

In addition to schools, we also examined the adequacy of other social infrastructural facilities such as post offices, public telephones, medical shops and dispensaries in terms of their accessibility to the mohalla respondents. We found that most of the public utilities, except for telephones and public libraries, are perceived to be within walking distance by our respondents.

It is obvious that the physical infrastructure of the walled city and certain vital social infrastructural facilities such as schools are becoming malfunctional under increasing population pressure. It is also evident that in this case the problem of inadequacy and overuse arises from the absence of timely maintenance and development of infrastructure to keep up with the increasing population.

OVERLOAD ON CIRCULATION SPACE

As described in Chapter 3, the street system in the walled area emerged in the spaces that were left over after housing had been constructed. The structure of the residential neighbourhoods or mohallas determined the route and width of the street. The street patterns are thus essentially unplanned, the space between the houses lending itself to the formation of only narrow and winding streets. The inner lanes that traverse through the mohallas are just 5 to 10 feet wide, meant to serve mainly pedestrian traffic. The streets which separate one mohalla from another are about 20 to 30 feet wide, barely allowing two vehicles to cross each other. Only the primary streets (which are usually inter–urban) such as the Charminar to Nayapul road and

the Charminar to Puranapul road, are uniformly broad, ranging between 40 and 60 feet.

The increasing population in the walled city has brought about not just a greater volume but also a greater variety of traffic on the walled city roads. The largely pedestrian inner lanes and streets are now being increasingly used by motorised and fast-moving vehicles such as cars and scooters. However, since these lanes and streets are often narrow and winding, they obstruct the free flow of fast-moving vehicles, leading to frequent bottlenecks and traffic jams. Moreover, the combination of slow-moving vehicles like bicycles and rickshaws, which are still a dominant mode of transportation, and fast-moving and heavy vehicles like buses, cars and scooters cause further congestion by slowing down the pace of traffic. As a result, there are frequent breakdowns in the flow of the circulatory system.

Many of the walled city residents have found employment in the new city. They also look to the new city for such facilities as higher education, better schooling, better hospital services and entertainment. More and more of the walled city residents are thus becoming regular, long-distance commuters. According to our sample survey, 27 per cent of the working population are employed in the new city, 3 per cent work in the industrial areas of Balanagar and Sanathnagar on the outskirts of the new city and 9 per cent work in Secunderabad (Table 4.14). Thirty-nine per cent of the working population thus commute daily to their place of work north of the river Musi, travelling mostly by bus and bicycle. The traffic cell of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority reports that on a working day, as many as 6,05,521 people move towards the new city mainly via the Nayapul and the Chaderghat bridges, and about 5,72,247 people move towards south of the river Musi (the entire Old City area), again via these two bridges.

These figures and the data regarding the location of the residents' work-place indicate the tremendous increase in the flow of traffic moving in and out of the walled city. The volume is so great that even the points of entry and exit—the two bridges—get heavily congested with traffic. The primary road leading from Charminar to Nayapul is also choked with traffic almost 24 hours of the day.

The combination of slow-moving and fast-moving vehicles breaks the smooth flow of traffic, with the slow-moving vehicles retarding the efficiency of the fast-moving ones. According to the traffic cell of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, the walled city has a

Table 4.14
Place of Work and Mode of Transport

Location	Mode of transport																	
	Train		*Bus*		*Cycle rickshaw*		*Cycle*		*Auto*		*Mobike/ scooter/moped*		*Car/jeep*		*Walk*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Inner city	0	0.00	22	5.19	21	4.95	63	14.86	3	0.71	19	4.48	2	0.47	294	69.34	424	100.00
Old city	1	0.43	45	19.30	16	6.89	82	35.34	8	3.44	25	10.77	11	4.74	44	18.96	232	100.00
New city	0	0.00	135	43.54	2	0.64	95	30.64	4	1.29	57	18.38	5	1.61	12	3.87	310	100.00
Secunderabad	10	9.90	64	63.36	2	1.98	5	4.95	1	0.99	12	11.88	5	4.95	2	1.98	101	100.00
Balanagar/ Sanathnagar	0	0.00	29	78.37	1	2.70	4	10.81	0	0.00	3	10	0	0.00	0	0.00	37	100.00
Districts	3	8.10	26	70.27	1	2.70	2	5.40	0	0.00	5	13.51	0	0.00	0	0.00	37	100.00
Total	14	1.22	321	28.13	43	3.76	251	21.99	16	1.40	121	10.60	23	2.01	352	30.85	1141	100.00

large number of slow-moving vehicles. During peak hours (from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.), about 6,828 cycles and 974 rickshaws, that is, 7,802 slow-moving and 2,777 fast-moving vehicles (1,992 scooters/motorcycles, 521 auto-rickshaws, 152 buses, and 112 cars) travel on the Charminar to Nayapul road. Although on an equally major road in Secunderabad (the Ranigunj to Paradise road) there is an equally dense flow of traffic during peak hours (comprising 1,682 slow-moving and 3,261 fast-moving vehicles), there is not as much congestion due to the predominance of fast-moving vehicles.

CONCLUSION

Both the dimensions of congestion and the structural problems underlying it are formidable in the walled city. For the residents in the area congestion in the physical infrastructure is a greater source of worry than congestion of the social infrastructure. Social infrastructure such as the condition of schools is poor everywhere in the metropolis, as it is in the country as a whole. Indeed, the number of schools in the walled city is higher than that in the rest of the metropolis. The survey responses indicate that doctors, medical shops, retail shops, post offices, police stations and so on are mostly located within walking distance. The people interviewed are more upset by their physical environment. In this corner of a modern metropolis, the ancient system of manual removal of night soil continues; households have to do without electricity for lack of financial resources; and children have to play in the streets for lack of parks and playgrounds—streets that are so congested with traffic that they are hazardous even for pedestrians. Some of these problems are caused by the inadequacy of physical infrastructure, but quite a few have to do with the economic disability of the walled city residents. The story of their poverty is told in the next chapter.

FIVE

A Socio–Economic Survey

The walled city of Hyderabad can be distinguished from the rest of the metropolis not merely by its Islamic urban design and architectural heritage but because it is easily identifiable as an area of urban deprivation. The term deprivation is sensitive to the multi-dimensional facets of urban decay and connotes more than poverty and low income levels. Nowhere in the city is urban decay as prevalent as it is in the walled area. Dilapidated structures, poor housing conditions, inadequate sewerage and garbage disposal facilities, and other undesirable aspects of the urban environment are rooted in multiple deprivations[1] which are experienced on an area basis. Household incomes are, for instance, substantially lower than elsewhere in the city. This appears to be due to the lower wage levels which result from the semi-skilled and unskilled types of occupation generally practised by the walled city residents. Inadequate income compounded by large household size have multiplier consequences, such as residential overcrowding and sharing of scarce amenities. In turn, poor residential facilities or large family size, set off other types of deprivation such as poor sanitation, poor health and indebtedness. Further, multiple deprivation in the walled city has to be understood in the historical context within which it has evolved. Many of the residents lost access to certain resources as a consequence of the transfer of power from the Nizams to the Government of India, a change in the official language policy, and so on.

[1] For a definition of multiple deprivation see Chapter 1.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

While there are several factors that perpetuate multiple deprivation in the walled city, the root of the problem appears to be the historical events which at various stages isolated it from growth generating forces. The walled city was once the heart of Hyderabad, the political and cultural centre of the Nizam's dominions. As in the case of all feudal cities, its growth was propelled by the constant appropriation of revenue from the peasantry by the royalty and the nobility, who spent large chunks of it on building palaces and making their lives more luxurious. The city thus owed its development largely to the presence of its ruler and his nobles. The major sources of employment were linked to the feudal administration. There were feudal privileges like jagirs, mansabs and inams as well as government and quasi-government posts in the revenue, civil, judicial, police, municipality, city improvement, education and ecclesiastical departments. Then there were the regular army and the Nizam's 'irregulars', the offices of the feudal estates and the household establishments of the feudal gentry, as well as private service with other aristocratic families. The volume of commerce and business such as banking and trade, and avenues of employment in them were also dependent upon the activities of the ruler and his feudal lords. The city of Hyderabad was thus primarily an administrative centre. It had no self-generating, autonomously growing economic base and its growth was propelled by the exogenous factor of surplus extraction from rural fiefdoms.

The Police Action of 1948 and the subsequent Jagirdari Abolition Regulation of 1949 caused the dismantling of the feudal economic base. A large number of the feudal elite, mostly Muslims, fled to Pakistan or to the northern states in India in search of new privileges, while their dependents and relatives, who stayed back, languished in poverty. The large armies of servants employed by these aristocrats were retrenched. The disbanding of the Hyderabad army and the Nizam's irregulars also contributed to the rising level of unemployment. In other words, with the democratisation of the government and its bureaucracy, all those who were hitherto functionaries in the feudal occupational structure faced the problem of their increasing irrelevance in a modernising society. Further, their proficiency in the Urdu language (the official language in the Nizam's administration) turned to their disadvantage when Telugu became the official language of Andhra Pradesh.

With the outmigration of the feudal elite, there occurred a dislocation and restructuring of the classes. The vacuum created by the fleeing elite was soon filled by the steady stream of poorer Muslims who came in from the districts. In the wake of the Police Action, they began to gravitate towards the walled city which, for them, represented the only lasting symbol of Muslim culture. Most of these immigrants lacked the basic skills, and educational and linguistic qualifications necessary for employment in an urban economy.

Business activity and commerce, however, were not too drastically affected by the Police Action and the subsequent movement of the population, essentially because they were in the hands of the Hindu business communities like the Marwaris. Although several Marwari families moved to the north of the Musi (where they set up a major wholesale centre in Begum Bazar) when the Nizam shifted his residence, those who remained in the walled city consolidated and expanded their business to a substantial degree. It should be noted here that much of the major business that goes on in the walled city survives on its cultural and traditional value. The Pathergatti–Charminar area, for instance, is renowned throughout the world for pearls and stone-studded bangles known as *goot* (an Urdu word which literally means a 'fat bangle'). However, the pearls and stones are not of local origin. Pearls are brought in from Bombay; in fact, both the pearls and stones are to a great extent imported: pearls from Japan and stones from Australia and Pakistan. Hyderabad provides the skilled labour, a tradition of skill nurtured since the days when the market for these products in Charminar and the famed 'Lad Bazar' evolved out of the aristocratic patronage and grand life-style of the Nizams and their nobles. Bangles from other parts of the country, such as the 'Sonabai' (thin, yellow glass bangles) from Ferozabad in Uttar Pradesh, are also sold here. In other words, the basis for the bangle market of the walled city is its 'reputation' and a locally nurtured skill rather than locally available materials. Merchants exploit this reputation and the local skill by investing in the import of pearls and stones and by organising marketing outlets for the finished products, both local and from elsewhere in the country.

Likewise, the walled city continues to be a centre for traditionally established business in grain, cloth, utensils, etcetera, which is mostly controlled by the Marwari community. However, this constitutes only a small fraction of the economic activity in the city, the major chunk of it being, as our data will show, in the informal sector.

While commerce is an intrinsic feature of the walled city, it has not kept pace with the commercial growth in the rest of the metropolis. In fact, over the past two decades it has shown signs of decline, with many of the big businessmen shifting to the new city. The reason behind this shift has been the frequent outbreak of communal riots. The forced closure of shops and long periods of curfew have caused serious damage to the business community in the walled area.

MIGRATION

In our sample of 1,031 households, 220 (21 per cent) are first generation migrants, that is, households in which the head is a migrant. Among the Muslim households, 20 per cent are migrants, while the figures for the Hindu and the scheduled castes and tribes are 30 per cent and 9 per cent respectively.

Of the Muslim migrants, 86 per cent have migrated from the erstwhile Nizam's dominions, that is, from some of the districts in Andhra Pradesh, and parts of Maharashtra and Karnataka. While 41 per cent of them came to Hyderabad following the Police Action, 54 per cent migrated between 1951 and 1971. Among the Hindus, 70 per cent are from the erstwhile Nizam's dominions and 30 per cent are from Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and Gujarat. Of these, only 22 per cent migrated immediately after the Police Action; the rest of them came in during the 1950s and 1960s.

Most of those who came from the northern states were Hindus, who seem to have migrated mostly between 1951 and 1961, when land prices were highly favourable in the walled city. Our survey shows that 15 per cent of the migrants in the sample came to do business in the walled city and that 62 per cent of them settled down here during the two decades after the Police Action. Our data also show that 57 per cent of these businessmen were from the northern states of India.

Table 5.1 shows that a majority of the migrants came to the walled city in search of a livelihood, reflecting an overall low socio–economic status. On being asked whether migration brought about an improvement in their socio–economic status, 34 per cent of the migrants admitted to have experienced a rise in occupational status after migration.

Table 5.1
Total Household Income

Rs. per month	*Number of households*	*Per cent*
Less than 200	19	2
201 to 400	90	10
401 to 1000	421	45
1001 to 2000	238	26
2001 to 5000	133	14
5001 and above	24	3
Total	925	100

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Our household survey shows that the average, walled city resident belongs to the low income group. Of the 925 households in our sample which answered this question, 57 per cent have a monthly income below Rs. 1000. Of these, 2 per cent earn less than Rs. 200 per month, 10 per cent have an income of between Rs. 201 and Rs. 400 and 45 per cent have an income ranging from Rs. 401 to Rs. 1000. The poverty level in 1980 was defined by the Planning Commission as Rs. 533 per month or Rs. 6400 a year for a five-member family unit. According to this definition, at least 12 per cent of the walled city households are living below the poverty line. In addition, there are a sizeable number who belong to the Rs. 401 to Rs. 1000 category, earning just around Rs. 500.

The problem of poverty is much more acute for households living below and on the poverty level because of the large size of their household. According to our survey (1986) the average number of members per household is eight in the walled city. The 1981 census figure for the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad was six; it was seven for the walled city.

PER CAPITA INCOME

We found that the median per capita income is Rs. 541 per month in the walled city. Of the total working population from whom we could elicit a response on the question of income (only 1749 answered the question on income) 11 per cent earn less than Rs. 200 per month. Twenty-nine per cent earn between Rs. 201 and Rs. 400, 43

per cent earn an income of between Rs. 401 and Rs. 1000, and 12 per cent earn between Rs. 1001 to Rs. 2000. Only 2 per cent have an income above Rs. 2000 (Table 5.5). In other words, 86 per cent of the working population in the walled city earns less than Rs. 1000 per month.

Such low incomes are insufficient to support even a standard household comprising five members. Even households with two earning members barely manage to eke out a living, given the large size of their household. Many of them therefore try to supplement their main incomes (Table 5.2) by sending their children out to work, by setting up small businesses like peppermint and other sweetmeat shops or by taking up odd jobs such as tailoring, ironing clothes, and supplying food. Often, the only asset that residents, who are disinherited in terms of linguistic, educational and occupational skills, have is their ancestral house. Thus residents who have lost channels of mobility due to the changed politico–economic structure of the area frequently use this inheritance to enhance their incomes. The survey shows that the most common way of supplementing income is by letting out rooms on rent. Gulf remittances also constitute a significant contribution to the household income.

Table 5.2
Supplementary Sources of Household Income

Sources	*Number of households*	*Per cent*
House rents	63	51
Gulf remittances	26	21
Side business	22	18
Agricultural income	7	5
Commission/dividends	6	5
Total	124	100

This data on income levels in the walled city is corroborated by the results of a study conducted in the periods 1976 to 1977 and 1983 to 1984,[2] which covered wards 17, 18 and 19 in addition to the four wards of the walled city. According to it, almost 30 per cent of the workers earn less than Rs. 200 per month. About 25 per cent earn between Rs. 201 and 400 while 22 per cent earn between Rs. 500

[2] Mohammed, Afzal, 'Planning for the Social Facilities in the Old City of Hyderabad: A Case Study', Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad, mimeo.

and Rs. 1000. Only 13 per cent earn a salary of more than Rs. 1001 per month. According to our study, 14 per cent belong to this category. These income levels are a reflection of low occupational levels, as is evident from the data on occupation provided by our survey.

OCCUPATION

Before presenting the survey data, it might be useful to take a look at the census data on the changes in occupational structure.

In 1951, the working population formed only 30 per cent of the total population. It increased to 40 per cent in 1961 and then remained static for the next two decades. However, the 1981 census data show a sudden decrease in the working population, which fell from 40 to 32 per cent. One of the factors responsible for this decline (apart from the increasing pressure of population on a stagnant economy) is the repeated incidence of communal rioting in the walled city since 1978. Prolonged periods of curfew have caused much damage to business and to those working on a daily wage basis.

It would be well to underline, however, that the proportion of workers to non-workers in the walled city (31 per cent) remains higher than the overall average of 27 per cent for the entire city of Hyderabad. Those with little or no skill and educational qualifications are absorbed in the informal sector. This is evident from the marked increase in transport, household industry (which includes weaving, printing cloth, supplying food, making chappals, and so on) and other services (a residual category which is not clearly defined in the census handbook) in the 1961 Census for the area.

Since the occupations are rather broadly classified in the census, the figures in Table 5.3 give only a rough idea of the occupational structure in the walled city. Our household survey contains more detailed information. A pilot survey provided the initial data on the types of occupation pursued in the walled city. On the basis of this information, we identified 23 occupational categories. Finally, using the income and prestige attributed to each occupational category as our basis, we collapsed the categories into five, assigning category I with the highest status and category V with the lowest. Thus, although Gulf employment would ordinarily be included in categories IV and V because of the semi-skilled or low-skilled nature of the work involved, because of the high income levels in the Gulf it has been included in category III.

Table 5.3
Occupational Structure of the Residents of the Inner City (1951–1981)

Year	*Cultivators*		*Agricultural labourers*		*Household industry*		*Construction*		*Trade and commerce*		*Transport storage & communication*		*Other services*		*Non-workers*		*Total population*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
1951	3802	1.19	5648	1.77	7530	2.36	4778	1.50	4019	1.26	2925	0.92	67248	21.08	223078	69.92	319028	100.00
1961	1942	1.19	3513	2.16	6554	4.03	2638	1.62	3204	1.97	1933	1.19	45525	27.97	97467	59.87	162776	100.00
1971	2594	1.22	4381	2.06	8638	4.06	3623	1.70	4344	2.04	2639	1.24	58859	27.65	127759	60.03	212837	100.00
1981	2309	0.96	2362	0.98	5322	2.22	4940	2.05	5761	2.40	5789	2.41	50964	21.22	163017	67.86	240195	100.00

Source: Office of Directorate of Census Operations.

Table 5.4
Occupational Categories

Community	*Occupational categories*										Total	
	Category I *Big business/ managerial in industry/gazetted officials*		**Category II** *Professionals (privately practicing & govt. employed)/ medium business*		**Category III** *Non-gazetted officials & clerks/ agriculturalists/ retired govt. officials/Gulf employed/armed forces*		**Category IV** *Artisans and other unorganised skilled workers/industrial workers/petty business/daily wage workers in service sector/Nizam government pensioners/religious functionaries*		**Category V** *Itinerant salesmen/ unskilled self-employed/contract and daily wage labourers/class IV employees*			
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	31	2.64	163	13.86	343	29.17	395	33.59	244	10.75	1176	100.00
Hindus	50	6.98	121	16.90	129	18.02	237	33.10	179	25.00	716	100.00
SCs & STs	0	0.00	8	4.19	23	12.04	92	48.17	68	35.60	191	100.00
Total	81	3.89	292	14.02	495	23.76	724	34.76	491	23.57	2083	100.00

Table 5.5
Occupation and Income

Occupational categories	*Income levels*										*Total*	
	Less than Rs. 200		*Rs. 201–400*		*Rs. 401–1000*		*Rs. 1001–2000*		*Rs. 2001 & above*			
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Category I Big business/managerial in industry/ gazetted officials	0	0.00	1	1.32	19	25.00	42	55.26	14	18.42	76	100.00
Category II Professionals/(privately practicing and government employed)/ medium business	5	2.23	25	11.16	122	54.46	59	26.34	13	5.80	224	100.00
Category III Non-gazetted officials & clerks/agriculturalists/retired government officials/Gulf employed/armed forces.	41	10.05	78	19.12	178	43.82	74	18.14	37	9.07	408	100.00
Category IV Artisans and other unorganised skilled workers/industrial workers/ petty business/daily wage workers in service sector/Nizam government pensioners/religious functionaries	68	11.31	222	36.94	272	45.26	30	4.99	9	1.50	601	100.00
Category V Itinerant salesmen/unskilled self employed/contract & daily wage labourers/class IV employees	76	17.27	178	40.45	168	38.18	12	2.72	6	1.36	440	100.00
Total	190	10.86	504	28.82	759	43.38	217	12.41	79	2.80	1749	100.00

In a sample of 2,083 workers (27 per cent of the total population and 44 per cent of the adult population), only 4 per cent belong to category I which includes big business such as sale of jewellery and wholesale trading of goods like grain, oilseeds, etcetera, managerial jobs in industry and gazetted officials (Table 5.4). Although most of the big businessmen gave us highly undervalued estimates of their incomes (this was obvious because the incomes quoted did not match the appearance and size of the business establishments), we found a comparatively high income level in category I with 55 per cent earning a monthly income of Rs. 1000 to Rs. 2000 and 18 per cent earning Rs. 2001 and above (Table 5.5). This high-prestige occupation category includes 7 per cent of the Hindus and 3 per cent of the Muslims in the walled area. There is no one from the scheduled castes and tribes in this category.

The next category, comprising 14 per cent of the population, includes privately practicing and government employed professionals like doctors, lawyers, teachers and lecturers, as well as those involved in medium-scale business, such as small-scale retail of grocery, cloth and sarees. Fifty-four per cent of the people in this category reported a monthly income of between Rs. 401 and Rs. 1000. Here again, we faced the same problem of businessmen reporting incomes which were blatantly incommensurate with the size of their establishments or houses. However, the salaried and the low income classes by and large reported seemingly accurate incomes. Seventeen per cent of the Hindus, 14 per cent of the Muslims and four per cent of the scheduled castes and tribes in the walled area fall into this occupational category.

Comprising 23 per cent of the population, category III includes non-gazetted officials and clerks, agriculturists (whose main income is from land in villages), retired government officials, those employed in Gulf countries (whose dependents live in the walled city) and those in the armed forces. Forty-four per cent of those employed in this category of occupations earn a monthly income of between Rs. 401 and Rs. 1000 and 29 per cent earn less than Rs. 400. About 18 per cent, probably those employed in the Gulf, earn more than Rs. 1000. The work undertaken by those employed in the Gulf is generally of a semi-skilled or low-skilled nature, such as motor repair, shop floor supervision, clerical work, driving, tailoring and cooking. However, their incomes are relatively higher than can be earned in similar occupations in Hyderabad. Twenty-nine per cent of the Muslims, 18 per cent of the Hindus, and 12 per cent of the

scheduled castes and tribes in the walled city belong to this category. The presence of a higher proportion of Muslims in this category is due to the inclusion of those who are working in the Gulf.

In category IV, which comprises 35 per cent of the working population, are included the skilled and semi-skilled self-employed workers. Artisans engaged in traditional occupations such as weaving, chappal making, pottery, and food preparation like baking, milk and curd production, all belong to this category. There are also industry-related skilled workers and operatives (unorganised) such as motor mechanics, lathe machine operators, cycle and rickshaw repairers, welders and fitters. We also included in this category those engaged in petty business such as vending fruits and vegetables in the market, and selling peppermint and other sweetmeats, as well as the daily wage workers in the service sector like auto rickshaw and truck drivers, tea boys and cleaners (in hotels). All these occupations, as is evident, are part of the informal sector and constitute 93 per cent of this category. The industrial workers, the Nizam's government pensioners and religious functionaries like muezzins, mullahs and caretakers of mosques and temples constitute the remaining 7 per cent. About 48 per cent of them earn an income of less than Rs. 400 per month while 45 per cent earn between Rs. 401 and Rs. 1000.

Category V comprises 25 per cent of the working population. Apart from contract and daily wage labour, the category includes those in unskilled self-employment like rickshaw pulling, scavenging, vending fruits and other articles on carts, and selling clothes, combs, pens and other sundry items on the footpaths: These occupations are usually associated with the informal sector and constitute 74 per cent of this category. Class IV government employees such as peons, havaldars, watchmen, Municipal Corporation cleaners and sweepers also fall into this category. The income level of 57 per cent of the people in this category is below Rs. 400, while 38 per cent earn between Rs. 401 and Rs. 1000. By and large, therefore, categories IV and V comprise the informal sector which accounts for 50 per cent of the working population of the walled city.

The proportion of workers in categories IV and V is more or less the same among the Hindus and the Muslims. However, the proportion of Hindus and the scheduled caste and tribe communities in category V is higher than that of the Muslims because of their predominance in daily wage and contract labour (mostly construction work). These categories are thus characterised by people who belong to

low income groups and, as can be seen, comprise the majority of the population. All the three major communities in the walled city have a large low income strata.

The difference between the Hindu and Muslim employment pattern is significant only in two occupational categories. The proportion of Hindus is higher than Muslims in occupation category I primarily due to the predominance of Marwaris who are engaged in big business. On the other hand, the Muslims predominate category III which consists of clerks, retired government officials and those employed in the Gulf countries (Table 5.4).

The study entitled 'Planning for the Social Facilities in the Old City of Hyderabad'[3] found that 40 per cent of those employed in the informal sector in metropolitan Hyderabad live in the walled city. Our own household survey shows that almost 50 per cent of the walled city residents are engaged in the informal sector. The question that arises, then, is whether these workers are employed in the walled city itself or whether, due to the availability of cheap housing, the walled city has become a dormitory for unorganised and floating labour.

Our data (Table 5.6) show that 11 per cent of the working population in the sample work at home and 44 per cent work elsewhere in the walled city and its neighbouring Old City areas. The majority of these workers belong to categories IV and V which are largely comprised of the informal sector. A good number of workers in category II, which includes professionals like lawyers and doctors and those engaged in medium-scale business, also work in the walled city. This may be explained by the presence of the City Civil Courts and High Court in the walled city and, of course, by the perpetual demand for professionals like doctors and teachers. Medium-Scale business in the walled city is generally of the traditional type. Thirty-two per cent of the walled city working population are employed in the new city, as are a sizeable number of those who belong to the informal sector. Among those who work in the new city are also a large number of workers from category III, most of them being non-gazetted clerks and officials.

BUSINESS ACTIVITY

Apart from considering the levels and status of occupations, we also

[3] *Ibid.*

Table 5.6
Location of Work-place

Occupational categories	*Location*														*Total*	
	At home		*Old City (inclusive of inner city)*		*New City*		*Districts within state*		*Other states*		*Other countries*		*No specific place of work*			
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Category I																
Big business/managerial in industry/gazetted officials	2	2.73	20	27.39	35	47.94	13	17.80	1	1.36	2	2.73	0	0.00	73	100.00
Category II																
Professionals/(privately practicing and government employed)/medium business	11	4.36	134	53.17	87	34.52	9	3.57	2	0.79	2	0.79	7	2.77	252	100.00
Category III																
Non-gazetted officials & clerks/agriculturalists/ retired government officials/Gulf employed/ armed forces.	3	0.99	75	24.75	135	44.55	19	6.27	4	1.32	66	21.78	1	0.33	303	100.00

(Table 5.6 contd.)

Location of Work-place

Occupational categories	*Location*														*Total*	
	At home		*Old City (inclusive of inner city)*		*New City*		*Districts within state*		*Other states*		*Other countries*		*No specific place of work*			
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Category IV Artisans and other unorganised skilled workers/ industrial workers/petty business/daily wage workers in service sector/Nizam government pensioners/ religious functionaries	133	19.55	270	46.71	145	25.08	21	3.63	2	0.34	3	0.51	24	4.15	578	100.00
Category V Itinerant salesmen/ unskilled self-employed/ contract & daily wage labourers/class IV employees	46	11.58	199	50.12	108	27.20	9	2.26	0	0.00	2	0.50	33	8.31	397	100.00
Total	175	10.91	698	.3.54	510	31.81	71	4.42	9	0.56	75	4.67	65	4.05	1603	100.00

undertook a detailed analysis of the scale of business operation in the walled city. We identified three levels of operation, namely, household industry—where the product is manufactured in the house by the members of the household with or without the help of hired workers; business establishments—where business is transacted in shops, hotels, and so on, and for which hired workers are employed; and self-employment—where business is the outcome of individual enterprise, skill and labour. We elicited information on various aspects of business such as types of business activity, reach of market, and the source and place of storage of raw material.

Table 5.7 shows that while only 16 per cent are engaged in wholesale business, 45 per cent do retail and 20 per cent do piece work, that is, work done for big business establishments on short-term contract basis, usually at home by self-employed artisans. Only 19 per cent engage in long term contract jobs.

Table 5.7
Types of Business Activity

Scale of operation	*Type of business*									
	Wholesale		*Retail*		*Piecework*		*Contractors/ agents, etc.*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Self-employment (other than household industry)	33	15.63	82	38.86	52	24.64	44	20.85	211	100.00
Household industry	10	14.71	12	17.65	27	39.71	19	27.94	68	100.00
Business establishments	30	15.71	118	61.78	17	8.90	26	13.61	191	100.00
Total	73	15.53	212	45.11	96	10.43	89	8.94	470	100.00

The predominance of retail and piece work shows that business in the walled city is generally small-scale. Its clientele is therefore largely local. As can be seen from Table 5.8, 60 per cent of the clientele belong to the walled city itself. The household industry units are particularly oriented to the local market, specialising in such products as footwear, handloom lungis, wooden furniture and food preparations, all of which are locally consumed. Thity-one per cent come from the twin cities for such goods as jewellery, quilts, aluminium and enamelled utensils and perfumes, which are typical of the market there.

Table 5.8
Reach of Market of Inner City Goods and Services

Scale of operation	*Reach of market*									
	Local (inner City & Old city residents)		*Twin city buyers*		*Other districts within A.P.*		*Other states*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Self-employment (other than household industry)	128	59.81	70	26.17	7	3.27	9	4.21	214	100.00
Household industry	51	69.86	15	20.54	6	8.22	1	1.37	73	100.00
Business establishment	118	57.84	68	24.51	14	6.86	4	0.49	204	100.00
Total	297	60.49	153	31.16	27	5.50	14	2.85	491	100.00

Table 5.9
Place of Storage

Scale of operation	*Place of storage*							
	In the shop		*At home*		*In a godown (separate from shop)*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Self-employment (other than household industry)	76	58.46	43	33.08	11	8.46	130	100.00
Household industry	35	60.34	22	37.93	1	1.72	58	100.00
Business establishment	140	81.87	16	9.36	15	8.77	171	100.00
Total	251	69.92	81	22.56	27	7.52	359	100.00

The type of storage space used also confirms the small scale of business activity in the walled city. Table 5.8 shows that 70 per cent of those doing business store their goods in the shop itself while 22.5 per cent store them at home. Only 7.5 per cent have a separate godown.

The scale and extent of business activity in the walled city of Hyderabad is thus fairly small. It is certainly much smaller than that

in the walled city of Shahjahanabad in Old Delhi. In Old Delhi, business activity has developed to such an extent that residential areas have been completely invaded by commercial establishments. All open areas, like the internal courtyards so typical of old city houses and even the space between houses, have been enclosed to serve as shops or godowns. Douglas Goodfriend writes:

> Archways and windows are being widened or sealed up to conform to the requirements of goods, transit and storage. Baithaks (living rooms) are being transformed into shops, factories, godowns and printing presses. Katras once housing 10 to 20 families have become cloth bazaars, forcing those families into even tighter quarters in nearby mohallas.[4]

This phenomenon is not seen in Hyderabad's walled city, both because the scale of business activity there is smaller and is limited to areas like Pathergatti and Lad Bazar.

The source of raw materials and finished goods for sale is also localised, with 63 per cent of the business units obtaining their raw materials or goods from the walled city itself or its neighbouring Old City areas. It is evident that, given the small scale of their business, most businessmen prefer to avoid transport costs. Those who get their raw material from the city are usually self-employed or run household industry units by doing short-term contract jobs, that is, piece work for the new city business establishments. Binding books, making chappals and manufacturing metal artefacts are some of the piece work jobs done in the walled city.

Thus we find that business activity in the walled city is, by and large, conducted on a small scale, within a localised market and has weak linkages with the new city business activities. This is not merely due to the low financial viability of its businessmen but also because of the various historical factors which isolated the walled city from the growth impulses of the new city areas. The linking of the railways with the old city of Delhi had played a crucial role in converting old Delhi into a major wholesale market. In the case of Hyderabad's walled city, it was its exclusion from major railway and trade routes that halted the further growth of economic activity south of the river Musi.

[4] Goodfriend, Douglas E., 'Shahjahanabad—Old Delhi: Tradition and Planned Change' in *Ekistics*, 49, 297, November/December 1982.

The imperialist policies of the British demanded that the sea port of Masulipatnam which was connected by a major commercial route to the Old City south of the Musi must suffer attrition. Hyderabad was therefore connected to the British initiated cities of Bombay and Madras. The railway line that was built up to Secunderabad in 1874 was connected to Madras in 1898 *via* Warangal and the entire trade of Hyderabad was transferred from Masulipatnam to Madras and Bombay. This inevitably accelerated the northward expansion of Hyderabad, assisted the industrial development of the new city, and reinforced the commercial development of Secunderabad. The process of industrial growth, which led to a self-propelling process of urban development in Hyderabad north of the Musi, was denied to the Old City, which had the potential of expanding further southwards.

Economic activity in the walled city therefore did not rise above the level of petty trading by local business communities. If there seemed to be any kind of industrial development, it was small-scale and rudimentary in nature, confined to the manufacture of such products as cooking oil, soap, buttons and metal artefacts. Even with the introduction of modern technology, industrial activity remained at the backyard production level: workshops for lathe machine operations, production of plastic pipes and the manufacture of ice were set up in garages and backyards.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Given the low level of economic activity in the walled city and the scarcity of employment opportunities outside it, a high unemployment rate is not unexpected. By asking every household in our sample about the number of its members who were seeking employment, we found that 487 persons are unemployed. With 2,083 persons working, the rate of unemployment in the walled city is 19 per cent as against the national rate of approximately 10 per cent.

Unemployment was found to be higher among the Muslim and the scheduled caste and tribe communities, both of which have an unemployment rate of 21 per cent as against 16 per cent among the Hindus. The higher rate of unemployment among the Muslims may be attributed to their past association with the Nizam's administration. Table 5.10 shows that out of a sample of 1,031 households, 304 households (29 per cent) have at least one member or ancestor who has

Table 5.10
Past Association of Households with Nizam's Administration

Community	*Status*											
	Nizam's descendants		*Nobility*		*Jagirdar/senior officials*		*Middle level officials*		*Soldiers/ minions*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	9	3.73	0	0.00	40	16.60	98	40.66	94	39.00	241	100.00
Hindus	1	2.00	1	2.00	9	18.00	17	34.00	22	44.00	50	100.00
SCs & STs	2	15.38	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	38.46	6	46.15	13	100.00
Respondents	12	2.95	1	0.33	49	16.12	120	39.47	122	40.13	304	100.00

been associated with the Nizam's administration or family in the past. The Muslims constitute the majority of these households, with most of them having been employed as middle-level officials and soldiers or minions. Very few of the Muslims who served in the higher levels of the Nizam's administrative hierarchy chose to stay back in the walled city after 1951.

After the Police Action, the households that were dependent upon the Nizam's administration for their livelihood, particularly those from the lower echelons, became downwardly mobile for two reasons. First, the nature of their previous occupations was such that it required no particular qualifications. Employment was granted mostly out of patronage and on the basis of the employee's proficiency in Urdu, the language of the now defunct administration. Many of the people in the Nizam's service thus found themselves redundant in the newly organised society. Second, families which experienced a sudden fall in status, such as those of the jagirdars and the middle-level officials, continued to maintain a false sense of dignity, preferring to subsist on a meagre pension rather than take up what they considered to be low-status jobs.

We came across a grand old lady who claimed to be a relative of the Nizam family. Her house, or rather, her mansion with its chandelliers, mirrors and cushioned furniture, was clearly reminiscent of a once opulent life-style. The rooms were so large that the house could easily accommodate a high school. However, most of the rooms had been locked up for years. The lady had two married sons, both of whom were unemployed but were making preparations for employment in the Gulf. The household's income came from her husband's pension and from the out-houses which were let out on rent to a few rickshaw pullers. The lady also maintained a car. Our data provides evidence regarding the downward mobility of such families. From among the 304 households associated with the Nizam's administration in the past, 197 persons are unemployed. About 82 per cent of these belong to households where the fathers or the grandfathers were middle-level officials, soldiers or minions in the Nizam's offices. In addition to the high rate of unemployment prevalent among such families, the condition of their houses, as will be shown later in this Chapter, is also very poor.

High unemployment among the Muslims may also be attributed to their higher proportion among the migrants from rural areas since 1961 (as has been mentioned earlier in this Chapter and in

Chapter 1). These rural immigrants usually remain unemployed for a long time before their absorption into the informal sector where they pursue such occupations as rickshaw pulling, fruit vending in carts and other odd jobs. The high level of illiteracy among the scheduled castes and tribes keeps them in humble occupations if not unemployed.

LITERACY AND EDUCATION

The literacy level of the walled city residents is relatively high. According to the 1981 census, the proportion of literates for the entire city population was 47 per cent. The survey of the walled area showed 77 per cent literates among the adult population. Among children, 75 per cent of the school-going age group (between ages 4 to 16) go to school while 25 per cent either stay at home, are drop-outs or employed.

However, as can be seen from Table 5.12 the level of education among the adult literates is low, with 26 per cent having studied upto the primary level or having undergone only religious instruction. Many of the 39 per cent who studied upto the secondary level dropped out before the matriculation examination or failed it. It might be pointed out here that most of the adult literates have been educated in the language of the erstwhile Nizam's administration, that is, Urdu.

The lowest levels of education are to be found among the scheduled castes and tribes. While 40 per cent of them are illiterates, 38 per cent of the literates have studied only upto the primary level, and another 32 per cent upto the secondary level.

Illiteracy is high among the female adult population, with 34 per cent illiterates as against 17 per cent among the male adult population. Table 5.12 shows that education levels among women are also very low. The table also shows a higher proportion of literates among the Muslim female adults, probably because it is customary to read the *Koran* in most Muslim families.

From among the 2,414 children of the school-going age group in the sample, 603 (25 per cent) do not go to school. While some of them may have never gone to school, a large number of them are drop-outs. Our data show that most of the drop-outs come from families with 'problems', that is, families deprived in one way or another, thereby leading to poor or no education.

Table 5.11
Education: Adults

Community	*Levels of education among adult literates*													
	Literate i.e. upto primary level/ religious learning		*Secondary level*		*Intermediate/ diploma holder/ graduate*		*Postgraduate/ professional*		*Total number of literates*		*Illiterates*		*Total adult population*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Muslims	564	25.85	913	40.23	565	24.90	227	10.00	2269	100.00	599	20.88	2868	100.00
Hindus	317	25.01	468	36.83	342	26.99	140	11.04	1267	100.00	381	23.10	1648	100.00
SCs & STs	87	38.32	72	31.71	54	23.78	14	6.16	227	100.00	154	40.40	381	100.00
Total	968	25.72	1453	38.61	961	25.53	381	10.12	3763	100.00	1124	23.15	4897	100.00

Table 5.12
Education: Female

Community	*Levels of education among adult female literates*													
	Literate i.e. upto primary level/ religious learning		*Secondary level*		*Intermediate/ diploma holder/ graduate*		*Postgraduate/ professional*		*Total number of literates*		*Illiterates*		*Total female adults*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Muslims	210	30.92	320	47.12	132	19.44	17	2.50	679	100.00	281	29.27	960	100.00
Hindus	122	25.95	219	46.59	122	25.95	7	1.48	470	100.00	272	36.62	742	100.00
SCs & STs	15	60.00	9	36.00	1	4.00	0	0.00	25	100.00	49	66.21	74	100.00
Total	847	29.55	548	46.67	255	21.72	24	2.04	1174	100.00	602	33.88	1776	100.00

Other than unfavourable economic conditions, some of the problems we identified are: illness or death of the head of household, which compels the children to work; the need of an additional hand in the family business; a poor foundation in early schooling because of irregular attendance and, particularly among girls, household responsibilities such as cooking and looking after the younger ones. We also identified problems of a social nature, such as early marriage and the belief in not educating female children above the minimum level. An appraisal of the school-going children shows that 67 per cent of them are at the primary level, of which 12 per cent are undergoing religious education. A good number (32 per cent) are being trained to acquire some particular skill, either by apprenticeship or by employment.

It is clear, then, that a large number of walled city residents are deprived of formal education. Among those who do receive formal education, many do not go beyond the secondary level. While this is certainly an outcome of poor economic conditions, paucity of educational facilities may also be a contributory factor.

As has been pointed out in Chapter 4, there are several schools in the walled city. But since they are small and congested, with practically no space for training in games and sports, most of them are structurally unfit for schooling.

From among 227 schools in the walled area covered by our on-the-ground survey, 155 (68 per cent) are primary/upper primary schools while only 51 (22 per cent) are high or secondary level schools. There are 21 (9 per cent) coaching centres which tutor secondary level students. Thus educational facilities are by and large restricted to the level of primary education. As a result, the few high schools that do exist, particularly the government ones, are under great pressure. Of the 18 government high schools, nine work on a shift system, with one batch of students attending school from 8.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and the other batch from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m.

This naturally implies a reduction in the number of learning hours, leading to a poor level of education. And because of the poor training provided in schools, especially high schools, more and more children find that they require extra coaching. This accounts for the large number of coaching centres mushrooming in the walled area. Also, many secondary level students prefer to travel to the new city and attend better schools there. During our fieldwork, several families with children studying in the new city complained

about the impairing effect that prolonged periods of curfew had on their children's education, since classes have to be missed every time curfew is declared.

About 70 per cent of the schools in the walled city are run privately, either by individuals or by community organisations like the Anjuman-e-Urdu-Tarakki. Often, schools are funded by mosque or temple authorities; these are sometimes located within the premises of the mosque or temple itself.

Most of the private schools are run on rented space which is usually a part of the landlord's house. Thus, space becomes a major problem for these schools because, as our survey shows, the average student strength of a school is between 150 to 200.

It is interesting to note that while most private schools use English as their medium of instruction, all government schools, both primary and secondary (numbering 72), use either Urdu or Telugu. This may be due to the fact that the government schools were established a very long time ago, when the official language of Hyderabad was Urdu and, to a lesser extent, Telugu. Thus 25 per cent of government schools continue to teach in Urdu while nine per cent teach in Telugu. Only about 5 per cent teach in Hindi.

Apart from English, a few of the recently established schools have also adopted Arabic as their medium of instruction. It is obvious from the recent nature of this phenomenon that it is Gulf-related. We found that Arabic is becoming increasingly popular in schools, at least as the second if not the main language of instruction, because it facilitates better employment opportunities in the Gulf. In Moghulpura, an area reputedly inhabited by upper class Muslims, most of whom have benefited from Gulf employment, there are two primary schools that use Arabic as their medium of instruction. One was established in 1984 and the other in 1985. In Hussaini Alam, an Arabic medium institution for boys called Nizamia High School was established during the days of the Nizam rule. Since then, this institution has expanded considerably, with new buildings constructed on its ample playgrounds. The authorities told us that this was possible because of the funds provided by supporting organisations in the Gulf countries.

To conclude, the major problem with education in the walled city is the lack of adequate infrastructure which leads to a cumulative lowering of standards. Facilities such as proper school buildings with adequate seating capacity, if not space for games and physical exercise,

and trained staff can easily be provided by the state. Ironically, it is in these very areas that the state-controlled schools are found to be inadequate. No effort has been made to renovate and expand government school buildings, nor has there been any attempt to introduce English as the medium of instruction at least in a few schools.

HOUSING

As might be expected in a situation of multiple deprivation, the problem of poor quality housing tends to coincide with the problem of low incomes, low levels of economic activity and a high rate of unemployment. The high level of congestion in houses, that is, shortage of living space leading to overcrowding of rooms and the sharing of household amenities like latrines, water, and so on, has already been discussed in Chapter 4. Here we are concerned with the physical aspect of housing, that is, with the quality of housing material used, as an indicator of the socio–economic status of the household.

The Census of India also contains information on this aspect, and classifies houses into two types: *kaccha*[5] and *pucca*[6]. *Pucca* houses have walls made of burnt bricks and stone which are packed with lime or cement, cement concrete or timber, and roofs made of tiles, galvanised corrugated iron sheets, asbestos cement sheets, reinforced cement concrete or timber. *Kaccha* houses, by Census definition, have walls and roofs made of closely packed (with mud) stone and unburnt bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, reed, thatch or any material other than those mentioned for *pucca* houses.

Looking at the census data on *kaccha* and *pucca* housing for the period 1951 to 1981, we find that for an urban area that is part of a growing metropolis, the walled city has an uncharacteristically high percentage of *kaccha* houses (see map on Population Density and Shelter). In the 1951 census, 64 per cent of the walled city's occupied residential houses were *kaccha* and 36 per cent were *pucca* (Table 5.13). Ward 20, a densely-populated settlement area from the time the Asaf Jah rulers built their palaces there, had the highest number of *kaccha* houses. The Asaf Jahis were Sunnis, and a large number of

[5] See, *Instructions to Enumerators for Filling Up The Household Schedule And Individual Slip*, a publication of the Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner for India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 1981, p. 5.

[6] See, *ibid*.

their community who belonged to the lower socio–economic strata settled down around their palaces. Even today, in areas like Hussaini Alam, Shahgunj, Fateh Darwaza, Kazipura, Panch Mohalla and Shakergunj (ward 20), the poorer members of the Sunni community are found living in *kaccha* houses.

Table 5.13
Types of Housing, 1951–1981

Ward	*House-holds*	*Occupied residential houses*		*Pucca*		*Kaccha*	
	No.	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
			1951				
20	25,182	18,352	100.00	6,799	37.04	11,553	62.95
21	17,369	13,267	100.00	4,977	37.51	8,290	62.48
22	7,444	5,369	100.00	1,825	33.99	3,544	66.00
23	10,481	11,149	100.00	3,696	33.15	7,453	66.84
Total	60,476	48,137	100.00	17,297	35.94	30,840	64.07
			1961				
20	7,883	6,496	100.00	2,596	29.96	2,900	60.04
21	7,315	6,291	100.00	2,634	41.87	3,657	58.13
22	7,177	5,312	100.00	2,193	41.28	3,119	58.72
23	27,275	5,933	100.00	2,470	41.63	3,463	58.37
Total	49,650	24,032	100.00	9,893	41.17	1,139	58.83
			1971				
20	9,690	6,211	100.00	2,304	37.10	3,907	62.90
21	7,325	4,986	100.00	2,158	43.28	2,828	56.72
22	8,429	6,003	100.00	2,469	41.13	3,534	58.87
23	8,988	6,117	100.00	2,687	43.93	3,430	56.07
Total	34,432	23,317	100.00	9,618	41.25	13,699	58.75
			*1981**				
20	10,848	10,833	100.00	5,400	49.85	5,432	50.14
21	7,111	7,094	100.00	4,280	60.33	2,814	39.67
22	8,317	8,093	100.00	6,474	80.00	1,619	20.00
23	9,864	9,644	100.00	6,751	70.00	2,892	29.99
Total	36,140	35,664	100.00	22,905	64.21	12,757	35.77

* In the 1981 census house and household have been defined synonymously. Therefore, the number of households is almost the same as the number of occupied residential houses.

Between 1951 and 1961, not only was there a decline in the proportion of *kaccha* houses but the number of both *kaccha* and *pucca* houses decreased. This decrease is perhaps explained by the massive outmigration trend which characterised that decade. The condition of many vacant houses deteriorated and perhaps as many were razed to the ground. Only a few *pucca* houses were built in their place.

In fact, the years between 1961 and 1971 witnessed a further decrease in the number of houses. The stagnation in housing construction has to be seen in the light of the reversal of the migratory trend which took place during this period, resulting in a fresh influx of people into the walled city. By 1951, the housing density in the walled city was already very high (see Chapter 4). Given this, and the fact that most of the migrants who came in were too poor to build houses for themselves, instead finding shelter with relatives or in rented premises, it is not surprising that hardly any new constructions were made.

If one looks at the changes that took place during the 1961–1971 period, one finds that the *kaccha* houses in ward 20 remained static, while some of the old *pucca* houses were pulled down or abandoned. In ward 21 there was a decline in the number of occupied residential houses, most of which were *kaccha*. The nucleus of the Marwari community in this area increased between 1961 and 1971, while the poorer Muslims moved to Muslim-dominated areas such as Hussaini Alam. The number of *kaccha* houses thus declined, probably because the houses left behind by these groups were demolished to make room for fewer but more spacious buildings.

In ward 22, there was an increase in both *pucca* and *kaccha* houses due to the availability of vacant areas which once formed the sprawling palace grounds of the nobles. In ward 23, however, there was only a marginal increase in *pucca* houses, with the number of *kaccha* houses remaining roughly the same.

Thus on the whole, we find that in the 1961 to 1971 decade there was no change in the standard of housing in the walled city, with *kaccha* housing continuing to predominate.

The 1981 census figures presented in Table 13 cannot be used for comparison because in this census, 'house' and 'household' have been used synonymously. Consequently, we find the census reporting a sudden increase in the total number of occupied residential houses in each ward, most of these being *pucca* houses.

However, our household survey data provides an appraisal of the

current standard of housing. In this study, we have introduced a third category to denote the type of housing, namely, *kaccha-pucca*. Many of the houses that we visited had select portions like the rooms facing the street renovated with cement concrete; the rest of the house was left *kaccha*, with mud and brick walls and a roof of roughly-made country tiles. Also, some of the old *pucca* houses, which usually have tiled roofs and walls made of lime, are in such a state of disrepair that we classified them under this third category.

Our survey shows that out of 1,030 houses, 43 per cent are entirely *kaccha* while 35 per cent are *kaccha-pucca* (Table 5.14). This indicates that the situation has not changed much since 1971, with the proportion of *kaccha* houses continuing to be high. The proportion of *kaccha-pucca* houses is also high, which only goes to show the financial inability of the walled city residents to fully renovate their houses (see Chapter 4, Table 4.10). Table 5.14 also shows a greater proportion of such houses among the Muslims, indicating that many of them have begun renovating their homes, however marginally. There is evidence in our survey that quite a few Muslim families can now afford renovations because of the additional income accruing to them through employment in Gulf countries.

Table 5.14
Types of Housing

Community	*Type of house*							
	Kaccha		*Pucca*		*Kaccha-pucca*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	267	45.28	110	18.61	214	36.21	591	100.00
Hindus	136	39.42	91	26.38	118	34.20	345	100.00
SCs & STs	41	43.62	22	23.40*	3	32.98	94	100.00
Total	444	43.11	223	21.65	363	35.24	1030	100.00

* 51 per cent of the slum dwellers belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The high proportion of houses among this community may be a consequence of the sites and services scheme for slum dwellers.

According to Table 5.14, the Muslims and the scheduled castes and tribes have poorer housing facilities than the Hindus. This is not surprising, given that these communities are characterised by higher levels of unemployment and humble occupation levels. Further, those households which were associated with the Nizam's administration

in the past, most of which are Muslim, have a high percentage of *kaccha* houses.

OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY AND RENT

As far as ownership of property is concerned, we find that 58 per cent (599 households) of our respondents own property, which is almost always the house they are living in. Only 19 households own houses in the new city, two own houses in the districts and four in other states. Approximately half of these property-holders have inherited their property, while the other half have purchased either the land on which their house is built, or the house itself.

Table 5.15 shows that a greater proportion of the Hindus and the scheduled castes and tribes have inherited their houses. This implies that there are still a large number of people in these communities whose families go back several years. Among the Muslims, however, several of the old families migrated out of the walled city during the 1950s.

Our data show that an important source of income to the household is the house itself. We found that in almost all the privately owned houses in the walled city, one or more portions have been let out on rent. Often, a tenant himself sublets his portion. However, as can be seen from Table 5.16, the rents at which they are let out are very low.

The rent structure derived from the survey shows that 64 per cent of the tenants pay less than Rs. 100 as rent. Among these, 17 per cent pay less than Rs. 30 per month. Of the rest of the tenants in the sample, 24 per cent pay a rent of between Rs. 101 and Rs. 200. The highest rent, paid by only one household in the sample, is around Rs. 1001. Such a low rent structure supports the evidence of the poor standard of housing. As we have just seen, a large number of the houses are still *kaccha* and, moreover, very old. We found that 40 per cent of our respondents live in houses that are 50 to 100 years old and about 7 per cent in houses that are over a 100 years old.

Nevertheless, ownership of a house, whatever its condition, is a valuable source of livelihood for the walled city residents. Because the rents are so low, there is a high demand for housing from the large floating population working in the walled as well as the new city.

Given the high demand for housing, there are frequent cases of

Table 5.15
Property Ownership by Community

Community	*Inherited*				*Purchased*							
	One house		*Two houses*		*One house*		*Two houses*		*Squatted (illegal property)*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	141	40.63	2	0.58	201	57.93	1	0.29	2	0.58	357	100.00
Hindus	123	59.71	1	0.49	81	39.32	1	0.49	0	0.00	206	100.00
SCs & STs	32	69.58	0	0.00	14	30.43	0	0.00	0	0.00	46	100.00
Total	296	49.42	3	0.50	296	49.42	2	0.31	2	0.31	599	100.00

Table 5.16
Rent Structure

Rent paid in rupees	*Number of tenant households*	*Per cent*
Below 30	162	16.75
31–50	171	17.68
51–100	285	29.47
101–200	231	23.88
201–300	75	7.75
301–500	38	3.93
501–1000	4	0.41
1001 and above	1	0.10
Total	967	100.00

subdivision and litigation of property, which further depress the socio–economic status of the households. In our survey we found 52 cases of subdivision, of which seven comprised *devdis* (mansions). In 34 per cent of the cases, the house was sub-divided into two, whereas in 57 per cent they varied from three to six portions. We could not elicit much information regarding litigation over property except about the duration of the litigation process. We discovered 17 cases of litigation, 29 per cent of which had been in progress for less than five years while the rest had been going on for longer, some for as long as 50 years.

Poor housing in the walled city is thus due to the presence of a large number of old and *kaccha* houses and the economic inability of most families to renovate them. Sub-letting rooms only compounds the problem by increasing congestion and pressure on amenities such as piped water, latrines and access to the house.

IMPACT OF GULF EMPLOYMENT

While formulating the questionnaire, we were particularly keen on capturing what we termed as the 'Gulf impact' on the walled city residents. The sudden rise in international oil prices during the 1970s gave a tremendous boost to the economies of countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in the Persian Gulf. This initiated a massive industrialisation process in these countries, which required large resources of skilled and unskilled manpower. While the former was imported from the more advanced, western countries, unskilled manpower was drawn in

abundance from Third World countries like India. From Hyderabad, particularly from the walled city, large numbers of unemployed youth migrated to these countries in the 1970s. The impact of this linkage with the gulf countries is most obviously seen in the improved facade of houses, which have been renovated in typically Islamic style; in the adoption of new styles of dress such as the Arab headgear; and in the increasing popularity of Arabic language classes in schools. Taking these as indicators, we formulated a series of questions for households with members working in the Gulf in order to get a quantified assessment of the Gulf impact.

Of our total sample size of 1,031 households, 126 households (12 per cent) have family members in Gulf countries. Of these, 82 households have one member each in the Gulf, 33 households have two members each and 11 households have three members each, totalling up to 181 persons in the Gulf. All of them are Muslims.

It might be pointed out here that this 12 per cent is not truly representative of the Gulf phenomenon. While it is correct for the walled city, it is well known that in areas just outside it, in Yakutpura for instance, and particularly in Barkas (the erstwhile Arab barracks which continue to be a predominantly Arab settlement today), one in every two or three households has a member in the Gulf, so much so that the State Road Transport Corporation has had to arrange a special bus from Barkas to the airport for travellers going to and coming from the Gulf countries.

We managed to elicit detailed information about only 159 persons in the Gulf. Of these, 12 were working, six were seeking employment and 24 were housewives. Of those who were employed, 16 per cent worked as labourers in construction or other similar activities (category V) and 31 per cent worked as operatives and mechanics in industry and in other skilled jobs such as tailoring, cooking and driving (category IV). Another 39 per cent were clerks doing white-collar jobs like accounting and typing (category III). Twenty per cent were professionals like doctors and engineers (category II). No one occupied managerial positions or was engaged in big business (category I).

The list of occupations pursued in the Gulf countries indicates that most of the walled city emigrants are absorbed in areas with a low occupational status and high job uncertainty. This is so particularly in the case of those who have found employment on a contract basis, either through an agent or by direct correspondence with the

employers. Once their contract ends, they either have to return home or try to find alternative sources of employment, which are often of a lower level than their previous employment. Of the 129 workers in our sample, 37 per cent got their jobs through agents based in Hyderabad, while 18 per cent were recruited through direct correspondence with the concerned companies. Three per cent were recruited *via* the Government of India, and 42 per cent found employment through friends and relatives. Seeking employment through agents is generally a risky business because, very often, the promised jobs do not exist, or the agents turn out to be frauds. From among our respondents, 34 have lost around Rs. 5000 in their pursuit of a job in the Gulf.

Given the low levels of occupation (although the incomes are higher than in Hyderabad), it is not surprising that the remittances sent home are not substantial. We found that 32 per cent of the workers could afford to send home only about Rs. 500 or less per month, while 38 per cent were able to send between Rs. 501 and Rs. 1000. However, 26 per cent send between Rs. 1000 and Rs. 2000 while 9 per cent could afford as much as Rs. 2000 to Rs. 5000. Only 5 per cent, presumably the professionals, could send home as much as Rs. 5001 to Rs. 10,000 or more.

Such low remittances cannot have any drastic impact on the overall socio–economic status of the household. They can only bring about minor changes and provide temporary relief to the family. According to our survey, barely 2 per cent of the beneficiary households used this money productively, either investing it in business or purchasing land. Eleven per cent saved their income from the Gulf in banks to meet marriage or similar expenses in the future; 55 per cent used it to meet household expenses and buy luxury goods; while 32 per cent spent it to renovate and repair their homes.

We have already mentioned that compared with other Muslim and the Hindu households (the Hindu households here include those of the scheduled caste and tribe community for the purpose of comparison), major improvements to the house were made by families with members in the Gulf. Our survey shows that 44 Gulf households, that is, 35 per cent of the 126 Gulf households, have made improvements in their houses as against 26 per cent (125 households) of the 465 other Muslim households and 20 per cent (89 households) of the 439 Hindu households in the sample. It is worth pointing out here that compared to other households, a larger

proportion of Gulf households have spent amounts greater than Rs. 25,000 on renovations.

Thus, apart from enabling the improvement of housing structure, Gulf earnings by and large provide only short-term benefits like better household utilities, access to luxury goods and better financial ability to face such exigencies as weddings and festivals. With the constant pressure from immediate needs and desires, savings for purchase of property, investment in business and other such ventures that may bring long-term relief are almost non-existent. As stated by many of our respondents, this may also be due to the fact that the incomes flowing from the Gulf are often irregular and varying in nature.

However, the cultural and social aspect of the Gulf impact has been more lasting. Several Arabic cultural styles have been adopted, such as the manner of wearing purdah among women and the mode of headgear among men; the Arabic language is becoming increasingly popular; and several households now possess luxury goods that are freely available in the Gulf. On the other hand, there seems to be a tendency towards a higher degree of fundamentalism and orthodoxy in the practice of religion.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate some of the more significant findings of this socio–economic sample survey. We found that 50 per cent of the working population in the walled city are in the informal sector. Some of them are skilled and semi-skilled self-employed workers. There are also industry-related skilled workers and operatives such as motor mechanics, lathe machine operators, cycle and rickshaw repairers, welders and fitters. Other respondents described their occupations as involving traditional skills such as weaving, chappal making, pottery, food preparation, baking, and milk and curd production. We also included in the informal sector those who sell fruits and vegetables, peppermints and other sweetmeats, as well as daily wage workers in the service sector such as auto-rickshaw and truck drivers, tea boys and cleaners in hotels. All these occupations, as is evident, form the informal sector.

We found that 25 per cent of our respondents are regularly in debt. Our survey shows that, compared to the Hindus, the minorities, namely, the Muslims and the scheduled castes and tribes, predominate

Table 5.17
Community-wise Reasons for Indebtedness

Community	*Reasons*												*Total*	
	For marriages/ religious ceremonies/funerals/ pilgrimage		*To meet household/medical expenditure*		*For business and other work-related needs*		*For renovation/ purchase of property/ litigation*		*To meet household expenses during curfew*		*Due to unemployment*			
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	43	33.07	30	23.07	26	20.00	21	16.15	9	6.92	1	0.76	130	100.00
Hindus	33	49.25	13	19.40	10	14.92	7	10.44	3	4.47	1	1.49	67	100.00
SCs & STs	6	40.00	4	26.66	2	13.33	2	13.33	1	6.66	0	0.00	15	100.00
Total	82	38.67	47	22.16	38	17.92	30	14.15	13	6.13	2	0.94	212	100.00

in low-prestige occupations. Whereas the rate of unemployment among the Hindus is 16 per cent, among the Muslims and scheduled castes it is 21 per cent. Hindus also have a higher proportion of *pucca* housing (relative to the *kaccha* and *pucca* distinction) as compared to the Muslims and the scheduled castes and tribes.

The one silver lining we had expected to find was the possibility of a positive impact of Gulf earnings on the socio–economic status of at least the Muslim households in the walled city. The status of most of the occupations pursued in the Gulf is low, and is coupled with job uncertainty. Further, the savings that are sent home are not as substantial as one might expect. Thus Gulf earnings have brought about only minor changes in the standard of living and temporary relief from economic hardship. The more lasting impact of the Gulf connection seems to have been cultural and social.

like the 'separate electorates' frowned upon by the architects of the Indian Constitution. However, on the other side there is the danger of secular parties getting increasingly marginalised in a mixed constituency wherein each community is aggressively nurtured by communal political leaders.

The delimitation of constituency boundaries (1956, 1966 and 1976) has been such that the concerned electorates in the old city are polarised into near-equal communal halves, thereby tempting parties to resort to communal propaganda at increasingly reckless levels in an attempt to capture seats and to ensure a larger voter turn-out. In so far as the vote banks are community-based, the consequence of these boundary delimitations has been to create situations of *certain uncertainty* regarding electoral results in the walled city. Such situations are ideal for the consolidation of communal forces and, indeed, the Majlis, which was an unknown quantity in the 1950s has leaped from peak to peak, having sent its leader from Hyderabad to Parliament, and having captured the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. It is possible that in reaction to the spectacular success of the Majlis, the Hindu communal forces may gather momentum in the coming years. And as one can imagine, this dominance of communal issues may further weaken effective local government.

SIX

Blight and Slum Formation

Students with a textbook notion of slums would be quite bewildered by the range of housing conditions which constitute a 'slum area' under the Andhra Pradesh Official Slum Act of 1956, as also by areas which fall outside its purview. When a locality is officially identified as a slum it becomes the beneficiary of a variety of government-sponsored programmes especially designed for the poor and those who live in low-income housing. Large financial commitments are made every year for slum eradication programmes, the implication being that such localities are entitled to basic facilities like water supply, street lights and paved roads without having to pay any betterment charges. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is a lot of lobbying by the inhabitants of poor localities to have their area declared a slum.

However, it is also obvious that not all poor localities can be identified as slums, since the finances available would be unable to meet the development costs of extensive areas. Who should direct the spending of such development funds, and how they should be spent and where, all depend on political decision-making. Since these decisions are generally made under political pressure, it is possible that relatively well-off areas might end up being labelled slums, whereas truly depressed and dilapidated areas may remain neglected for lack of political lobbying.

The problems of Hyderabad's walled city described in Chapters 4 and 5 are, of course, common to walled cities elsewhere in India, though their official perception has differed from city to city. For

instance, in Hyderabad, the whole of ward 22 in the walled city has been declared a slum. In Delhi, the entire walled city of Shahjahanabad has been declared a slum despite the booming industrial and business activity in the area. This is because of the acute congestion and high proportion of dilapidated buildings that characterise Shahjahanabad. At the same time, however, many areas in walled cities, including Shahjahanabad, can boast of the existence of essential services like water, sanitation and sewerage of reasonably good quality. Also, in spite of all its problems, several well-to-do people, both Hindu and Muslim, continue to live in the walled cities; as a consequence, land values in the Moghulpura area of Hyderabad's walled city, for instance, are as high as those in Banjara Hills, which is considered an upper class area. In marked contrast to these wealthy inhabitants are the middle classes who are unable to renovate their houses and who require state intervention to improve their environmental conditions.

Given this situation, our study on the walled city took cognizance of dilapidation in inner city areas other than those that have been officially recognised as slums under the Slum Act. In order to formulate a theoretical framework for presenting these two different types of dilapidation, it was important for us to understand how and why a particular area is identified as a slum by the concerned officials in the municipality and state government. We found that labelling an area a slum is essentially a political decision taken as a result of political pressure from residents of areas that are characterised by the non-existence of physical and social infrastructures. Once vacant, these areas have been illegally occupied by squatters. Although in some cases they do have entitlement to the land occupied, the structures put upon it are unauthorised. There are thus no connections for water, sewerage and electricity.

The residents of these areas are mainly socio-economically deprived migrants. However, they comprise valuable vote banks for parties in power. Politicians promise them 'patta rights' (land title), as also roads, water, sewerage and so on, without the imposition of betterment charges. They also promise them schools, training camps and other such facilities which are given free under the Slum Act, the *quid pro quo* being political support. Of course, when the pressure for an area to be declared a slum area builds up, the concerned authorities do insist on some formalities. A socio–economic survey is mandatory to ascertain the occupational and income levels of the people living in that particular area.

Occasionally, areas which do not qualify as slums by any objective criterion, have been declared to be so. An example of such a slum in Hyderabad is Laxminagar in the new city area, where many houses are double-storeyed. Apparently, the residents of Laxminagar requested that they be granted slum status because they wished to avoid paying betterment charges. Evidently, the right kind of political pressure is sometimes enough to get even better-off areas identified as slums. This type of wheeling and dealing on the issue of slum identification is not surprising when one considers the amount of funds involved in urban renewal programmes. Apart from the state and centre-sponsored programmes, there is also international funding of urban renewal programmes. The UNICEF has been sponsoring urban renewal programmes in Hyderabad on a matching grant basis since 1969. This project is known as the Urban Community Development Project of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. The project is now funded by the British Overseas Development Agency. In the first phase, beginning 1984, the Overseas Development Agency released Rs. 8 crores and they are expected to release a further amount of Rs. 14 crores at a later stage. The state government's contribution is Rs. 2 crores for each phase.

In formulating our theoretical framework for this part of the study, we took as our starting point the information from the town planning office that areas with authorised structures would not qualify for financial support under the Slum Act, even if they suffered from extreme dilapidation and slum-like conditions. To differentiate between such dilapidated structures and 'declared' slums, we labelled the former category 'blighted'. The characteristics associated with a slum area differ significantly from those associated with a blighted area. The hypothesis that follows is that the inmates of a slum and those of a blighted house have very different socio–economic and psychological attributes.

Slums develop on vacant land in and around large cities, along waterfronts, railway tracks, highways and sometimes even in graveyards. They are inhabited by poor people from rural areas who migrate to towns in search of employment. The houses they live in are mostly unauthorised structures with poor ventilation and with low mud or no walls. The roofs are thatched, or made up with scraps of discarded packaging materials or tarpaulin. They are overcrowded and possess no infrastructural facilities such as water, light, drainage and approach roads. The residents themselves are mostly illiterate and belong to the lower strata of society.

In contrast, a 'blighted area', is a built-up area comprising privately-owned, authorised structures with a settled population that has become downwardly mobile owing to the play of historical forces. Once, this blighted area had adequate infrastructural facilities. But the overload on them due to increased population density makes them dysfunctional. The increased population is accommodated by sub-dividing the houses which are often very old, and this leads to increased housing density.

In addition, the inmates of a blighted area have socio–economic and psychological attributes that are very different from those that characterise slum inhabitants. The typical inhabitant of a blighted house is a downwardly mobile, respectable but economically stagnant person whereas the selective effect of migration makes the slum dweller more dynamic. The people who live in blighted houses and the slums do not differ much in terms of median income, but they certainly differ in terms of education, type of occupation and, indeed, educational and occupational aspirations and life-styles. One reason why income levels are sometimes higher among slum dwellers than among those of blighted houses is that the more 'educated' and status conscious inmates of blighted houses are choosy about the kind of jobs they find acceptable. The slum dwellers, on the other hand, are willing to take on any job to make a living. This phenomenon is aptly summed up by the head of a household living in a blighted house. When interviewed, he said that personally, he would not mind even pulling a rickshaw, but would not the consequent fall in status make it impossible for him to get his daughter married? And how would his son face his friends in school?

We classified the households in our sample survey into three categories, based on whether the house was 'all right', blighted, or had been identified as a slum house. We had the house numbers of all the slums in the inner city and could therefore classify those which appeared in our sample list accordingly. In order to differentiate between houses which are all right and those which are blighted, we instructed the investigators to label a house as blighted only if its condition was extremely dilapidated. Even a *kaccha*[1] house was to be labelled 'all right' if its structure did not appear to be in an extreme condition of dilapidation. Thus broken staircases, cracks on the walls, precarious roofing and so on, were to be identified as blight.

[1] See chapter 1, n. 7 for definition of *kaccha*.

The conceptual differences between slum and blight may be summarised thus:

	Slum Area	*Blight/Dilapidated Area*
1.	Originally a vacant area.	Originally built-up area.
2.	Often unauthorised structure/ squatter settlements.	Authorised structures.
3.	Infrastructure has to be created.	Infrastructure already exists, but suffers from overload.
4.	Structures are new.	Structural or physical dilapidation of existing structures.
5.	Structures before improvements are mainly *kaccha*.	Structures are *pucca*.[2]
6.	High congestion.	High congestion.
7.	Poor socio-economic condition due to low level of occupation.	Poor socio-economic condition due to downward mobility.
8.	Mainly migrant population.	Old settled population.

Our survey sample identified 99 slum households and 136 households who live in houses which are blighted. Just as the slum households are found in areas identified by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad as slums, the blighted households are located in areas where a group of blighted houses are clustered together. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the differences between slum and blight as revealed by our survey.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SLUMS AND BLIGHTED AREAS:

An important distinguishing feature of blighted and slum areas is the poor quality of housing in these areas. Most of the slum structures are *kaccha*, being relatively new (having come up in the past 30 to 40 years) and often unauthorised. Table 6.1 shows that 53 per cent of the slum houses are *kaccha*. However, 18 per cent are *pucca*, most of these having been built after the slum dwellers were given *patta* rights (land title) by the government under the 'Sites and Services' scheme. Through this scheme, slum dwellers are allotted plots of land acquired by the government and encouraged to build their own

[2] See chapter 1, n. 7 for definition of *pucca*.

houses. Financial assistance is provided by banks. Civic amenities like roads, drainage, water supply and electricity are also provided.[3]

Table 6.1
Types of House

Type of urban poor	*Kaccha*		*Pucca*		*Kaccha-pucca*		*Total*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Slum	52	52.53	18	18.18	29	29.29	99	100.00
Blight	62	45.59	7	5.15	67	49.26	136	100.00

Among the blighted houses, 46 per cent are *kaccha*. Not only are they built with poor housing material, they are also in an advanced state of disrepair. This is because the structures are old and belong to families who are unable to carry out repairs and improvements.

What we have defined as *kaccha-pucca*[4] constitute 49 per cent of the blighted houses. As has been pointed out earlier, these were once *pucca* structures which had tiled roofs and lime walls, as did all the *pucca* houses built under the Nizam's administration. Today, due to lack of maintenance, these dilapidated structures represent very poor housing. Many of the families living in such houses have repaired parts of the house, albeit with *kaccha* material. These houses were thus classified as *kaccha-pucca*. The 7 per cent of the blighted houses which are completely *pucca* are now in an advanced state of dilapidation, with no repairs having been carried out in any part of the house. Thus, while slums have a larger proportion of *kaccha* houses, housing conditions there are better than in blighted areas.

One determining factor in assessing the quality of housing or its condition is the sufficiency or insufficiency of such amenities as living space, water supply, latrines and electricity. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show the usage of living space in slum and blight houses. The horizontal columns depict the number of households per house, while the vertical columns depict the number of rooms available to each household in a house.

As shown in Table 6.2, 56 per cent of the slum households live in one room only. Among these, 36 per cent do not share their house

[3] Rajagopalachari, T., *Glimpses of Hyderabad U.C.D.*, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, 1983. See also, Naidu, Ratna, 'A Report on Slums in Hyderabad-Secunderabad', in *Indian Journal of Social Work*, XXXIX, 3 October 1978, pp. 297-312 and Naidu, Ratna and Deb, Kushal.

[4] See chapter 5 for definition of *kaccha-pucca*.

Table 6.2
Sharing of Living Space by Slum Households

Number of households in a house	*Number of rooms*							
	1		*2–5*		*6–9*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1	33	45.83	36	50.00	3	4.17	72	100.00
		35.86		53.73		75.00		44.17
2–5	22	45.83	26	54.17	0	0.00	48	100.00
		23.91		38.83		0.00		29.44
6–9	26	83.87	4	12.90	1	3.23	31	100.00
		28.26		5.97		25.00		19.01
10–13	11	91.67	1	8.55	0	0.00	12	100.00
		11.95		1.49		0.00		7.36
14 & above	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
Total	92	56.44	67	41.10	4	2.45	163	100.00
		100.00		100.00		100.00		100.00

Table 6.3
Sharing of Living Space by Households in Blighted Areas

Number of households in a house	*Number of rooms*							
	1		*2–5*		*6–9*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
1	11	12.79	62	72.09	13	15.12	86	100.00
		9.90		46.26		92.85		33.20
2–5	61	50.00	61	50.00	0	0.00	122	100.00
		54.95		45.52		0.00		47.10
6–9	24	68.57	11	31.43	0	0.00	35	100.00
		21.62		8.20		0.00		13.51
10–13	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00
14 & above	15	93.75	0	0.00	1	6.25	16	100.00
		13.51		0.00		7.14		6.17
Total	111	42.86	134	51.74	14	5.40	259	100.00
		100.00		100.00		100.00		100.00

with other households and live in one-room tenements; 24 per cent share their house with a maximum of four other households, while 28 per cent live in houses which are occupied by six to nine households. In fact 12 per cent were found sharing their house with as

many as 10 to 13 households. These are the *chawls* (multi-storied, slum-like tenements) or *badas*(such as Bansilal Bada) which were once palaces belonging to the nobility, but have now been declared slums.

However, 41 per cent of the slum households have two to five rooms to themselves, and most of them (54 per cent) do not share their house with others. On the whole, 44 per cent of the slum households do not share their house with other households, partly because a large number of these houses (46 per cent) are one-room tenements.

In blighted areas, a greater number of households share their house with others. While 33 per cent have a house to themselves, 67 per cent share it with two or more households. This indicates a greater proportion of tenants in blighted houses than in slums. Among the blighted households, 43 per cent have just one room to themselves, but unlike in slums, very few of them (10 per cent) live in independent one-room houses. Fifty-five per cent share their house with a maximum of five other households, and 14 per cent live with more than 14 other households.

Frequent subdivision and segmentation makes the problem of congestion more pronounced in blighted households. For instance, although a large number of slum households also live in only one room, many of these are independent, one-room houses which have their own separate access and sometimes even a bathroom and a latrine (in most cases, slum households have to use the public tap and latrines provided by the Municipal Corporation). On the other hand, blighted households which occupy just one room almost always share the house with two or more households. As a result,

Table 6.4
Latrine in the House

Type of urban poor	*Nature of facility*							
	No Latrine		*Khuddi*		*Latrine connected to sewerage/septic tank*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	45	45.45	11	11.11	43	43.43	99	100.00
Blight	6	4.41	29	21.32	101	74.26	136	100.00

Note: Of the 99 slum households many do not have latrines in the house because of the lack of infrastructure such as sewerage and drainage connections and have to resort to public latrines.

Table 6.5
Average Number of Persons Sharing a Latrine

Type of urban poor	*Persons per latrine*									
	5		*6–10*		*11–15*		*16+*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	13	25.00	22	42.30	7	3.46	10	19.20	52	100.00
Blight	26	20.00	57	43.80	18	13.80	29	22.30	130	100.00

access to one household invariably passes through the premises of the others. Thus the pressure on housing amenities, which were originally meant for only one household and are already in poor condition (as will be shown), is aggravated even further. Of the 99 slum households many do not have latrines in the house because of the lack of infrastructure such as sewerage and drainage connections and have to resort to public latrines.

Table 6.5 shows that the pressure of population on the latrine facility is higher in blighted houses than in those slum houses which have latrines. Although all the slums covered by our sample were listed for improvement under the Urban Community Development Project, several slum dwellers complained of unhygienic sanitary conditions. Forty-four per cent of our respondents from the slums complained that the public latrines in their locality are unfit for use, there being no water supply. Some even complained that there are no public latrines in their vicinity.

If one considers the physical characteristics of slum and blight households, one can see that while both have poor housing conditions, the problem of physical disrepair is greater in the blight households.

SOCIO–ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES

According to our survey, the community composition of slum and blighted areas is as follows: slums have 44 per cent Muslims, 5 per cent Hindus and 51 per cent scheduled castes and tribes. Blighted areas, on the other hand, have 70 per cent Muslims, 25 per cent Hindus and 4 per cent scheduled castes and tribes.

As mentioned earlier, our hypothesis is that the slum dwellers and the inhabitants of a blighted area have very different socio–economic and psychological attributes. Typically, a downwardly

mobile, respectable and economically less adventurous population live in blighted houses, whereas the slum dweller will take on any job to make a living. This distinction can be perceived in the income levels, types of occupation and the educational qualifications of the two sets of people. They also differ in terms of their educational and occupational aspirations and in their lifestyles.

Income and Unemployment

A comparison of the income levels of blighted and slum households should take into consideration their respective sizes. We find that both household size and the level of household income are slightly higher in blighted houses as compared to slum houses. Household size is seven in blighted houses, as against six in the slums. The median household income is Rs. 811 per month in the former category; it is Rs. 689 in the latter. The median per capita income is approximately the same for both categories, being Rs. 368 per month in blighted houses and Rs. 322 in the slums. However, it might be pointed out here that the higher median income level of the blighted households is due to the greater inflow of Gulf earnings. If one were to ignore this additional source of income, and the fact that blight-affected households very often have extra earnings from rent, the average household income would then appear to be slightly higher among slum dwellers.

The view that slum dwellers are socio–economically more dynamic is supported by the high proportion of working population among them. Of the total adult population in the slums covered by our survey, 53 per cent are working, whereas the figure is 45 per cent for the blight-affected households. (The proportion of working population for the inner city as a whole is 43 per cent.) Moreover, while 25 per cent of the female adult population in slums are employed and earn an income, this is true of only 9 per cent of the female adult population of blighted households. Unemployment is therefore the lowest among slum dwellers. While the rate of unemployment for the inner city as a whole is 18.9 per cent, among the blighted households it is 21.5 per cent, while among the slum households it is only 11.9 per cent.

The lack of socio–economic dynamism among households in blighted areas as compared with households in the slums is peculiarly coupled with the higher occupational and educational status, and indeed, the higher occupational aspirations of the former.

Occupations[5]

Eighty-three per cent of our respondents from slums are engaged in the informal sector. They pursue occupations like daily wage manual labour *(hamali);* unskilled self-employment such as vending, hawking and rickshaw pulling; skilled self-employment, which involves traditional craft work such as weaving and chappal making; and mechanical repair work. Some also work on a daily wage basis as cleaners and tea boys in hotels and as hired auto-rickshaw drivers, while others have set up petty businesses. In Table 6.6, these occupations are listed under categories IV and V, together with other occupations in the formal sector that are of a similar status.

Only 7 per cent of the slum dwellers work as non-gazetted clerks and officials while 2 per cent are professionals, that is, doctors or teachers. Significantly, none of them are found in category I, a high status occupational category.

Among the working population in blighted households, 62 per cent are engaged in the informal sector. However, the nature of their occupations varies from those of the slum dwellers. As is evident from the table, a smaller proportion of the workers from blight households are found in category V as against the proportion of slum dwellers in this category. The occupations pursued in the informal sector by workers from blight households are by and large those that belong to category IV, such as industry-related skilled and semi-skilled work like car and truck repair, cycle and rickshaw repair, cloth printing, and so on. These operations are often carried out in small workshops attached to the house. Some also work as hired auto-rickshaw and private car drivers. For many outside the informal sector in this category, the only source of income is the pension from the Nizam Trust for the employees of the erstwhile Nizam's administration. Among those who fall under category V, many are engaged as itinerant salesmen, preferring this type of work to wage labour.

A large number of workers from blighted households (18 per cent) are engaged in clerical occupations, with some of them employed in similar white-collar jobs in the Gulf. Twelve of the 234 workers from blighted households, work in the Gulf (as against only one among the slum households), earning an average income of Rs. 2000

[5] See pp. 70–73, for the rationale for the classification of occupations in this study.

Table 6.6
Categories of Occupation

Type of urban poor	*Category I* *Big business/ managerial in industry/gazetted officials*		*Category II* *Professionals (privately practicing & govt. employed) medium business*		*Category III* *Non-gazetted officials & clerks/ agriculturalists/ retired govt. officials/Gulf employed*		*Category IV* *Artisans and other unorganized skilled workers/industrial workers/petty business/daily wage workers in service sector/Nizam government pensioners/ religious functionaries*		*Category V* *Itinerant salesmen/ unskilled self-employed/contract and daily wage labourers/class IV employees*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	0	0.00	3	1.55	13	6.74	112	58.03	65	33.63	193	100.00
Blight	6	2.27	17	6.44	47	17.60	122	46.21	72	27.27	264	100.00

Table 6.7
Education Levels of Adults

Type of urban poor	*Levels of Education*										*Total*	
	Post-graduate/ professional		*Intermediate/ diploma in technical training/ graduate*		*Secondary level (std. VI-X)*		*Religious instruction/ literate/primary level (only upto std. V)*		*Illiterate*			
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	2	0.27	47	12.84	51	13.98	88	24.04	178	48.63	366	100.00
Blight	59	9.95	75	12.65	197	33.22	105	17.71	157	26.47	593	100.00

or more. As many as 6 per cent are qualified professionals and 2 per cent belong to the managerial/gazetted official category.

The higher occupational status of the blighted households can be attributed to their higher level of education, which makes them fastidious about the type of employment they are willing to take. Often, however, high educational qualifications such as graduation and post-graduation do not guarantee immediate employment; in fact, they often become an impediment for the degree-holder who is unwilling to take up jobs that are not commensurate with his/her qualifications. This is one reason why unemployment is higher among blighted households.

Education

The higher educational status of blighted households is reflected in Table 6.7. Forty-nine per cent of the adult population in the slums are illiterate as against 26 per cent in blighted households. Secondly, 10 per cent of the adult population in blighted households have studied upto the post-graduate level or are professionals, while only 0.27 per cent among the slum households are similarly qualified.

Table 6.8
Education of Children

Type of urban poor	*Levels of education*							
	Being trained in skill		*Currently at primary level/ religious learning*		*Currently at secondary level*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	91	38.72	104	44.26	40	17.20	235	100.00
Blight	14	2.90	320	66.25	149	30.84	483	100.00

Differences are also to be found in the educational standards of school-going children in slum and blighted areas (Table 6.8). Among the slum households there is a high preference for acquiring skilled training rather than formal education. As many as 31 per cent of the school-going children are learning skills which will enable them to earn a living. While many do go to primary school, they tend to drop out at the secondary level. In contrast, barely 3 per cent of the school-going children from blighted households are being trained in skills which would increase their chances of employment. There

appears to be a preference for formal education here, with as many as 31 per cent of the school-going children studying at the secondary level as against 17 per cent from the slum households.

Table 6.9
Occupational Aspirations

Type of urban poor	*Kinds of jobs applied for*													
	Clerical government job		*Any non-clerical job*		*Technical job*		*Professional job*		*Service sector (in hotel, transport*		*Any job*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	0	0.00	4	23.53	1	5.88	0	0.00	1	5.88	11	64.71	17	100.00
Blight	5	15.15	6	18.18	5	15.15	4	12.12	0	0.00	12	29.29	33	100.00

Table 6.10
Association of Ancestors with Nizam's Administration

Type of urban poor	*Status*											
	Nizam's descendants		*Nobility*		*Jagirdars/ senior officials*		*Middle/ level officials*		*Soldiers/ minions*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	1	5.56	0	0.00	1	5.56	5	27.27	11	61.11	18	100.00
Blight	2	4.35	0	0.00	4	8.70	25	54.35	15	32.60	46	100.00

Note: Total sample consisted of 99 slums and 136 blight households.

The educational levels among the slum and blighted households also appear to determine their occupational aspirations. Table 6.9 shows that members of blighted households are more particular about the types of occupation they would like to pursue. While 65 per cent of the slum dwellers are ready to take up any job, only 39 per cent of the respondents from blighted households are willing to do so. Secondly, while 15 per cent (probably graduates and post-graduates) of the population from blighted households desire clerical posts in government offices, no one among the slum households is interested in such posts.

Apart from occupational aspirations, there are other social and cultural factors that distinguish slum households from the households in blighted areas. Table 6.10 shows that many of the blight households have been associated with the Nizam's administration.

From our sample of 136 blight households, 46 households or 34 per cent have had past associations with the Nizam's administration. Among the 99 slum households, only 18 per cent had such a connection.

Life-styles

Our household survey also covered the existence of modern facilities such as televisions and telephones in households. Looking at the slum versus blight distribution of such facilities (Tables 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13), we find that 6 per cent of the blight households own a telephone, 54 per cent subscribe to newspapers and 35 per cent own a television. On the other hand, no slum household owns a telephone, 38 per cent buy newspapers and only 11 per cent own a television, although 27 per cent report that they watch television on payment of a nominal fee to persons who own a television. Moreover, while 70 per cent of the respondents from blighted areas read newspapers, only 34 per cent of the respondents from slums do so.

Thus, while the income levels of both types of households are more or less the same, their life-styles differ, with the blighted households keeping up the appearance of a life-style of a bygone era.

Table 6.11
Access to Telephone

Type of urban poor	*Access*							
	Respondent owns		*Friends/ neighbour/ relatives*		*On payment (in shop, hotel, office)*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	0	0.00	8	14.55	47	85.45	55	100.00
Blight	6	6.12	29	29.59	63	64.29	98	100.00

Table 6.12
Access to Television

Type of urban poor	*Access*							
	Respondent owns		*Friends/ neighbour/ relatives*		*On nominal payment*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	7	11.11	39	61.90	17	26.98	63	100.00
Blight	27	35.53	48	63.16	1	1.32	76	100.00

Table 6.13
Access to Newspapers

Type of urban poor	*Access*							
	Respondent owns		*Friends/ neighbour/ relatives*		*Libraries/ shops/book shops/hotels*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Slum	13	38.24	8	23.52	13	38.24	34	100.00
Blight	52	54.17	37	38.54	7	7.29	96	100.00

CONCLUSION

The conceptual distinction between slum and dilapidation, or the distinction between dilapidation and the official recognition of a dilapidated area as a slum, is especially important in the context of urban decay in the older parts of Indian cities. These are often the erstwhile walled areas in large cities, where different communities are now in conflict, although they once lived peaceably under feudal patronage for hundreds of years. The grievances of these communities, because of the urban civic problems that they face, are exploited by communal parties who stage frequent communal riots. Residents of these areas, who have seen better and brighter days, are demoralized in the face of economic stagnation. Urban renewal programmes should certainly extend beyond new unauthorised squatter settlements to the old class of the poor living in aging buildings. Urban renewal programmes appropriate for this class of the poor—including interest-free loans to carry out renovations, training for jobs and upgrading of skills—may stem the tide of communal discontent in the old cities. Since the socio–economic status of the 'respectable' poor and the new slum-dwelling poor are not very different, a more differentiated urban renewal policy needs to be formulated to take cognizance of different types of urban poverty.

SEVEN

Institutionalisation of Communal Politics

One of the major purposes of this study is to delve into the reasons for frequent riots in the old city. Each time a riot occurs, there is loss of property and lives, which adds to the legacy of embittered communal relations. In 1978, communal riots paralysed the old city for 50 days. The two worst years in recent times seem to have been 1983 and 1984. During each of those years, riots erupted in the walled city and spread to the entire city three times. During 1983, there were riots in February, May and September. During 1984, there were riots in May, July and September. The walled city was curfew-bound for almost a month during both these years. In 1985 there was a week-long breakdown of law and order in the old city following the withholding of election results of the Chandrayangutta constituency. Indeed, most of the recent riots in Hyderabad seem to have been election-related.

Issues of electoral politics seem inextricably entwined with communal aspirations in complex civilisations where the level of relative deprivations is high. What should be the language of administration, where should new economic activities be located, which groups should be selected for affirmative action policies—these are all issues which affect communities identified by language or religion. In so far as the decisions regarding these issues are political, the political process itself becomes communalised.

EARLY PHASE OF COMMUNALISATION IN HYDERABAD'S POLITICS

In Hyderabad, the communalisation of politics took place in two phases. The first was the aggressive consolidation of Congress hegemony immediately after the integration of Hyderabad state into the Indian Union. During this phase, the minority (mainly Muslim) communities were wooed—thereby communalising politics—in order to cut into the vote banks of the hitherto well-established Left parties. In the second phase, there emerged a 'Hindu' party, the Jan Sangh, as a counter to the Muslim communal party, the Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimin (referred to as MIM or Majlis hereafter). The emergence of the Jan Sangh was facilitated by the delimitation of constituency boundaries which inadvertantly created Hindu vote banks in Muslim areas. The second phase also saw the rise of factional in-fighting within the Congress.

The political parties, particularly the MIM and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had a major hand in fomenting antipathy between the communities. There are a number of publications on the rise of the MIM and BJP and we need not detail these here.[1] It is sufficient to point out that, with the transformation of the Nizam's subjects into Indian citizen and the growing consciousness of their rights, there was a questioning of the dominance of Islamic culture and norms by the Hindu majorities. The Arya Samaj played a leading role in awakening this consciousness among the Hindus. The MIM which, when it was founded in 1927, was merely a federation of Muslim religious heads, soon became a defensive organisation to counter the militant demands of Hindus led by the Arya Samaj. The riot of 1937,[2] which was precipitated by the Hindus and left a trail of destruction of Muslim property and lives, awakened an equally formidable militancy

[1] See Khan, Rasheeduddin, 'Muslim Leadership and Electoral Politics in Hyderabad: A Pattern of Minority Articulation, I and II' in *Economic and Political Weekly* VI, 16–17, 10 and 17 April 1971, pp. 783–94 and 833–40; Khundmiri, Alam, 'Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimin' in Bernstorf, Dagmar (ed.), *Wahlkampf in Indien* , Dusseldorf, 1971; and Wright, Theodore. P., 'Ittehad' in *Muslim World* , L III, 3 July 1963, pp. 234–43.

[2] The 1937 riot was the outcome of a Majlis–Arya Samaj confrontation. It was sparked off in an Old City area, Dhoolpet, reputed to be an Arya Samaj stronghold. The Majlis had announced earlier that it would be taking a religious procession through the area and the residents (mostly of the militant *Lodha* or warrior caste) took it as a prior announcement of attack. The procession was thus attacked by the residents and vandalism spread to other parts of the city.

in the Majlis. As is well known, the Razakars,[3] who took on the might of the law-enforcing agency of the Indian Union (the now-famous 'Police Action') were organised by the Majlis.

With the transfer of power, the Majlis as an organisation remained subdued for some years and the Muslims voted for the Left parties. However, the Majlis was soon instigated into reasserting itself by the various political forces which vied for Muslim votes. The Congress, for instance, was interested in acquiring the Muslim votes that were being given to the Left parties. Searching for ways and means by which it could become popular with the Muslims in the late 1950s, the Congress leaders inevitably seized the easier option of allowing Kasim Razvi, the hero of the Razakar movement and leader of the Majlis, the freedom to deliver speeches in Hyderabad before his departure for Pakistan. Thus the Majlis was resuscitated in the new regime.

In later years, the Majlis also gained from the factional in-fighting within the Congress. For instance, the spacious headquarters of the early Majlis, once confiscated by the Congress, was given back to them by a government led by the same party in return for their support in restraining the Telangana separatist movement that was spearheaded by a faction of the Congress in the 1960s. Thus factional in-fighting within the Congress invariably led to one or the other of its factions into rendering covert support to the Majlis. This is not unusual. The wooing of blatantly communal groups seems to be an operational hazard of many secular organisations and parties in India.

Gaining strength from the Congress' vulnerable position *vis-a-vis* the Muslim community, the Majlis was successful in capturing 19 out of 64 seats in the first municipal election it fought.

It should be underlined here that the Majlis' attempts to consolidate the Muslim communal base also laid the foundation for the arousal of the Hindu communal psyche. It is significant that the Jan Sangh made its entry into Hyderabad politics by fielding a candidate in the walled city. This was tactically the best option for the Jan Sangh, since the potential for mobilising a Hindu communal party is better in a situation which already contains Muslim communal aggression. The increasing assertiveness of the Majlis set off an aggressive

[3] The Razakars (literally, the volunteers) were a militant voluntary group organised by Kasim Razvi to support the Hyderabad Army of the Nizam during the uncertain months after Indian Independence when decisions regarding the integration of Hyderabad state to the Indian Union were still pending. They spread considerable terror among the non-Muslim population in Hyderabad.

communal attitude among the traders around Charminar. The first battle between the Jan Sangh and the Majlis thus centred around the newly-created Charminar assembly seat during the 1967 general elections. It was in this election that the electorate was, for the first time, polarised into communal vote banks. This communalisation was made possible by a series of delimitations of constituency boundaries in the old city, which took place in 1956, 1966 and 1976.

IMPACT OF DELIMITATION ON THE COMMUNALISATION OF THE ELECTORATES

In multi-ethnic constituencies, every exercise in delimitation tends to change the pattern of ethnic vote banks and therefore the election climate of the constituencies. Thus constituencies in which seats are 'safe' because one ethnic community is in the majority will have a less abrasive election climate. But if the previously safe seats become 'not so safe' due to delimitation and the gain in numbers of one community *vis-a-vis* another, then the resulting insecurity regarding voter preference will burden the pre-election dialogue with the bitterness of communal idiom. The 1966 delimitation of constituency boundaries seems to have had the special impact of polarising electoral communities into communal camps.[4]

Although, as in earlier years the 1966 delimitation order continued to retain Muslim majority constituencies in the old city, the boundary changes simultaneously gave a more significant role to the Hindus in the electoral politics of the old city. The success of the Jan Sangh (which later became the BJP) in the old city must be seen from this perspective. The fact that the Hindu electorate had more of a voice did not, of course, deter the further consolidation of the Majlis' support base. It may also be recalled that in 1967, the Majlis voted under the shadow of deteriorating communal relations all over India.[5] Predictably, the success of the Majlis increased the

[4] For details of data on delimitation of constituency boundaries and the impact of these changes on the electoral climate in the old city, see, Kamalakar, Jaya, M.Phil. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Hyderabad, 1981; see also, Naidu, Ratna and Kamalakar, Jaya, 'Communal Conflict in the Old City of Hyderabad' in *Social Action* , vol. 38, Oct-Dec., 1988.

[5] Communal incidents were again on the increase in the 1960s, reaching a peak in 1969 in the riots in Ahmedabad. Some of these riots were the repercussions of the serious communal riots in Bangladesh (at that time East Pakistan). For further information see my book *Communal Edge to Plural Societies* , New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1980, pp. 17–19.

attraction of BJP messages to the Hindus. In 1967, as also in 1972, in every constituency that the Majlis won, Jan Sangh scored over the Congress, taking second place. Further, the delimitation order of 1976 led to the formation of two new constituencies in the old city—Karwan and Chandrayangutta—with the inflammatory demographic composition of near-equal proportions of Hindus and Muslims.

In their attempts to consolidate voter support, the Majlis, the Muslim party, and the Hindu BJP inevitably plumbed the depths of community pathology in the two constituencies where the Majlis has been winning elections by narrow margins. The frequency of election-related communal riots in 1983, 1984 and 1985 has to be understood in this context. The uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes in situations of near-equal ethnic vote banks is a situation fraught with dangers of communal ill-will.

ATTITUDES RELATED TO POPULATION CHANGES

It will be recalled that our analysis of the walled city as the centrifuge of communal forces in the post-Police Action era was related to quantum changes in population proportions (Chapter 2). The Police Action and the abolition of the jagirdari system propelled a massive outmigration of Muslims, particularly upper class Muslims. The Hindu community, on the other hand, grew in size both because their business activity was not affected by the Police Action and because the flight of the Muslims led to attractive land and property values. However, with the passage of time and the deteriorating condition of the minority community in the districts and elsewhere in the city, the walled city became the symbol of both security and cherished values for the Muslims. Thus the proportion of Muslims as against the Hindus in the walled city increased again. A significant consequence of the peculiarly communal electoral battle in the walled city constituencies has been the efforts made by Majlis leaders to attract migrants from neighbouring rural areas as well as districts like Bidar, Mahaboobnagar, Nizambad and Tandur, in order to strengthen their support base. These migrant settlements have been named after their leaders, such as Owaisinagar (in ward 8) after S.S. Owaisi and Ammannagar I and Ammannagar II (in ward 17) after Amanullah Khan. There is also some evidence that, for reasons of security, the Muslims from heterogeneous

slums elsewhere in the city are moving into predominantly Muslim areas.[6]

Through our survey questionnaire we attempted to probe the attitude of the respondents towards the population changes just outlined. The pervasive fear and insecurity of the communities *vis-a-vis* one another is especially evident when a mohalla identified with a particular community is invaded by members of other communities. The following kinds of responses were recorded by our investigators:

> Only Muslims are occupying the open land and constructing houses. Land should be equally distributed to all communities. A concentration of one community is always dangerous. We don't like to walk through that area and use it as a thoroughfare. Nobody is prepared to visit us—Sultan Shahi is so notorious, no auto-scooter is prepared to come here.

On the other hand a Muslim respondent says:

> There is a lot of tension between the communities. Each one is suspicious of the other. We will like to live here, fight out our battle with the Hindus. Life is in danger everywhere. If we move out, the others (Muslims) will have to move out. Hindus will then capture the entire area.

In response to a question about the reasons for not wanting to move out of the mohalla, 2 per cent of the respondents stated that they wished to stem the tide of outmigration among their community members. As can be seen from Table 7.1, in response to a question regarding the changed relationships between communities, 14 per cent of the respondents stated that relations had turned hostile due to the in-migration of the other communities into the mohalla.

The strong prejudices regarding the encroachment of a mohalla by members of other communities flow from perceptions of rituals and imagery associated with not merely ethnicity but also ethnic enmity. We therefore examined the locations of temples and mosques

[6] See, Deb, Kushal and Kamalakar, Jaya, 'A Comparative Note on the Walled City and New City Slums', University of Hyderabad, (mimeo).

which, in this context, would seem to be the most potent manifestation of ethnic presence.

Table 7.1
Changes in Relationships Between Communities

Nature of relationship	*Number of households*	*Per cent*
Good relationship/no changes	672	70.30
No other community lives here	152	15.90
Relationships turned hostile due to in-migration of other communities	131	13.71
Total	955	100.00

SURVEY OF TEMPLES AND MOSQUES

In 1917 there were 222 places of worship—164 mosques and 58 temples—in the walled city.[7] Our team's on-the-ground-survey (in 1981) showed 388 places of worship, 222 of them being mosques and the remaining 166 temples.

Most of the new mosques seem to have been built in ward 20 which comprises Panch Mohalla, Hussaini Alam, Kazipura and old Kabutar Khana. These are predominantly Muslim areas. In 1951, the Muslims constituted 70 per cent of the total population in ward 20. The figure came down to 55 per cent in 1961 and increased to 73 per cent in 1981. In 1961, the Muslim population in ward 20 was 23,858 and the figure increased to 55,109 in 1981. Thus between 1961 and 1981, the Muslim population in ward 20 doubled. It is not surprising, therefore, that the rise in the number of mosques is more evident here than in any other area of the walled area. There were 45 mosques according to the 1917 count. According to our survey (1984), there are 75 mosques.

The overall increase of the Hindu population in this area during the last 20 years is negligible. However, in Pardiwada (block 1, ward 20), the Hindu population has doubled from 3,163 to 6,964 and temples have increased from two in 1917 to 15.

The areas inside the Pathergatti commercial complex such as Mitti Ka Sher, Ricabgunj and Ghansi Bazar, as well as further west near

[7] Counted from the Municipal Survey Map, 1917.

Puranapul in ward 21, show a decline in the number of mosques from 36 in 1917 to 34 in 1984. On further enquiry we discovered the ruins of the two mosques in the midst of a predominantly Marwari area. It may be mentioned here that this is one area which has witnessed a decrease in Muslim population and in which the Marwaris have been buying up property for many years. Consequently, it has seen a significant increase in the number of temples: in 1984, we counted 33 temples. In Shakker Kota and its neighbouring areas there are now six temples as against none at the beginning of the century. In Salar Jung Deodi, Purani Haveli and Darushifa (ward 22) there have always been a large number of mosques. There were 39 in 1917; we ourselves counted 59 mosques in the area. However, temples in this area have also increased. There were only four temples in 1917, now there are 18. Although in ward 22, the Muslims are in a majority, there are some Hindu enclaves, such as Komatwadi, as well as areas along the edge of the wall, like Noor Khan Bazar, which have a mixed Hindu–Muslim population.

Ward 23, which consists of Moghulpura, Hari Bowli, Sultan Shahi, Lal Darwaza and Gowlipura, shows a marked increase in the number of its places of worship. There has also been a massive drive to renovate old mosques and temples in this area. Tables 2 and 3 present data on recent renovations and constructions of new mosques and temples as reported by our respondents. The respondents of ward 23 report a significant increase in renovation activities.

Table 4 compares the 1917 survey of temples and mosques with our own survey (1984). As can be seen, it is again ward 23 (especially the Lal Darwaza and Gowlipura area) which shows a sharp increase in temples from 21 in 1917 to 71 today. There were 44 mosques in

Table 7.2
Recent Renovations
(as reported by respondents)

Ward Nos.	*Temple*	*Mosque/ ashoor-khana*	*Both temple & mosque renovated*	*Temple renovated with mulgies*	*Mosque renovated with mulgies*	*Total*
20	8	14	3	1	0	26
21	9	4	2	0	0	15
22	19	21	12	0	0	52
23	39	28	11	3	6	87
Respondents	75	67	28	4	6	180

Table 7.3
Recent Constructions
(as reported by respondents)

Ward Nos.	*Temple*	*Mosque/ ashoorkhana*	*Both temple & mosque constructed*	*Temple and mosque constructed with mulgies*	*Total*
20	13	1	0	2	16
21	13	2	0	0	15
22	16	6	1	0	23
23	15	7	1	5	28
Respondents	57	16	2	7	82

Table 7.4
Mosques and Temples (1917 & 1984)

	1917		*1984*	
Ward Nos.	*Number of mosques*	*Number of temples*	*Number of mosques*	*Number of temples*
20	45	29	75	44
21	36	14	34	33
22	39	4	59	18
23	44	21	54	71
Respondents	164	68	222	166

the area in 1917; now there are 54. It would therefore be useful to have a closer look at the reason for this heightened presence of mosques and temples in ward 23.

Spatial Juxtaposition of Aggressive Religiosity

The entire area of ward 23 is part of the newly-created Chandrayangutta constituency on which we commented earlier in this Chapter. Communal antipathy is at its most intense in this area of the walled city. The most important reason for this is perhaps the delimitation orders that we have already discussed. Ill-will between the communities is fed by the peculiarly communal electoral campaigns which seem to have become a regular feature of the constituency. In fact, the most important spokesmen for the Hindu and Muslim communities (who are also members of the State Legislative Assembly) are natives of this area.

Moreover, one can find in this ward the spatial juxtaposition of the two conflicting cultures in their most ideal or typical form. The Moghulpura and Sultan Shahi areas are inhabited by Muslims, a considerable number of whom are employed in the Gulf countries. Their enhanced incomes as well as further exposure to the deeper nuances of Islamic culture is visible in the renovated mosques and Islamic cultural institutions.

Apart from enhanced prosperity and heightened cultural activity, the need for enlarging the vote bank of the community has given rise to attempts at creating pull factors to attract migrants. This is the explanation given by the local people for the emergence of 16 to 17 hutment colonies, which are occupied by Muslim migrants from the districts. No doubt, all these developments contribute to the feelings of insecurity among the Hindus of the neighbouring localities.

The Muslim locality of Moghulpura and the adjacent Sultan Shahi touches the settlements of Hari Bowli which extends to Gowlipura and Lal Darwaza, the stronghold of Hindu communalism. For our analytical purposes, the Hindu community in this area may be divided into two, namely, the upper caste Hindus, most of whom reside in Hari Bowli and Shalibanda, and the backward class of upwardly mobile castes, who live mainly in Gowlipura and Lal Darwaza.

The Hari Bowli and Chandulal Bela areas (once comprising Kishen Pershad's palace and its surroundings) are largely inhabited by descendants of upper caste (Kayasths and Maharashtrian Brahmins) mansabdars and jagirdars. It was these families who first welcomed the message of the Arya Samajists at the turn of the century.

It may be mentioned here that the Arya Samaj message is not merely one about the reformation and rejuvenation of the Vedic basis of Hinduism, but by its attempts to strengthen the inner resilience of Hinduism, it is also, by implication, anti-Islam, especially in the context of Muslim political dominance. The local leadership of the Arya Samaj movement, as we have said, came from among the Maharashtrians. One of the only two Arya Samaj temples in the inner city is situated in this area. It is interesting that the demonstration effect of Tilak's public celebration of the Ganesh festival was echoed by the Arya Samajists in Hyderabad for the first time in 1885.

Another interesting feature about this area is the increasing aggressiveness of its backward class/caste groups. The Yadavs, (traditionally milk vendors), Kapus (agricultural caste), Padmashalis (weavers), Gangaputras (fishermen) and Mudirajs (agriculturists) are concentrated

in Gowlipura, Lal Darwaza and Mehtarwadi. These upwardly mobile caste groups are now increasingly engaged in business or trade in grain and gold, or in processing pearls and lending money. What is of interest to us are the revivalistic and ritualistic activities of these castes, and their public displays in, for example, a procession. In view of the equally aggressive, visible religiosity of the Muslims, these displays usually end up verging on confrontation. One ritual involves the worship of Kali's incarnations such as Mahankali (to whom the largest temple in the inner city, situated along the wall in Lal Darwaza, is devoted), Mysamma, Pochamma and Rudramma, in an annual festival called 'Bonalu'. As has already been pointed out, there has been an enormous increase in the renovation of old and the building of new temples dedicated to these goddesses. The Bonalu procession, which was once a simple ritual limited to local areas, has now become a major source of worry to the law and order authorities. Previously, it was the prerogative of women to go around the local temple area in a procession. Today, it is a mammoth affair involving both men and women, and goes far beyond the original conception of the Bonalu procession.

We have discussed the localities of ward 23 in detail to provide an example of settlements which are communally activated. One can find such spatial juxtapositions of aggressive religiosity in many areas of the old city. However, in ward 23, the additional dimension created by the need of a communal idiom for political survival (a result of delimitation) nurtured communal disaffection which has now spread throughout the metropolis. In a sense, the processions, winding their way through several areas of the metropolis, carry this message of disaffection.

PROCESSION ROUTES

Every year, three major processions are organised in the walled city—the Bonalu, the Ganesh and the Muharram. The Bonalu festival is celebrated in the month of July, making it the first procession of the year. The Ganesh festival, which is usually celebrated in September for a period of ten days, often coincides with Muharram. All three processions are traditional. While the Ganesh procession can be traced back to the turn of the century, the one for Muharram originated in the Qutub Shahi period (1591 to 1687). The Bonalu procession is a ritual of the indigenous population and therefore much older in origin.

Celebrated by lower caste Hindus, Goddess Kali in her various local incarnations is worshipped in temples during the Bonalu festival. Traditionally, the deity is carried from the temple in a procession led by a male person called the *pothraju*, who is believed to be possessed by the goddess. The rest of the processionists are mainly women, who carry decorated pots filled with cooked rice as offerings. It is believed that when the *pothraju* carrying the deity passes through a street, the houses that line it are protected from smallpox and other such scourges. The destination of the procession is usually a river, lake or well, where the deity and the pots are washed. The deity is then taken back to the temple.

The Ganesh festival is popular among all the Hindus in the walled city. In accordance with tradition, clay idols of Lord Ganesh are worshipped in homes for a period of ten days and, on the last day, they are immersed in a well or a pond in the vicinity. It is also customary to celebrate the festival at the mohalla level by collecting funds from all the mohalla residents and installing an idol either at the temple or the community hall.

Muharram is the period during which the Muslims mourn the martyr Imam Hussain, grandson of Prophet Mohammed . According to the custom established by the Qutub Shahi kings, Alams (military standards of the Hussaini army which were handed down to him by Prophet Mohammed) are carried in processions to the river Musi at the Chaderghat bridge for immersion. Several such processions are organised on the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth days of Muharram. Historically, *Bibi Ka Alam Julus*, the procession organised on the tenth day is the largest, comprising at least three to four lakh mourners.

While the Muharram procession seems to have retained its original character, the Ganesh and the Bonalu processions have undergone considerable changes over the past nine years. In 1978, a Ganesh procession was organised on a massive scale under official patronage, and was presided over by the Chief Minister who, at that time, was a leader of the Congress party. Before 1978, all Hindu processions were local and small in size. There were only three major Ganesh processions, and even these were local, with their termination points at a nearby pond, well or river. One of them started from Old Kabutar Khana and proceeded west to Puranapul for immersion. Another started from the Lal Darwaza–Gowlipura area in the south and moved further south towards Chandrayangutta, where the idol was

immersed in a well. The third major procession started from the Etebar Chowk area and proceeded north to immerse the idol in a large well situated in Salarjung Devdi (now City Civil Courts). Thus, all three major processions moved in opposite directions and, by and large, through Hindu-dominated localities.

In 1978 this pattern changed to some extent, and in 1980 it changed completely. In 1978, the Lal Darwaza procession route was altered to travel all the way north to Salar Jung Devdi *via* Charminar, where the Etebar Chowk procession usually ended up. This procession was unusually large and, as mentioned earlier, was received and addressed at Charminar by the Chief Minister. Many successive Chief Ministers continued this tradition of addressing the Ganesh procession at prominent places, although after 1983, when the new Telugu Desam Party came into power, this practice was stopped.

In 1980, a Ganesh Utsav Samiti was formed under the leadership of prominent Hindu religious and political leaders. It might be pointed out here that this Samiti was formed in the wake of the November 1979 riot sparked off by the Majlis' demonstration of strength, although ostensibly, this demonstration was organised to express sympathy and solidarity with the Islamic world on the forcible capture of the 'Kaaba' in Saudi Arabia. Also, the victorious emergence of the BJP (having won in the Chandrayangutta constituency which hitherto belonged to the Majlis) during the 1980 parliamentary elections provided additional support for the organisation of this Samiti.

During the 1980 Ganesh festival, the Samiti, whose other active participants were the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Hindu Raksha Samiti, the RSS activists and some of the local businessmen, took up the task of bringing together all the old city processions to form a single, monolithic procession. These processions converged at Charminar and other focal points on the road north and south of Charminar and then proceeded towards Hussain Sagar lake (renamed Vinayak Sagar for the occassion) in the new city, about eight kilometres away from Charminar.

On the basis of information provided by the Police Commissioner's office, we have traced all the important procession routes, showing their convergence points with the main procession on the Charminar road (see map on *Religious Places, Religious Processions, Conflict-prone Locations).*

Before we analyse the route pattern on the map, we might point

out some other aspects of the changed character of processions. First, there are now a larger number of mohalla level processions, with mohalla residents installing life-size or larger-than-life idols in temples and at street corners. These places become the hub of festive activities for ten days with pujas, bhajans, film music and religious speeches being blared out through loudspeakers every day. Many temples install temporary Ganesh platforms with loudspeakers, causing much discomfort to the neighbourhood which is often made up of members of other communities.

Over the years, loudspeakers have become a convenient instrument for antagonising the other communities. While the Hindus use loudspeakers on every religious festival the Muslims use them at prayer time (for *azan*) in mosques, and during Ramzan when a call has to be given every evening for breaking the holy fast. Following a series of objections and clashes over the use of loudspeakers, the Police Commissioner activated the legislation which makes it incumbent for loudspeaker users to acquire a licence from the police. In this way, the police hoped to prevent the installation of loudspeakers in sensitive spots (such as near the place of worship of other communities). Despite this, 300 unlicenced loudspeaker sets were confiscated by the police during the 1984 Ganesh festival.[8]

Second, the Ganesh processions have become large and noisy. The idol is usually carried in a truck which is followed by several other trucks filled with saffron capped youngsters. The list of procession routes provided by the Police Commissioner's office, which was prepared after the 1984 Ganesh procession, shows that a total of 151 individual processions converge to form the main procession on the Charminar road. The important individual (tributary) processions are shown in the map, together with the secondary processions (which combine two or three individual processions) and the main procession.

The largest Ganesh procession in the walled city starts from Lal Darwaza, which is the convergence point for processions from outside the walled area, that is, from Chandrayangutta and from other neighbouring areas. The procession becomes thicker as it moves northwards, being joined by two secondary processions from Aliabad and Gowlipura along the way. Likewise, a secondary procession proceeds from Doodh Bowli, becomes thicker at Hussaini Alam, where it is met by the Old Kabutar Khana procession, and

[8] Interview with the then Police Commissioner, Shri Vijay Rama Rao.

joins the main procession at Charminar. From the opposite side, a secondary procession formed at Etebar Chowk proceeds towards Charminar *via* Alijah Kotla. Further north, another secondary procession leading out of Ghansi Bazar and Petla Burj areas converge with the main procession at the Madina cross-roads.

Thus, while previously, the individual processions did not combine to form larger processions and the major ones moved in opposite directions, today they all converge at Charminar. Further, as can be seen on the map, whereas the earlier processions were confined to what were known as Hindu areas, the procession routes today run through several Muslim areas. Not only do the secondary processions pass through Muslim majority areas in order to meet up with the others at Charminar, the tributary processions—which were earlier confined to Hindu localities—also have to pass through or along Muslim mohallas to join the secondary processions.

For instance, the Old Kabutar Khana procession now meets the Doodh Bowli secondary procession (which combines processions from outside the wall) at Hussaini Alam and travels along this Muslim majority area to Charminar. As is evident from the map, there are several mosques along this route, both on the Hussaini Alam–Moosa Bowli side and on the Shakker Kota side. The largest mosque is the Chowk Masjid in Mahboob Chowk near Lad Bazar. Tensions are easily heightened along these routes, particularly when the processionists become boisterous and provocative and deliberately stop in front of mosques to beat their drums for what appears to be an unnecessarily long time. Mosques on the main procession route are an even greater source of tension. For instance, the mosque on the Pathergatti road is located right in the middle of the road, with traffic flowing all around it. Several clashes have been sparked off at this point. It is said that passing processionists once provoked a major riot by throwing slippers into this mosque.

The tributary processions travelling through Muslim majority areas, such as the Himmatpura procession which passes through Moti Galli, the Kavelu Ki Kaman procession which passes through Sultan Shahi and the Komatwadi procession which passes through Noorkhan Bazar, are also sources of tension. During fieldwork in Kavelu Ki Kaman, the neighbouring Muslims complained of provocative slogans being shouted at them by members of the Ganesh procession.

An exception is the Komatwadi procession route which, although

it passes through a Muslim majority area, is relatively tension-free. Its earlier route, which passed through the Balshetty Khet–Kali Kabar area, has been abandoned after some clashes took place near a mosque at Balshetty Khet.

The Bonalu processions have now adopted a route that is similar to that of the Ganesh processions. While previously, Bonalu processions were confined to certain localities and comprised mainly the women of the locality, today they travel across the inner city upto Nayapul (near Madina), where the *bonums* or pots are washed and kept at the Mata temple along the Musi river. In these processions, men now outnumber the women.

This new trend followed the precedent set by the Ganesh Utsav Samiti and the very first procession of its kind led to a major communal riot. In 1981, a huge Bonalu procession took off from the Golconda area, which has a sizeable Muslim population. The procession was disturbed midway and the dispersed crowd went berserk, stabbing 30 persons to death and injuring 90.[9]

As can be seen from the map, the main Bonalu procession starts from the Mahankali temple outside Lal Darwaza. It is met by the Gowlipura and Hari Bowli processions at Shah Ali Banda, from where it passes along Moghulpura to Charminar. Here it is met by the processions of Old Kabutar Khana and Doodh Bowli, which meet the Bandi Adda (Shakker Kota) procession at Shah Gunj and proceed towards Charminar. Coming from the east are the Etebar Chowk and Alijah Kotla processions. In 1984, according to the list supplied by the Police Commissioner's office, the main procession comprised 35 individual processions by the time it finally reached the river.

Again, the presence of mosques along Bonalu procession routes has been a major source of tension. On 23 July 1984, another major communal riot took place in the walled city. The spark was provided by the mosque situated on the Moghulpura main road, just beyond the Hari Bowli area which has a Hindu majority. In a sense, this mosque stands on the border between Hari Bowli and Moghulpura. As the procession passed in front of the mosque, a commotion broke out among the processionists who claimed that stones were being hurled upon them from the mosque. But the accompanying police insisted that they had not seen any stones and tried to restrain the processionists. However, some of them broke loose and ran into

[9] 'Clashes that Spring from a Sense of Insecurity', *The Hindu*, 27 July 1984.

lanes to locate the culprits, attacking a number of shops and houses in the process. Curfew had to be imposed for a week; it was only lifted on Friday to enable the Muslims to attend mosques during prayer time. Seizing this opportunity, the Muslims retaliated by stabbing and looting the area around the Macca Masjid.[10]

The Muharram procession, as mentioned earlier, has more or less retained its original character. It starts from Bibi Ka Alam (where the Alams are kept) in Dabirpura and moves towards Charminar from where it turns eastwards, towards the Chaderghat bridge. Here, the Alams are washed in the river Musi. It can be noticed that most of the localities through which the procession passes are Muslim majority areas. However, when the Ganesh festival coincides with Muharram, as it did in 1983 and 1985, tensions erupt because the Muharram procession passes the Ganesh idols installed in the mixed population areas like Etebar Chowk, Chowk Maidan Khan and Mir Chowk.

As an answer to the Ganesh and Bonalu processions, the Muslim communalists have come up with a new Pankha procession. Although it did not originate in the walled city, it is a consequence of the communal situation there. The Pankha procession was organised by the Majlis party shortly after the regeneration of the Ganesh festivities. The procession starts from a shrine in Nampally (in the old city, north of the river Musi) called Dargah Yousufain and goes around the neighbouring Moazamjahi market area before coming back to the Dargah. It is organised to propitiate the saint Yousufain by the symbolic gesture of fanning his grave, representation of which is carried in the procession. What is interesting about this procession, apart from the fact that it was virtually unknown earlier, is that it is taken out three days before the Ganesh procession. Inevitably, therefore, it passes the Ganesh idols installed at certain points along its route. In 1983, a minor skirmish took place at Moazamjahi market when a Ganesh idol was desecrated by passing processionists. At the crossroads in Moazamjahi market, the Majlis leaders receive the procession and deliver speeches with a political flavour, just as three days later the Hindu legislators address the Ganesh procession at the very same place, referred to as Vinayak Chowk for the occasion.

PROCESSIONISTS

Today, processionists seem to expect trouble as a matter of course,

[10] *The Hindu*, 29 July 1984.

and come prepared for it. Some of our investigators who are old city residents and participate in the Ganesh procession, say that they always carry a knife during a procession— a telling commentary on what the culture of religious processions has deteriorated into.

Vandalism during processions reached its peak in September 1984 when, for the first time, Ganesh processionists in the new city attacked selected Muslim shops and restaurants in the well-known and fashionable shopping centre in Abids. It is not surprising, then, that processions today evoke fear and uncertainty among the Hyderabadis. Our survey therefore included questions on the residents' attitude towards them. Predictably, 69 per cent of the sample respondents were quite emphatic in their belief that processions should be banned. There are interesting differences between the Muslim and the Hindu responses to this question, which can be seen in Table 7.5. Most of them also felt that processions are no longer what they used to be about a decade ago (Table 7.6).

When asked for their opinion on the efficiency of the police in providing security and maintaining law and order during processions and communal clashes, the responses were varied. Only 37 per cent expressed satisfaction with the police. While 15 per cent were indifferent, as many as 36 per cent were distinctly unhappy because of the harrassment they sufferred at the hands of the police (Table 7.7).

Given the violence and communal aggression characterising religious processions today, we tried to get a clearer picture of the processionists by analysing their socio–economic background and their responses to our questions.

Of our sample respondents 191 (19 per cent) claimed active participation in processions. Among the Muslims in our sample, only 6 per cent take part in processions: among the Hindus, the figure is 32 per cent while it is 49 per cent among the scheduled castes and tribes. Of these processionists, 14 per cent belong to the age group 16 to 20 years, while 53 per cent are between 21 and 40 years old. The rest are above 40 years of age. Interestingly, 41 per cent of the processionists are women, although most of them travel for just a short distance with the processions.

Most of the processionists in the walled city belong to the low income strata. Seventeen per cent of them earn only Rs. 200 or less per month, as against the two per cent in the entire sample. Another 45 per cent earn between Rs. 201 and Rs. 600, while 22 per cent earn between Rs. 601 and Rs. 1000. However, about 16 per cent of the

Table 7.5
Ban on Processions

Community	*Government must ban (emphatic)*		*Should not ban because processions are an aspect of religion/ culture.*		*Ban only other community's processions/ ban all except Muharram*		*Ban new processions, those which lead to disturbance*		*Indifferent*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	446	79.93	43	7.71	14	2.51	10	1.79	45	8.06	558	100.00
Hindu	172	52.93	93	28.62	3	0.92	1	0.30	56	17.23	325	100.00
SCs & STs	55	52.50	19	21.59	0	0.00	2	2.27	12	13.64	88	100.00
Total	673	69.31	155	15.96	17	1.75	13	1.34	113	11.64	971	100.00

processionists earn between Rs. 1001 and Rs. 4000; presumably, they belong to the business community.

We find that only 12 per cent of the processionists are employed in the organised sector of the economy. As many as 11 per cent are unemployed. Among the workers, 71 per cent are engaged in contract and daily wage labour, skilled and unskilled self-employment and petty business, all of which belong to the informal sector.

Table 7.6
Changes in Processions over the Years

Community	*Processions are being organised on a much larger scale than before (routes are extended, more people, organisation, accessories, etc.)*		*Decrease in religiosity and increase in political/goonda elements*		*Number of processionists have decreased in our community*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	165	33.27	125	25.20	206	41.53	496	100.00
Hindus	146	51.59	38	13.43	99	34.98	283	100.00
SCs & STs	24	32.00	22	29.33	29	38.67	75	100.00
Total	335	39.23	185	21.66	334	39.11	854	100.00

Thirty-three per cent of the processionists are illiterate as against the 23 per cent in the entire sample, and 43 per cent have had a school education only. However, 9 per cent of them are graduates.

The processionists are thus, mostly comprised of youth, predominantly male and generally from a poor socio–economic background. However, a fraction of them, probably those who provide the leadership, are from the higher socio–economic strata in the walled city.

We analysed separately the responses of the processionists regarding the imposition of a ban on processions. Paradoxically, 43 per cent of the active processionists are in favour of a ban. However, the rest believe that religious processions are a historical–cultural phenomenon and should not be banned. And as one respondent pointed out, some of them believe that the banning of religious processions implied a restriction of religious freedom.

Table 7.7
Opinion about Police

Community	*Satisfied with role of police*		*Not satisfied with role of Police (they harrass, arrest and damage houses)*		*Partial to their community*		*They are partial to rich*		*CRPF and army are better/ strength should be increased in State Police*		*Indifferent*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	175	29.66	241	40.85	58	9.83	12	2.03	10	1.69	94	15.93	590	100.00
Hindus	171	49.57	89	25.80	7	2.03	13	3.77	15	4.35	50	14.49	345	100.00
SCs & STs	35	37.23	43	45.74	1	1.06	2	2.13	0	0.00	13	13.82	94	100.00
Total	381	37.03	373	36.27	66	6.41	27	2.62	25	2.43	157	15.26	1029	100.00

Regarding the efficiency of the police, 45 per cent of the processionists said they are satisfied with it, while 43 per cent complain of harrassment and arrests without reason. The rest are either indifferent, or consider the police inefficient.

We questioned all the respondents regarding the nature of the relationship between the two communities. Seventy per cent claimed to enjoy a good relationship with the other community. However, 14 per cent are antagonistic towards the other community, stating that relations have turned hostile due to various factors such as invasion of the mohalla by the other community, elections and religious festivals.

PATTERN OF COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION IN THE MOHALLAS

Although not very extensive an area, the two-and-a-half square miles of the walled city has been populated by people from many cultures right from the beginning of the Asaf Jahi rule. The pattern of land use in the inner city typically comprises 'residential cells' or mohallas. Previously, the residents of each mohalla belonged to one particular community and the places of worship and instruction for the young were located within the mohalla boundary. Thus, while the inner city was characterised by a high cultural mix or heterogeneity, each mohalla was to a large extent homogeneous.

This pattern was somewhat disturbed after the Police Action. With the outmigration of Muslims from many areas and the fall in land and property values, the settlement pattern in the mohallas also became more heterogeneous.

Recently, however, this heterogeneity has been reversed due to the fear of communal violence. Responses to our question about the actual reasons for residential mobility show that around 5 per cent seem to have moved to other areas either to be near their own community or to find some measure of security and safety. We need consider this information together with the fact that 55 per cent of the residential changes have taken place within the city itself (Table 7.8).

Our survey data show that 38 per cent desire to move out of their mohalla and out of these, 78 per cent households wish to do so because they fear communal violence. From these responses we gain the impression that the mohallas are perhaps becoming more homogeneous.

The analysis of enumerator blocks (each comprising an average of 100 households along a street length) in the 1981 census shows that out of a total of 370 enumerator blocks, 25 (6.7 per cent) are entirely homogeneous, inhabited by Muslims only; while two enumerator blocks (0.5 per cent) are inhabited only by Hindus. In 142 enumerator blocks (37 per cent) the Muslims are in the majority, constituting 70 to 95 per cent of the population in each. Such a predominance of Hindus exists in 82 (24 per cent) enumerator blocks. The remaining 119 enumerator blocks (32 per cent) are mixed, with 31 to 69 per cent of one or the other community. The entire population of scheduled castes and tribes lives in these areas.

Table 7.8
Residential Mobility

Direction of change	*Frequency*	*Per cent*
Within locality	175	35.28
Within the inner city	273	55.04
From outside to inner city	40	8.06
From inner city to metropolis	6	1.21
From inner city to other states and back	2	0.44
Total	496	100.00

Note: Our survey data further indicates that 38 per cent expressed the desire to move out of their mohalla, and out of these 78 per cent households felt this need because of the fear of communal violence.

Most of the 100 per cent Muslim enumerator blocks are located in the Hussaini Alam, Shah Gunj, Panch Mohalla, Kazipura and Fateh Darwaza areas in ward 20. The two entirely Hindu enumerator blocks are in the Gowlipura and Lal Darwaza areas in ward 23, as are many of the Hindu-dominated enumerator blocks. These can also be found in the Ricab Gunj, Pathergathi, Ghansi Bazar and Shakkar Kota areas in ward 21. A large number of Muslim majority enumerator blocks are found in wards 20, 22 and 23, with ward 21 having only 10 such enumerator blocks. It is these areas, inhabited by a majority of one or the other community, that are prone to tension: minority fears lead to defensive acts which, in turn, lead to majority aggression. Fifty-nine per cent of the total enumerator blocks are of this type.

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT-PRONE AREAS

We collected a list of conflict-prone areas in the walled city from the office of the Police Commissioner of Hyderabad. They are depicted on the map titled "Religious Places, Religious Processions, Conflict-Prone Locations". We looked into the spatial distribution of communities, location of religious places, and procession routes, and the relationship between all these variables, to formulate a classification of conflict-prone locations.

First, we found that in a general situation of tension, aggression against one community by another is likely if the former is caught in an enclave surrounded and outnumbered by the latter. The aggressions occur for a variety of reasons. It may be a matter of territorial dispute as in Jalal Kooncha where the Harijans are harrassed by Muslims interested in buying their land. Or it may be a fall-out of incidents sparked off in other places. Enclaves are also vulnerable to attacks along processions' routes, as in Mitti Ka Sher where processionists from the main road have often infilterated into the by-lanes with aggressive intent.

The second type of conflict-prone locations are the boundary areas which separate mohallas inhabited by opposing communities. An example is the area between the Balshetty Khet–Komatwadi localities. Balshetty Khet is a predominantly Muslim locality which borders the Hindu Komatwadi. The symbols of Islamic culture, such as a mosque, along this border are often perceived as incitements to violence by the Hindu processionists from Komatwadi. Another example is Mir Munim Daira near Gowlipura. As has been pointed out, the Hindus in Gowlipura are politically aggressive and the Muslims living and/or passing along the border here are frequently victims of their hostility. A similar situation exists in the Moghulpura–Hari Bowli border area where, however, the aggressors are Muslims. Since Moghulpura symbolises Muslim strength, Muslims from Hussaini Alam and even from as far as Mehdipatnam in the new city gather here to consolidate their aggression which finds an immediate outlet in the Hindu inhabitants of Hari Bowli. Similarly, the border between the Muslim locality of Sultan Shahi and the Hindu Mehtarwadi is vulnerable to attack by Hindu infiltrates from Gowlipura. Thus border roads between mohallas which are inhabited by communities in conflict become, as in the case of nation-states, 'frontier areas'.

The third type of conflict-prone areas comprise neighbourhoods which are part of a procession route. When the procession of one community passes through a neighbourhood inhabited by communities with whom its relations are strained, conflict is inevitable. Without exception, clashes occur when processions pass a place of worship. In Sukhimir Kaman, a Muslim majority area, a Bonalu procession, which started a day before the main procession from Moosa Bowli and was headed towards Golla Khidki, was the cause of a major clash at the mosque there. Reportedly, people from the mosque objected to the loud music played by the processionists. The Shehran hotel locality in Pathergatti is another violence-prone area. There is a mosque in the middle of the road which is taken by the major Ganesh and Bonalu processions going to Nayapul. According to newspaper reports, slippers were thrown into this mosque which provoked retaliation by Muslim spectators from Shehran hotel.

Communal clashes also occur when one community invades the locality of another. For instance, the Marwari community, who are old residents of certain mohallas in the walled city have been buying property in other mohallas when and as prices became attractive due to outmigration. Etebar Chowk is one such area where tensions are high between the resident Muslims and the newly-settled Marwaris.

Lastly, the internal lanes through mohallas which are predominantly inhabited by one community, become hazardous for passers-by of the other community who use them as short cuts to their own mohallas. These lanes become even more hazardous during periods of curfew, when they have necessarily to be used for the purchase of necessities, the main roads being under more thorough police surveillance. Also, it is much easier for the aggressors to escape in these maze of lanes.

One such lane is Moti Galli, which passes through Himmatpura, a Muslim-dominated locality. Hindus from Doodh Bowli and its neighbouring Hindu localities often use this lane as a short cut to Lad Bazar and Charminar. When tensions are high in the walled city, passers-by are often attacked in this lane.

In the Kishen Pershad Devdi area, the inner lanes have often been the scene of stabbing incidents. During curfew periods, Muslims from the neighbouring Sultan Shahi area who have to pass through this lane for the purchase of milk and other necessities, are often attacked.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we had proposed to examine the causes for communal tension in the walled city. More specifically, we wished to verify whether urban decay and congestion has had a direct impact on the build-up of communal tension. We could find no evidence for a direct relation between urban decay and communal tensions. But, in an environment of economic deprivation and a ghetto-type urban landscape, riots spread easily. High density and narrow, connecting lanes and by-lanes enable people to both assemble and disappear at short notice, a situation that is very conducive to riots. Thus congestion certainly has an exacerbating impact on tension. However, the explanation for the *culture* of communal conflict which has become prevalent in the walled city seems to lie elsewhere.

The civic problems in the walled area should have been articulated by citizens coming together on common platforms to voice troublesome, common issues. Instead, in the inner city of Hyderabad, the communal leaders herd the communities so as to pit them against each other, creating, as it were, a zero sum situation where the sum consists more often of symbols and sentiments rather than the issues of economic stagnation and civic decay which should be of concern to all communities. Increasingly, the communities have begun putting pressure on each other rather than on the city administration to stall the processes of urban and civic decay. Indeed, the recent success of Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimin in capturing the majority of the seats in the Municipal Corporation indicates that, as in the past, in the immediate future, too, the local administration will remain paralysed by communal issues.

We have tried to understand the reasons for the rise of such phenomena as the Majlis. We have seen that the Majlis gained ground in the 1950s, splitting the Muslim vote which was being given during the post-Police Action period to the communist and socialist parties. The Hindu communal parties (BJP) in turn gained strength as a reaction to the Majlis. But perhaps what is more interesting is that, over the years, both the Majlis and the BJP gathered strength as a consequence of the delimitation of election constituency boundaries.

One would assume that an electorate comprising a mix of different communities is ideal for the emergence of secular parties. Constituencies consisting of a majority of one community and considered a 'safe' seat for the representatives of that community are almost

like the 'separate electorates' frowned upon by the architects of the Indian Constitution. However, on the other side there is the danger of secular parties getting increasingly marginalised in a mixed constituency wherein each community is aggressively nurtured by communal political leaders.

The delimitation of constituency boundaries (1956, 1966 and 1976) has been such that the concerned electorates in the old city are polarised into near-equal communal halves, thereby tempting parties to resort to communal propaganda at increasingly reckless levels in an attempt to capture seats and to ensure a larger voter turn-out. In so far as the vote banks are community-based, the consequence of these boundary delimitations has been to create situations of *certain uncertainty* regarding electoral results in the walled city. Such situations are ideal for the consolidation of communal forces and, indeed, the Majlis, which was an unknown quantity in the 1950s has leaped from peak to peak, having sent its leader from Hyderabad to Parliament, and having captured the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. It is possible that in reaction to the spectacular success of the Majlis, the Hindu communal forces may gather momentum in the coming years. And as one can imagine, this dominance of communal issues may further weaken effective local government.

EIGHT

Local Administration and Policy Dilemmas

In describing the institutionalisation of communal politics in the last chapter, we gave a great deal of explanatory weight to the cross-currents of the electoral processes and procedures which have structured communal politics in the inner city. In particular, we made serious note of the role played by the delimitation of constituency boundaries in consolidating communal forces in this area. However, it would be a mistake to stretch this argument so far as to imply that there is no relation between the urban and civic problems and the communal problem. It is significant that the parties in power, first the Congress and later the Telugu Desam, were never able to capture votes from the old city. The alienation of the old city electorate is a reflection of its long years of neglect by the concerned authorities. Apart from the issue of urban and civic decay, Muslim alienation is also caused by the feeling that their age-old historical monuments, their culture and their language are neglected and, indeed, are under assault by the unbridled invasion of Hindu cultural symbols. A telling illustration is the Lakshmi Temple which has grown out of a milestone under the very shadow of the Charminar. It is said that this was the zero milestone from which distance to all parts of the city was indicated. Under the Nizam's administration, the construction of a Lakshmi temple virtually within the precincts of the monument would have been unthinkable. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Muslims consider the temple an affront to their sentiments.

That there should be powerful forces at work to reverse the Islamic and Persian intrusions into the Telugu–Hindu heartland is also not surprising. One facet of this battle for cultural imperialism is the opportunity it gives the politician to seize these forces for power and personal gain. The deep communalisation of the inner city psyche is to some extent inherent in the structure of its psycho-social propellants, but it is also true that to a large extent this psyche has been carefully nurtured by political leaders who surfaced from the electoral process in the area.

The Muslim communal parties are given support because the Muslims feel alienated from the corridors of power and because they feel that the long years of urban and civic neglect of a cherished landscape can only be corrected by their own party. The success of a Muslim communal party, in its turn, set in motion Hindu reaction and the consolidation of Hindu communal forces. Unfortunately, this communalisation of political forces jeopardised the efficiency of local government. To understand this vicious cycle, we first present the structure of the local government.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Until 1869 the Kotwal-e-Balda—the city Police Commissioner—appointed by the Nizam, also served as the Chief City Magistrate and the city's Municipal Commissioner. In 1869, a department of Municipal and Road Maintenance was created in the miscellaneous ministry of the government. The Municipal Commissioner functioned under this department. The Municipal Corporation for the city was given a statutory basis only in 1933, with elected representatives coming much later. Thus the major road network, the arteries and skeletal framework of the city, the lakes and the important buildings which have determined the city's image in such a definite manner, the currently functioning sewerage and water capacity system, were all developed before the emergence of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH). In any case, the main function of the MCH has always been one of maintenance. Planning and development came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Town Planning.

With the acceleration in the growth of the city, the need for a separate development and planning organisation for the city was filled by the creation of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) in 1975. Further, the Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development

Authority (QQSUDA) was created by the state government in 1981 in response to the mounting pressure of public opinion which emanated in the wake of recurring communal riots in the old city during the last 10 years. The QQSUDA, named after the founder of the city of Hyderabad, represents an unusual initiative, and was created specifically to deal with the urban crisis in the old city.

The main problems of the local government seem to be in two areas. First, there has been the problem of stable local government. The popularly elected local government was dismissed in 1973 and for 12 long years, elections to the Municipal Corporation were not held.[1] They were held at last in 1985, when a new chapter in Andhra politics was initiated by N.T. Rama Rao under the banner of the Telugu Desam party.[2] The Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimin, the party of the Muslim community, won 32 seats out of 100 and, together with the Congress (I) which had won 24 seats, captured power at the Municipal level. BJP, the Hindu party, and the Telugu Desam in 1988, constituted the opposition in Municipal politics.Thus, while the parties in power at the Municipal level and the state administration level concern themselves with capturing spheres of political influence, city development and local administration authorities are obstructed, being lower in the power hierarchy.[3]

Second, fragmented authority and lack of coordination between the many agencies which oversee administration, maintenance, and development of the city area create severe problems. I have reported elsewhere[4] that it has not been easy for HUDA to establish its bonafides and its authority as the apex organisation *vis-a-vis* other urban government agencies such as the Directorate of Town Planning,

[1]. A journalist writes succinctly about the failures of local government: '(These) have left the city vulnerable to the depradations of an increasingly corrupt bureaucracy and an equally rapacious political elite, the evidence of this is there for all to see. The cinema theatres and large complexes in crowded areas like Mushirabad and Abid Road are ample testimony to how laws can be bent and twisted to suit the personal needs of various important people'. Guruswamy, Mohan, 'Communal strife in Hyderabad' in *Newstime*, Tuesday, 14 August 1984, page 7.

[2] For an account of the emergence of this party, see my paper in Mathew, George (ed.) *Shift in Indian Politics*, New Delhi, Concept Publishing Co., 1984.

[3] Kamalakar, Jaya, is working on this topic for her Ph.D. thesis titled 'Consolidation of Communal Parties in Municipal Corporations: Shiv Sena in Bombay' to be submitted to the University of Hyderabad.

[4] Naidu, Ratna, 'Organisational Structure of Hyderabad Urban Development: Problems and Possibilities' in *Nagarlok*, XI, 2, April–June 1979.

the MCH, the State Electricity Board and the Department of Water Works. It is worthwhile to quote at length from that paper:

> These organisations are linked to political authority through a single Secretary (the Secretary to Government, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department) who in turn is responsible to two ministers (the Minister for Housing and Youth Services and the Minister for Municipal Administration including Urban Development Authorities, Environment, Pollution, Sanitation).
>
> The urban Government organisations other than HUDA are old, established and have exercised authority in well-defined spheres for many years. HUDA is a newcomer to this network of agencies and has to compete with them and lobby to extend its sphere of authority and influence. Indeed, a single Secretary being responsible for several organisations and being responsible to two Ministers, each having his own sphere of authority and influence, should be inevitably pushed into balancing acts. For, in a situation where old, established, multifunctional organisations have not shed concerns which should be the concern of newly-instituted organisations, it will be natural for each organisation and Ministry to act as though it had its own client and objectives. But these organisations in fact have similar objectives and cater to the same public. For instance, not only do HUDA, the MCH and the Housing Board each have their own programme of slum rehabilitation, but they compete with each other to obtain finance for their programmes from local, central and even international agencies. The rationality-frame of the balancing acts of the Secretary in charge of urban government in such a situation cannot, therefore, be of the same order as the rationality frame which would recognise complexity and relatedness in policy. Policies should evolve so as to serve compatible rather than competitive objectives of different civic authorities. It is necessary, therefore, that the functions and objectives of the different civic authorities should be defined clearly so that these reinforce each other, and are amenable to a policy frame which is the result of coordination and integration[5].

However, the failure of the Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development Authority has to be attributed to a different set of factors. The

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4

fragmentation of authority and lack of coordination between the different government agencies do not apply directly to the Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development Authority situation. In fact, it is a misnomer to call it an Authority. The QQSUDA is only a registered society and has no statutory basis. Whereas HUDA was created through a legislative order, under the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975, QQSUDA was created under an executive order in 1981 and registered as a society under the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Public Societies Registration Act in 1985. The executive order came, as already mentioned, in the context of the urgent need to stem the tide of urban decay and communal riots in the old city. It was a political solution to a difficult situation arrived at with the consensus of all parties and welcomed by the public. The Chief Minister took up its chairmanship right from the time of its inception. The weight of this high office gives support to all planning and development activities of QQSUDA.

During 1981-85, the policy-making body of the QQSUDA was large and unwieldy. Chaired by the Chief Minister, it consisted of 35 members. The members were nominated from all government departments associated with the urban planning and development of the old city, men of public standing from politics, architecture and other professions, from the office of the Commissioner of Police and Public Health, as well as from Parliament and legislative assemblies. The few times (twice in 1981, once in 1982, and once in 1984) that this policy-making body met, there were unseemly wrangles and a division among members on a community basis. For instance, during one of the initial meetings of the QQSUDA, the question of increasing the Floor Space Index (FSI) for the old city was raised. The issue was introduced for consideration by Majlis political leaders. It is clear that if the FSI were increased in the old city, the commercial value of its land and property would escalate. The official reaction against it should have been based on a concern for the existing overload on infrastructure and its inevitable deterioration if FSI were to be increased, especially in the walled area.[6] However, the debate on FSI which ensued at the meeting was laced more by political passions

[6] Under the Hyderabad City Master Plan's zoning laws, the Floor Space Index is lower in the old city relative to the new city. In the inner city the FSI is as low as 1: 0.75. It is slightly higher in other parts of the old city. In parts of the new city, the FSI is as high as 1:2 whereby 200 per cent or twice the area of the plot may be covered in the upper storeys.

than by rational considerations. The BJP members of the Society vigorously opposed the Majlis proposal. In this instance, the possibility of Muslim gain did not necessarily imply a loss in Hindu prosperity. Debates such as these set the precedent of policy questions becoming acrimonious communal issues.

Even on the question of the organisational basis of the QQSUDA there was a division of opinion on a communal basis. The Majlis proposed that like HUDA, QQSUDA should also have legislative sanction. As expected, the BJP opposed this move.

The experiences and difficulties of the first few years of the QQSUDA may be summarised as follows:

1. Since the Majlis and the BJP have strong bases in the old city, they were necessarily nominated as members of the QQSUDA. These and other political representatives in the QQSUDA reduced all policy discussions into political debates, thereby inducing paralysis at the level of policy and execution.
2. There was too much of a gap in status between the Member-Secretary of the QQSUDA (drawn from the IAS cadre) and its Chairman, who as the Chief Minister of the state had many pre-occupations concerning the government and his party. With the several intervening levels of hierarchy, even access to the Chairman was difficult. This made extracting decisions from the governing body, a problem for the Member-Secretary.

In 1985 the QQSUDA was reconstituted as a two-tiered organisation comprising (*a*) the Society, with a large membership which meets only occasionally to formulate general policies on the problems of the old city; and (*b*) the Managing Committee, which is the executive authority of QQSUDA. Being compact and only 12 in number, the members of the Managing Committee can make appointments and control the budget of the QQSUDA. It can also acquire and dispose of property and adopt measures to execute all its schemes. The members consist of the Chairman (who is the Chief Minister of the State); the vice-Chairman (who is the Minister for Municipal Administration); and the Administrator, who is a full-time executive of the QQSUDA drawn from the IAS. Besides these three, the Managing Committee includes representatives from local government organisations: the Chairman of HUDA, the Municipal Commissioner, the Chief Engineer, Hyderabad Water Works and the Member-Secretary

of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. The Committee is also supposed to have two nominees from the central government, one from the Ministry of Works and Housing and another from the Town and Country Planning Organisation, as well as three members of the Legislative Assembly representing the old city.

Significantly, since its inception as a registered society in 1985, only a seven-member Managing Committee has been functioning. The seats of the two central government nominees and the three political representatives have not been filled. The Administrator is the chief executive officer of the Society and the convenor of the Managing Committee. In the absence of the Chairman and vice-Chairman, he presides over the meetings of the society.

The QQSUDA does not have a large body of personnel nor is its personnel highly qualified or experienced. The projects of the QQSUDA are therefore implemented/executed through the personnel of either the MCH or the HUDA. Thus, while funds are allocated to the QQSUDA directly through the state budgetary grants, they are spent through the old and well-established urban development organisations. This is obviously an interesting and innovative institutional arrangement designed for the protective allocation of funds for a special purpose. It was hoped that the allocation of substantial funds would allow for the speedy execution of projects to check urban decay and recurrent communal riots in the old city.

Until recently, a full-time IAS officer occupied the position of Administrator of the QQSUDA. However, since the Municipal elections in February 1986, when the Majlis captured the Corporation, the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation took up this job as well. When one recalls that the QQSUDA is entirely a creature of the state government and that the state is governed by the Telugu Desam while the Municipality is governed by the Majlis, the appointment of the same person to play the role of the QQSUDA Administrator as well as that of the MCH Commissioner lends itself to varying interpretations.

One would be that by not providing a full-time person at the highest executive level, the state government has undermined the work and importance of the QQSUDA. Another way of looking at it may be that the inner city problems are so complex and intractable that the QQSUDA has not been able to make much headway (as is evident from its inability to spend all the funds allotted to it by the state government). Hence the decision to consider the chief executive's

job as less than full-time. According to a more complex interpretation, the fusion of the roles of the QQSUDA Administrator and the MCH Commissioner in one person would avoid conflict between two officers whose political masters belong to two opposing parties, namely the Majlis in the Municipal Corporation and the TDP in the QQSUDA.

But, whatever one chooses to make of this innovation to the authority structure of the QQSUDA, the fact remains that, in any case, almost all the executive jobs of the QQSUDA are carried out by MCH personnel. Perhaps that is why it is felt that it would be just as well to have the same man function as the chief executive officer of both organisations. The danger, of course, is that the aims and objectives of the two organisations may become identical, thereby perhaps defeating the purpose for which QQSUDA was created. Clearly, QQSUDA has a specific role to play in both the *physical* conservation of the fabric of the walled city heritage, and the *social* conservation of its people. More than in any other area, walled city development and renewal plans have to be *people*- centred and have to be sensitive to culture, symbols and sentiments.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE WALLED CITY

Most of the development plans for the walled city were drafted by HUDA in the City Master Plan, 1975. The QQSUDA is trying to implement them through what they term as Area Development Plans, which supposedly take into account the specific needs of particular areas. However, we did not discern the kind of sensitivity to physical and social conservation that one might ideally expect of an urban renewal plan for an area of walled city vintage.

Our survey had a specific question on what the walled city residents consider to be the priorities for development in their areas. Table 8.1 gives ward-wise priorities for development. As can be seen from the Table, the respondents gave the highest priority to the need for developing physical infrastructure, although respondents from ward 23 were relatively less emphatic about it. This makes sense when one recalls that the more prosperous Moghulpura area is located in this ward. This is also the ward which is part of the riot-torn Chandrayangutta constituency. Predictably, therefore, residents of this ward gave higher priority to questions of security and police.

Table 8.1
Priorities for Development

Ward No.	*Physical Infrastructure*		*Social Infrastructure*		*Housing*		*Schemes for employment*		*Security (police should be disciplined and impartial)*		*Shifting of important govt. administrative offices to inner city*		*Renovation of historical monuments*		*Religious education*		*Eviction of prostit.utes from the area*		*Total*	
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
20	107	49.31	64	29.49	8	3.69	27	12.44	4	1.84	6	2.76	0	0.00	1	0.46	0	0.00	217	100.00
21	60	53.10	20	17.70	11	9.73	10	8.85	9	7.96	1	0.88	1	0.88	0	0.00	1	0.88	113	100.00
22	77	52.03	37	25.00	9	6.08	11	7.43	11	7.43	2	1.35	1	0.68	0	0.00	0	0.00	148	100.00
23	79	38.92	58	28.57	12	5.91	23	1.28	23	1.28	6	2.95	0	0.00	0	.0.00	2	0.99	203	100.00
Total	323	47.43	179	26.28	40	5.87	71	10.42	47	6.90	15	2.20	2	0.29	1	0.15	3	0.44	681	100.00

Wards 20 (197 persons per acre) and 21 (201 persons per acre) are considered to be high density areas. According to the 1981 census, 50 per cent of the houses in ward 20 and 40 per cent of the houses in ward 21 are *kaccha*. We also find that among the four wards, ward 20 has the highest proportion of *khuddi* latrines. Twelve per cent of the residents in this area report the *khuddi* system of latrines in their households. We may also mention here that the highly commercialised and congested Pathergatti–Ghansi Bazar area is located in this ward. In response to a question on the effect of the changes in land use on social environment, 63 per cent of the respondents in this ward mentioned low water pressure, choked drainage, narrow approach roads, poor ventilation and low voltage.

Our study data seems to confirm that of other surveys on the old city:[7] that according to most residents in the area, drainage facilities, road conditions, street lighting and water supply are highly inadequate. The major development schemes of the QQSUDA therefore, necessarily relate to physical infrastructure.

The sewerage scheme under construction is based on population projections for 2011, and the expectation of walled city depopulation (see Chapter 4) through the growth of satellite townships, as proposed in the radial of Bangalore and Vijayawada highway near Kantedan, about 15 kilometres from Charminar. But even if satellite townships were to emerge, it is not likely that they would serve the purpose of decongesting the inner city. The inability of the walled city residents to be mobile because of financial limitations and sentimental attachments, has to be taken into account. Expectations of depopulation in the walled city thus seem unrealistic.

A favoured policy statement by the government, earlier the Congress and now the TDP, has been on the proposed widening of roads in the old city, particularly the primary road running from Charminar, the core of the walled city, to Falaknuma palace, situated at its extreme southern periphery. In this context, it might be appropriate to take a brief look at the road development schemes of the QQSUDA. These involve both the construction of new stretches of roads and the widening of existing ones.

[7] See, Muttalib, M.A., 'Urban Renewal: A Case for the Old City of Hyderabad', Vols.1 and II (mimeo), Regional Center for Urban and Environmental Studies, Osmania University, 1985. See also, Mohammed, Afzal, 'Urban Development and Planning in Hyderabad: A case study of Old City' (mimeo), Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad.

The scheme for building new stretches of roads would involve the construction of the 'missing links' in the peripheral areas of the old city. This would mean three important stretches on the eastern, western and southern peripheries of the old city. A major road on the eastern side, from Amberpet to Falaknuma, would to a great extent take the pressure of traffic off the inner core, namely, the main Charminar–Falaknuma road.

There are also plans to widen major roads in the inner city, especially those radiating from Charminar. The three axial roads are the Charminar to Falaknuma road to the south, the Charminar to Puranapul (via Lad Bazar) road to the west and the Charminar to Kotla Alija road to the east. The road from Charminar to Gulzar Houz, which connects the walled city to the metropolis in the northern direction, is not being widened according to current plans. Aside from these axial roads, other major roads such as the Khilawat road and the Azakhana Zohra to Mir Jumla road, will also be widened. All these proposals for widening roads were included in the HUDA Master Plan.

However, the range of the QQSUDA proposals is much more extensive and very often at variance with the Master Plan.[8] For instance, the Charminar to Falaknuma road has an existing width of 40 feet. The Master Plan proposed to widen it to 60 feet upto Shah Ali Banda and to 100 feet thereafter; the QQSUDA has proposed that it should be widened to 100 feet all the way through. Similarly, the Master Plan proposal that the Charminar to Puranapul road be widened from 40 feet to 60 feet has been altered by the QQSUDA to cover 80 feet. On the Charminar to Falaknuma road is the famous Panch Mohalla Palace, and most of the shops housed in the palace wall along this road are occupied by tenants. The rehabilitation of the shops is proposed on a seven-acre plot in the Manjli Begum Haveli situated in the interior along the main road and in the Panch Mohalla Palace complex. There was no proposal to widen the 40-feet wide Charminar to Ali Jah Kotla road in the Master Plan, but the QQSUDA proposal is to widen it to 80 feet. There are a number of mosques along this road and the chances are that the Kotla Alijah gate will have to be demolished in case the road is widened. The

[8] 'Hyderabad Old City Urban Renewal Project: Feasibility Report for World Bank Aid', Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad, pp. 55–60, (mimeo).

Khilawat road which passes through a residential area and is as narrow as ten feet in some stretches is proposed to be widened throughout to 60 feet by the QQSUDA. The Master Plan had proposed a width of 40 feet, especially in the more narrow stretches.

On the road from Azakhana Zohra to Mir Jumla Tank there are a number of large mansions, including the Purani Haveli Palace. The facades along this old road will be affected when road-widening exercises take place. Kalikabar, a large, black grave, also lies along this road which passes through Mir Alam Mandi. There is a stretch through the Mandi which is very narrow and widening it will certainly affect several shopkeepers.

Another major road-widening programme, proposed on the Shah Ali Banda to Bahadurpura Road (part of the Master Plan proposal for a Loop Road), will lead to extensive dislocation. The 50 feet wide stretch of road which is to be widened to 100 feet, passes through the thickly-populated Himmatpura and Kazipura areas. There are a number of mosques on both sides of the road, and it is easy to foresee a great deal of social and emotional disturbances that will ensue once the dismantling process begins.

Similarly, the Master Plan proposal for a ring road around the Charminar area (to protect the monuments in that area by diverting the traffic) involves not merely the widening but also the construction of a new stretch of road through the Panch Mohalla area around the Macca Masjid. One can foresee two difficulties in this proposal. First, the new road to be built will pass through the Panch Mohalla Palace and will join Motigalli on the Khilawat road. This will involve cutting a road through the Panch Mohalla Palace area, which will presumably require the demolition of Hydari Darwaza. The old residents in the Palace complex will also have to be relocated. Second, the construction of the ring road would necessitate widening the road which passes through Ghansi Bazar and terminates at Kaman Sher-E-Batil. This area is one of the most congested in the inner city. It is characterised by narrow winding lanes and three-storey *pucca* houses. Demolition along this road is sure to present considerable difficulties.

The extent of demolition which will be involved in the road-widening exercises may be assessed from the fact that as many as 921[9] shops would be affected by the widening of the Charminar–

[9] This information has been given by the Quli Qutub Shah Urban Development Authority.

Falaknuma road. As already mentioned, these shopkeepers would be rehabilitated in shops that would line the widened road, as well as in the proposed seven-acre commercial complex at Manjli Begum Haveli, and the 10-acre district commercial centre in Chandrayangutta outside the walled city. The landscape of the walled areas will probably have to be completely restructured if all these proposals are implemented.

There are, in addition, enormous problems in acquiring land for implementing all these proposals. The compensation for acquiring surplus land under the Land Ceiling Act is negligible. It is only Rs. 30 to Rs. 60 per square yard depending on the area. Moreover, all the land which comes under the Land Ceiling Act has not been reported. The few pieces which have been reported are too fragmented to be useful for road-widening or other development purposes.

The QQSUDA, however, is trying to pursue the problem of land acquisition through the zonal regulations of the MCH. Under these regulations, the MCH can directly acquire land by paying around Rs. 160 per square yard as compensation and Rs. 39 as a solatium. Thus compensation under the MCH zonal regulations is slightly higher than it is under the Land Ceiling Act. The QQSUDA is also providing compensation by making alternative sites available to shopowners and relaxing some of the building regulations, such as the extent to which shops may abut the road. However, even these compensations are negligible when one considers that the market value of land in the core area of the walled city is Rs. 1000 per square yard.

Given the serious problems in the acquisition of land, one may well question the feasibility of extensive road-widening programmes. The structure of Islamic walled cities has been characterised as cellular, with the buildings in the mohallas being closely interconnected to form 'residential blocks'. The residences open inwards into courtyards but have little space around the outer facade of the buildings, especially along inner streets cutting through the mohallas.[10] Major re-development and road-widening programmes and even marginal inroads into the mohallas would therefore certainly transform the structure of the walled city. The houses are not separated by the standard widths of road or pedestrian paths from neighbouring activities as required by modern city regulations. They seem to have evolved from within one another, a weave which defies arbitrary intrusions

[10] See Chapter 3.

and piecemeal changes. Furthermore, highly ornate buildings, mosques and temples line most of the roads, and destroying or removing them is unthinkable considering not only their architectural value but also the communal sensitivity of the walled city.

Thus it appears that the proposed development plans for the walled city violate norms of conservation to a great extent. Granted that conservation should not be at the cost of convenience, efficiency and comfort, one still has to ask the question: who would be the beneficiaries of the development plans which, it is claimed, would usher in an era of efficiency and convenience for the walled city residents? It is not certain that they would be the people currently living in the area. We know from experience that development projects benefit only those people who have some entitlements to the market. But most of the people who would be affected by the development and demolitions are tenants. Table 8.2 shows that 54 per cent of the shop owners are in rented buildings. Tenants do not have any entitlement to compensation. The beneficiaries would thus be the owners who would probably make new arrangements with clients who do have entitlements to the market and who could come from anywhere in the metropolis or, indeed, from anywhere in the country.

As reported in Chapter 5, after the Police Action during the decade of 1951–61, there was a massive outmigration of Muslims from the walled city and invasion by prosperous migrants from as far away as Gujarat, Haryana and Rajasthan. Among the Hindu migrants in our sample, 30 per cent came from these areas. Our survey also shows that 15 per cent of the total migrants during that decade had come to extend their business. Development programmes in the inner city could usher in a similar spurt of commercial activity. Indeed, it may even involve considerable change in the nature of commercial activity in the area.

Lad Bazar, along which the bangle shops are located, is a charming area which draws tourist shoppers to the walled city. The demolition and rebuilding of shops here would certainly involve intrusion into tenant–owner relationships, as well as the destruction of the facade and cultural style of the bazar area.

At the same time, it is obvious that the walled city cannot be preserved as a museum piece, especially since it forms the core of the city's communal divide. One can never overemphasise the need for easier traffic between the walled city and the metropolis, not merely physical traffic but also the traffic of ideas and information.

Table 8.2
Type of Business Activity and Whether Shops Rented or Owned

Type of business activity	*Rights over property*									
	Rented		*Owned*		*Partly owned/ partly rented*		*unauthorised*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Household industry	26	50.98	24	47.05	1	1.96	0	0.00	51	100.00
Self-employed (other than household industry)	76	49.03	66	42.58	2	1.29	11	7.10	155	100.00
Business establishment	105	58.99	68	38.20	2	1.12	3	1.69	178	100.00
Total	207	53.90	158	41.14	5	1.30	14	3.64	384	100.00

Our survey data shows that 20 per cent of the respondents (more among the Muslims) reported that there are members in their households who never go out of the inner city. The structure of access to ideas and information may be assessed by Table 8.3 which lists the newspapers that are read by the residents of the walled city. The Table gives evidence of community-wise differentiation of the types of newspapers which are read. Lack of exposure to contradictory ideas and more differentiated information strengthen the mental walls which support the communalisation of the inner city psyche. It would seem that fundamental socio–economic changes are required to de-communalise the inner city environment. Further, the emergence of cosmopolites and an environment free from ethnic prejudices would probably strengthen the movement for conservation.

To summarise, the policy and planning dilemmas with regard to the walled city appear to be as follows: there are serious problems of land acquisition for widening roads and building new shopping complexes. This is evident from the fact that out of the Rs. 10 crores budgeted by the state government for 1985-86, the QQSUDA had been able to spend only Rs. 3 crores when we interviewed them in June 1986. Some of the difficulties may be due to its own organisational weakness. However, as we have seen, the QQSUDA is meant primarily for protective financing to ensure the development of the old city. The personnel of the MCH and the HUDA

Table 8.3
Newspaper Readership

Community	*Hindi Milap*		*Janasatta/ Hindustan*		*Siasat*		*Rahnuma/ Munsif*		*Eenadu*		*Udayam*		*Andhra Patrika*		*Any English Daily*		*Total*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Muslims	4	0.86	1	0.21	372	80.86	59	12.82	2	0.43	0	0.00	0	0.00	22	4.78	460	100.00
Hindus	45	19.23	7	2.99	14	5.98	0	0.00	102	43.58	4	1.70	2	0.85	60	25.64	234	100.00
SCs & STs	4	13.79	1	3.44	0	0.00	0	0.00	21	12.41	0	0.00	1	3.44	2	6.89	29	100.00
Total	53	7.33	9	1.24	386	53.38	59	8.16	125	17.28	4	0.55	3	0.41	84	11.61	723	100.00

Note: (*a*) Hindu Milap is a pro-Congress-I newspaper and turns communal only during riots. (*b*) Janasatta & Hindustan are neutral. Their major theme is anti-corruption (*c*) Siasat is pro-Congress-I and is known to give most authentic news during riots. (*d*) Rahnuma and Munsif are communal newspapers. Munsif is Majlis' voice and Rahnuma has recently turned pro-TDP. (*e*) Eenadu is pro-government (*f*) Udayam is pro-opposition to Congress-I (*g*) Andhra Patrika is neutral (*h*) Any English Daily—most of these are moderateiy neutral.

are entirely at its disposal especially since, as of now, the same individual serves as the Administrator of QQSUDA and as the MCH Commissioner.

Since it is neither finance nor lack of administrative will and/or technical expertise which inhibit the implementation of development projects, the reason for poor utilisation of funds would seem to lie in the problem of land acquisition. Even if there was no difficulty in acquisitioning land, there would still remain the question of whether the benefits of the development projects would filter down to the masses of the walled city residents given that their entitlements to market and property are limited. In other words, we are arguing that successful land acquisition, growth and development may violate the norms of both equity and conservation. A more complex level of planning is necessary for meeting the needs of conservation and the needs of a people who have been suffering from multiple deprivation. We believe that what is required is not just the development of social and physical infrastructures, but a *revitalisation* of the inner city, keeping intact its cultural heritage and at the same time nurturing its ability to be viable in juxtaposition with the metropolis. We have some suggestions in this regard, but before we outline them, it would be useful to take a quick look at the profile of the walled city as it emerges from our study.

The entire inner city gives the impression of dilapidation—made all the more sad by the occasional glimpse of opulence from another era. In earlier chapters, we have described the phenomenon of multiple deprivation experienced by the inner city residents, which is due to both historical and cultural factors. To reiterate the three most important historical factors—the first, was the signing of the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty with the British in 1798. The British Cantonment and the Residency was established north of the river Musi. The economic concessions granted to the British attracted merchants and bankers, and the booming commercial capitalism which flourished was given a further boost by the introduction of the railways in 1874. Soon mechanical workshops, railway repair shops, a mint, a cotton ginning and a spinning and weaving factory, and a tile factory came up in the northern half of the city. The axis of growth shifted in the northern direction and the walled city began to stagnate. The Nizams also began to look outwards to foreign technology and culture rather than inwards towards integrating the historic core of the city to the developmental impulses of

the larger city. The second historical moment was perhaps when the Nizams moved their residence to the northern bank of the Musi. With the Nizam, many of the nobles and the upper crust of the elite also moved out of the walled city.

The third important historical moment came with the Police Action of 1948, which dismantled the Nizam's administration and the jagirdari system. It thereby not only hastened the flight of the elite from the walled city, but also created an influx of low income group Muslim migrants from the districts into the walled area. Also, with the collapse of feudal system the walled city was left with no inherent dynamic to sustain itself. The city south of the river, especially the walled area, was thus reduced to a residential area for low and middle income groups. The palaces and mansions of the nobility and other officials have fallen into decay and blight has set in. The income level of the inhabitants of the inner city, together with their large family size, has resulted in the increasing subdivision of houses, lack of maintenance, sharing of amenities among members of large households, encroachment of open land and litigation over property.

Our survey shows low levels of income among the inner city residents. While the median per capita income is Rs. 541 per month, the median household income is Rs. 910 per month. Considering that the mean household size is eight and that Gulf earnings and incomes from rent are included in household income, it appears that most of the inner city households are living below or around the poverty level (which in 1986 was defined by the Planning Commission as Rs. 533 per month for a five-member family unit).

The occupational hierarchy that emerged from the survey has a broad base which comprises occupations in the informal sector. As many as 25 per cent of the working population are engaged in low-skilled or unskilled occupations such as rickshaw pulling and hawking. Another 35 per cent are engaged in occupations such as weaving, shoe making, food preparation, and hotel service (Chapter 5). The survey also reflected a high unemployment rate of 19 per cent.

Poverty is also visible in the condition of houses in the inner city. Our survey found that as many as 43 per cent of the sample houses are *kaccha*, 35 per cent *kaccha–pucca* and only 21 per cent completely *pucca* houses.

This description of the socio–economic conditions of inner city residents has to be read together with our analysis of slum households as compared to the households which are experiencing downward mobility and live in dilapidated buildings. We presented a comparative analysis of slum dwellers and the downwardly mobile, respectable, but economically stagnant population of blighted areas. We showed that while there is only a marginal difference in income between the slum dwellers and dwellers from blighted houses, there are considerable differences between them in terms of education, type of occupation, educational and occupational aspirations and life-styles. This is because dilapidation/blight and slum formation are outcomes of different forces. Dilapidation is related to socio–economic and cultural factors, while slum formation and the emergence of squatter settlements are connected with demographic factors in the region. Dilapidation, as we have seen, is the outcome of the disinheritance of the walled city from the privileges of the Asaf Jahi rule. The shift from the dominance of one cultural group to the dominance of another, the collapse of the feudal economy and culture and the change in the language of administration with the transfer of power has meant that the majority ethnic group (the Muslims) in the walled city found themselves downwardly mobile. The feudal structure was the economic mainstay of certain segments of the people in the walled city. With its collapse, the upper classes of these segments left the city while the remaining found themselves unemployed and poor. Sometimes their only source of capital is the property which they have inherited from their forefathers. Subdivided and rented, this property becomes a source of income. It is not surprising that according to our data almost 60 per cent of the households (or 615 out of 1,031 households) are owners or joint owners of their house and only 40 per cent are tenants. In fact, the source of the *additional* income that 51 per cent of the households (numbering 124 in our sample) have, is rent. However there is little money for renovation. Forty-five per cent of our respondents said that they cannot afford renovations.

It is important to underline the implication of the fact that while 60 per cent of the households live in their own houses, 54 per cent of the business premises are rented. This means that portions of houses, especially along the outer walls, are rented out as shops, once again demonstrating the 'cellular structure' of the built-up environment which is not conducive to piecemeal changes.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS

It is clear that QQSUDA cannot merely be a conduit for spending protected allocation of funds. It is also clear that the implementation of development projects will not necessarily benefit the inner city residents, but might well attract prosperous investors from outside if the projects involve massive intrusions into the nexus of social and economic relationships. The QQSUDA, as its name implies, should also have a major commitment to the cultural heritage of the walled city. We may recall that deprived of its economic opportunities with the dismantling of the feudal structure and deprived of its elite, who usually play an important role in the enhancement of civic amenities, the inner city as an area languished from multiple deprivation. We suggest, therefore, a multiple approach to this multiply deprived area. This multiple approach could have three major thrusts.

First, the walled city should be declared a 'protected area' and because of its unique problems should not be equated with other urban areas in the application of the usual packages of urban renewal programmes. Second, the approach should be one of revitalisation of the economic ability of inner city residents. It may be pointed out that 55 per cent of the population of workers have their place of work within the inner city or its neighbouring old city areas. Indeed, of this 55 per cent, the work-places of 11 per cent are located in their own residential premises. Half the occupations pursued by inner city residents belong to the informal sector (see Chapter 5).[11] It is obvious that the earning capacity of these people should be enhanced. Third, access between the metropolis and the inner city should be designed, keeping in mind the peculiar urban character of the walled area. Successful revitalisation will certainly require easier accessibility. But this might be better achieved through a careful planning of traffic and transportation than by merely widening roads. What follows is a more detailed discussion of these three approaches.

Suggestion That the Inner City Should be Declared a 'Protected Area'

The core of the inner city is a treasure house of historical and cultural heritage, the value of which has been undermined as the city acquired new cultural and architectural traditions. Indeed as the centre stage of activities shifted to the north, the walled city languished.

[11] See also Muttalib, *op. cit.*

The pervasive dilapidation of the inner city in Hyderabad can also be found in other old Indian cities. It is necessary, therefore, to design innovative approaches to the problem of reaching such areas with government-sponsored programmes. We might think that it is a mistake to adopt a simplistic approach to development. The approach that Delhi has taken in declaring the whole of Shahjahanabad in old Delhi a slum, so that the benefits of slum eradication programmes percolate down to its residents, also seems inappropriate. First, the term 'slum' has connotations which it would seem foolish to apply to the cultural treasure house of the inner city. Second, there are many well-to-do people in walled city areas. Inspite of its overall slum-like appearance, a term more appropriate than 'slum' is required to connote the special problems of the inner city. Third, as we have seen from our analysis of the socio–economic data based on the slum/blight distinction, there is a concentration of different types of urban poor in the inner city. It would thus be a mistake to implement standard urban renewal programmes usually meant for squatter settlements and unauthorised structures. New programmes, more appropriate for authorised buildings that have become dilapidated, need to be designed. Fourth, it is necessary to officially label the area in such a way that the merits of the special investments in it become apparent. Finally, the nomenclature of official notification for the upgrading of the walled city area is important because it is necessary to make some attempts to woo some of the prestige-conscious classes into the area. The improvement of an area is not possible without its association with moneyed income groups.

This is not to suggest drastic changes in the structure of property ownership. Indeed, even the scale (including the working class *kaccha* houses) of the built-up environment can remain as it is. At the same time, if the hundreds of upper class mansions and the many palace complexes were to be renovated so as to absorb modern conveniences, and if living in these places became a status symbol, then the entire culture and character of the area would change. The term 'gentrification' has been used to describe this process in the old cities in Europe. I can do no better than to quote from Donald Appleyard[12] to describe this process:

> (A) 'solution' to the difficulties of financing historic and physical conservation is to allow or encourage the private market to

[12] Appleyard, Donald (ed.), *The Conservation of European Cities*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1979.

rehabilitate the housing. It usually means a middle- or upper-middle-class invasion of lower-class neighbourhood. The British label this process by the deceptively quaint expression, "gentrification". It is a common phenomenon in European cities and is beginning to spread in the United States.

Gentrification has not yet been studied systematically. Most commonly it is a private process involving a chain of "gentrifiers". Those who spearhead invasions of lower-income districts are in fact more like 'pioneers' than gentry. They are often students, artists, and design professionals looking for cheap accommodation and interested in living in mixed neighbourhoods.... They are often single people or couples without children. In the Trastevere, the Jordean, the Chelsea and Islington, Telegraph Hill and Greenwich Village, the process has inexorably transformed the character of historic quarters.[13]

Once an area becomes associated with 'chic', the real estate speculators become active in buying, converting and selling to the moneyed classes, who may find it easier to buy the more spacious and gracious built-up environment gifted by our ancestors than to create a new environment on the same scale using a new generation of builders and craftsmen.

We suggest that the walled area be declared a 'protected area' with special protective measures to reverse the consequences of the multiple deprivations that the area has suffered over many decades. Some of the measures would involve careful control of types of trade and industry which are proposed to be introduced; control of population invasion into the area both for business and residential purposes, so as to allow for gentrification without hardship to the local people; and control over sale of buildings identified for conservation in the study undertaken by HUDA.[14] Incentives should be given for joint efforts/cooperatives formed by several households to renovate/restore a building complex or to upgrade an area. Banks should be encouraged to give loans especially for such cooperative ventures. Rates of compensation for takeover of land, buildings, and especially buildings which are sought to be recycled

13 Appleyard, *op.cit.*, pp.30–31

14 See, 'Conservation of Historical Buildings and Areas in Hyderabad City: A study sponsored by the Ford Foundation', Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad, December 1984.

for conservation purposes, should not be at par with rates of compensation in the rest of the city, but appropriate to the multiple and special problems of the walled city. Furthermore, as an area the walled city is politically sensitive and prone to communal riots. It is the core from which communal ill-will spreads to the entire metropolis. The idea of declaring it a 'protected area' for conservation and revitalisation schemes would surely find wide public acceptance.

However, the success of these measures requires a combination of political will, public cooperation, appropriate legislation and their firm implementation, and flexibility in the cooption of the interests of the moneyed classes for the purposes of conservation—a rare package of attitudes and approaches to urban revitalisation! We have much to learn in this regard from the European cities. I am especially reminded of Plaka, the ancient settlement around the Acropolis in Athens. For decades the Plaka was inhabited by people from low income groups. It is now being transformed into a mixed residential area and the ancient settlement is being restored to its authentic identity. The programme for the protection and conservation of Plaka began in January 1979. Today, it is a much-talked about success story[15] which is also lauded for its humanitarian approach. The narrow irregular streets and small squares are now elegantly covered by natural stone slabs. Freedom from motor vehicles has made these streets quiet, enjoyable and a memorable experience for the tourist.

Suggestions for Revitalization Schemes

In the case of the inner city of Hyderabad, area-based development plans should be matched with people-centred plans. We have presented comprehensive accounts of the inner city residents' low entitlements to the economy and have also pointed to the possibility that massive developments may endanger their entitlements to the area.[16] It may be preferable, in the context of the inner city problems, to speak of 'revitalisation' rather than 'development'. Two basic policies are involved in revitalisation. First, policies which will create employment for the people of the area and enhance their

[15] See, Zivas, Dionysis A., 'The Future of the Old Sector of the city of Athens: Plaka' in Appleyard (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 247–52.

[16] See p. 160.

ability to earn more income. Second, policies which will conserve the cultural heritage of the area by recycling the buildings and other assets by making them appropriate for modern usage. Accommodating the first policy with the second is not an easy task. Efforts at conservation can easily conflict with willy-nilly creation of employment opportunities.

We therefore suggest the creation of those types of employment which will create the least disturbance to the structure of the inner city, and at the same time produce goods which have a mass market. QQSUDA has suggested various types of cottage and craft industries such as bidri work, nirmal painting and papier mâché in their sites and services programmes.[17] However, these products have a very limited market which is more than sufficiently served by the existing production centres for these goods. We suggest instead, goods which have a mass market not only in India but also abroad. The model we have in mind is the Taiwan shirt which has a market all over the world. The inner city has large numbers of retail and wholesale shops for ready made garments which are manufactured in north India. These could be manufactured in the inner city as well. Backyard activities such as assembly of electronic and electrical goods, carpentry, printing and other such pollution-free, income-generating activities can be carried out without necessarily disturbing the structure of the *mohallas*. All such initiatives in creating sources of employment in the inner city could be given financial and other kinds of state support.

Design of Access

In keeping with our suggestions on revitalisation, conservation and the declaration of the inner city as a 'protected area', we propose that the principles governing access should stress on design and the organisation of traffic and parking rather than on widening roads.

Indeed, the narrow and irregular streets should be allowed to regain their original purpose. Maximum pedestrianisation and hidden parking areas within inner courtyards should be sought. One does not expect all parts of a city to have the same functions or play the same roles. We thus do not support the recommendation often made by experts that government offices should be shifted to the old city in order to vitalise it. We suggest that the inner city has

[17] QQSUDA report for World Bank, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

a unique role to play. Urban renewal/revitalisation programmes, economic activities and access should complement this role. Road-widening programmes are not only difficult to implement in old, established and built-up areas,[18] but can only be a palliative to traffic problems in an exploding city. Furthermore, widening roads is not really necessary in the walled city context, since its total area is only 2.5 square miles. But the core of this area should certainly be pedestrianised. The remaining area can be made more easily accessible by smaller vehicles like mini buses run on a shuttle service. The present, standard-size buses that run through the mohallas are a menace to people and monuments alike. We suggest that these buses should not allowed to enter the walled area at all. Commuters should transfer to mini buses or six-seater open autos at points of entry. Transfer points can be created near the Chaderghat Bridge, Puranapul Gate, and the Madina, Dabirpura and Yakutpura railway stations.

Instead of running through the inner city, the standard city buses could follow the routes circumscribing the inner core. They could enter through Nayapul (from Afzalgunj), travel via Madina and High Court and return to the new city via Puranapul, or travel around the wall into the old city via National Highway No. 7. Passengers could change over to the mini bus shuttle service at various junctions on this route, if they wish to travel into the inner city.

Standard city buses could also enter from Nayapul, travel along Salar Jung Museum and return via the Salarjung or Chaderghat bridges to the new city. On the eastern side they could enter from Chaderghat bridge and travel upto the inner city via the Amberpet to Falakanuma road that is proposed for construction. Passengers could alight at junctions such as the Dabirpura or Yakutpura railway stations and take the mini bus shuttle service into the inner city.

The case for the area around Charminar, which requires to be pedestrianised, has already been presented in several reports. The rationale for the pedestrianisation of the inner city core has been eloquently argued by S.P. Shorey in the HUDA study sponsored by Ford Foundation. He concludes from a sample survey of modes of transportation used by the residents of the Charminar area that 78 per cent of these people either walk, or use cycles or cycle-rickshaws. If cycles and cycle-rickshaws are allowed to continue,

[18] See pp. 39–42.

then the small percentage of people who use buses, scooters or cars, would need to walk a maximum of only 300 yards from the pedestrian entry point to their destination. He also suggests residents who own cars and scooters could be issued entry passes for their vehicles, as is the practice for pedestrianised areas in European cities. According to his estimate, the numbers of such resident vehicles are no more than 30 cars and 100 two-wheelers. Delivery vehicles for shop owners could be allowed entry after closing or during the early morning hours. It is worthwhile quoting bits of the HUDA study at length:

> A major opposition to pedestrianisation could be from shop owners who may fear a loss of business. Similar resistance was faced in most European cities in the beginning but the results were different after the schemes were put through.... The business of pedestrianised shopping centres in fact increased many times instead of decreasing. There is a bright but seasonal example in Hyderabad of pedestrian zones. Hyderabadees have long enjoyed the advantage of shopping in the traffic free enclosures of the Annual Industrial Exhibition. Once inside, families with children can move around without any danger of being knocked down by a speeding auto or a truck. The character of pedestrianised shopping streets, with seats and benches, flower-troughs, pools and fountains, display cases, telephone boxes and pavement cafes combine to create a human and agreeable atmosphere. There is also no pollution from exhaust fumes.[19]

If the core area around Charminar were to be pedestrianised as has been proposed in the HUDA study, it is certain that the social character of the walled city would change radically.

Hyderabad, as other cities like Lucknow, Ahmedabad and Delhi, is fortunate in having a historic core, a four centuries old core which should allow reflection on the past and a perspective on the future. It is a pity that not only has the value of this historic core been dimmed through negligence, but the core itself has been allowed to become a menace. Economic stagnation, urban decay and the constant threat of communal conflicts in the walled city has created a hydra-headed monster which is poised to strike at the metropolis as a whole.

[19] 'Conservation of Historical Buildings and Areas in Hyderabad City', *op. cit.*, p. 217.

The QQSUDA, which still has the freedom, autonomy and the funding to reverse the dangerous trends of the last two decades, must act quickly. Given that it can capture both a realistic and an idealistic vision of the walled city's restoration to a viable urban form, there should be no lack of support, financial and professional, from either the centre or from international agencies. The plans, we repeat, cannot merely be a town planning job. They must be people-centered economic and social plans which at the same time ensure the conservation of the built-up environment which is Hyderabad's heritage.

Glossary

Anderun	inner city
Azan	a call to muslims for prayer
Bada	single-storied, slum-like tenement
Berun	outer city
Bonalu	a religious festival of the Telugu community
Chawl	multi-storied slum-like tenement
Chowk	square
Darwaza	gate
Deydis	mansions
Gulli-danda	a local game played on the streets with two pieces of different sized sticks
Hamali	daily wage manual labour
Jagirdari	feudal landholding
Jami	main mosque
Kaccha	mud house
Kacchi-mori	dug-out, open drain
Kaman	large gate without doors
Khidki	posterns
Khuddi	manual removal of night soil
Mardana	parts of a house reserved for males
Mohalla	residential block
Patta	land title
Potharaju	person who is believed to be possessed by the Goddess Kali
Pucca	cement house
Shafa	right of pre-emption
Umma	community of the faithful
Zanankhana	inner quarters of a house reserved for females

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